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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to investigate the influence of earnings news on stock liquidity and the 
relationship between information asymmetry cost component and Post Earnings 
Announcement Drift in different equity markets. The scope of this research includes 426 
firms from three countries in capital trading, the United States of America, South Africa and 
France. The first part of empirical work, shows that price reaction and liquidity effect are 
profound during short term event window length and reduce over time when the news ceases, 
The second part, a multivariate regression analysis which uses Generalised Method of 
Movement to capture both the problems of a likely presence of endogeneity between the 
explanatory variables and cross-stock heterogeneity, shows that the impact of earnings 
announcement on stock liquidity can split in two directions. The immediate effect is the 
shock after the news, causing stock liquidity to decrease immediately by lifting the illiquidity 
function upward. After the event, from the new increased position of illiquidity function, 
stock liquidity improves over time due to the trading volume increases and shifts the slope of 
illiquidity function downward. The overall effects at a point of time will be the total impact 
of the two side effects. And as shown in the results, the overall impact on the US and SA 
markets are that stock liquidity decreases while that of Euronext Paris, the stock liquidity 
increases. There are two types of Accounting law systems of which the common law system 
is used in the US and SA equity markets and the code law system used in France, the 
difference between the two law systems is that the information asymmetry component 
dominates the bid-ask spread in common law countries as in the US and SA markets while 
the cost of trading dominates the bid-ask spreads in code law countries such as France equity 
market. Finally, it is shown that there are several determinants of the PEAD, of which stock 
liquidity is one. Earnings news changes the stock liquidity, and therefore stock liquidity plays 
a role in the market response. When earnings news is released, it initially creates a gap 
between the informed traders and the uninformed traders, increasing the bid ask spread. Over 
time, this information gap decreases, however in the meantime more information on the 
market increases trading volume and reduces trading cost, leading to another part of the bid 
ask spread decreasing or stock liquidity improving. After decomposing bid ask spread into 
information asymmetry cost and cost of trading components, the final part of empirical 
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analysis shows that information asymmetry cost component provides a partial explanation for 
PEAD in the Johannesburg stock exchange and Euronext Paris. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
Post earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is the tendency for a stock’s cumulative abnormal 
return to drift in the direction of an earnings surprise for the time following an earnings 
announcement. The persistence of PEAD involves numerous studies since it was first 
reported by Ball and Brown (1968). The main focus of available literature on earning 
announcement has been on the reaction of investors to new earnings information. In the 
market efficiency hypothesis, available information at time, t, should be reflected in stock 
price immediately. The investor’s expectation of tomorrow prices is today’s price plus a 
small risk premium, because they cannot predict the direction of the market. However, PEAD 
is an anomaly that is inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis. PEAD was reported 
from efficient market test, where it looks like after controlling for risk, it is still possible to 
earn abnormal return.  Stocks with high earnings surprises have high abnormal returns and 
continue to drift in the direction of positive earnings surprise, while stocks with negative 
surprise continue to decline, where by initially price reacts to information on a large scale, 
but this reaction is not complete after the news, but rather it continues to drift dependent on 
the direction of the news in the months after. And this is confirmed by Ball et al. (1993), 
Mendenhall (2002), Ng et al. (2008), Hou and Moskowitz (2005),Chordia et al.(2006),Sadka 
and Sadka (2004), Jacob et al. (2000), Kim and Kim (2003). 
What can an investor do to trade on PEAD? He can exploit this phenomenon by buying stock 
with highest positive earnings surprise and short stocks with lowest negative surprise to 
maximize the drift. This highlights the curiosity around the role of PEAD and why it can be 
important to investors as well as researchers.   
The prevalence of this observable fact has been confirmed for the last decades since the work 
of Ball and Brown (1968). This phenomenon has not only been confirmed in the US for many 
years following Ball and Brown, but also in the UK in the studies by Hew et al.(1996), Liu 
and strong (2003); in the emerging Finnish stock market by Booth et al. ( 1997), Hanna et al. 
(2005). Unfortunately not so many researches have been done on PEAD and stock liquidity 
in South Africa thereby data related to this topic is limited. So far there have been quite a lot 
of attempt to solve the question of what causes PEAD, some possible explanation for it are 
analysts and investors’ under-reactions to earnings surprises, information biases processing, 
deficient asset pricing model and misspecification of risks which still remain controversial 
and unclear. 
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1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT: 
Post earnings announcement drift is the tendency of stock cumulative abnormal return to drift 
in the direction of an earnings surprise for the time following an earnings announcement. 
PEAD contests both efficient market hypothesis and capital asset pricing model, as under the 
expectations of these theories PEAD cannot occur. 
In an efficient market hypothesis, stock price reflect all available and relevant information, 
hence adjust immediately to earning news instead of it continuing to drift in the direction of 
earnings surprises for up to several months after earning news. 
The reasons why efficient market hypothesis is not consistent with PEAD are explained by 
Albarbanell and Bernard (1992) PEAD is as a result under-reaction by analyst and investors 
to earning surprise.  
Ball (1992) also explained PEAD could result when the market is inefficient, and also when 
the market is efficient but measurements error are incorrect, errors such as  errors  in 
estimating rates of returns, errors in measuring normal expected returns, overstated statistics.  
Bhushan (1994) also point out that transaction costs, in conjunction with different abilities 
among investors to process information can result in a drift. 
In the capital asset pricing model, stock prices follows a random walk in a foreseeable 
manner, since stock prices are unpredictable, leading to no drift in the capital asset pricing 
model, based on the anomaly of PEAD, stock price can be predictable leading to a drift in the 
cumulative abnormal returns of stocks price in the direction of earning surprise for the time 
following the earnings announcement. 
Most studies from Jones and Litzenberger (1970), Bernard and Thomas (1989), Albarbanell 
and Bernard (1992), Freeman and Tse (1989), Bhushan (1994). Consider under reaction as 
the main basis for PEAD, analyst under react and investors who are advised by analysts were 
said to be unconfident about the information gotten, consequently they steadily adjust stock 
prices even after earnings announcements. 
Information biased processing is another form of under-reaction; it is the market’s 
inefficiency in processing earnings information. Some people in the past believed that PEAD 
result is due to a methodological limitation or measurement error. Lee (1992) provides 
evidence on the estimation between the PEAD and the extent to which sophisticated investors 
can limit the mispricing, AsthanaSharad (2003) proves that PEAD dropped with the growth 
of information technology. 
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On the other hand, other studies point out that PEAD in fact occurs due to the inadequacy of 
CAPM regardless of investors’ behaviour. This argument is consistent with Ball (1978), and 
Foster et al. (1984). According to Ball (1978), the two-parameter model when applied to a 
portfolio of common stocks, mis-specify the process of generating securities yield. He stated 
that CAPM omits one or more variables. Later on, in Foster et al (1984), their tests results are 
consistent with the notion of the capital asset pricing model misspecification and reject the 
possibility of an interference of information market or time period explanation.  
Most previous studies in the literature assume that liquidity risk is constant during the period 
of earnings announcement. However, this is now being quizzed. Bhushan (1994) is the first to 
indirectly link stock liquidity and PEAD by suggesting a transaction cost explanation for 
PEAD. Over the last several years, checks on PEAD developed a new direction for empirical 
analysis, questioning the impact of liquidity risk on the PEAD. Following Bhushan and 
Mendenhall (2004), Hou and Moskowitz (2005) and Brav and Heaton (2006), however, none 
of them studies directly the relationship between PEAD and transaction cost. Only several 
papers, studied in detail the relationship between PEAD and stock liquidity; they are: Sadka 
(2006), Battalio and Mendenhall (2007), Ng, Rusticus and Verdi (2008) and Chordia et al 
(2009). Examine in details the relationship between PEAD and liquidity, Among these 
papers, Sadka (2006) uses price impact to proxy liquidity and decompose it into fixed and 
variable price effects; Chordia et al (2009) standardised zero trading volume day with the 
PEAD, Amihud et al. (2002) Amihud illiquidity ratio, Battalio and Mendenhall (2007) study 
the implication of quote bid ask spread, finally, Ng et al (2008) study the implication of 
transaction cost (bid ask spread and commission) to the PEAD. The major drawback from 
Chordia et al (2009) is that they exclude illiquid stocks lower than $5 and requiring stocks 
with at least 10 day trading each month. This is problematic because it is very well-known 
that infrequently traded stocks drive liquidity premium, which creates bias in results. The 
major drawback from Battalio et al (2007) and Ng et al (2008) is that they use bid ask spread 
or bid ask spread and commission as direct estimates of transaction costs, overlooking the 
information factor of earnings announcement. In fact, none of those studies use other data but 
US data; none of those studies include an information based factor, and they mainly focus on 
the transaction cost rather than liquidity itself 
Liquidity effect in fact is a type of risk misspecification, which could be the cause of PEAD. 
The higher the liquidity the lower is the risk. Using different measurements of liquidity these 
studies by Brennan et al. (1998), Hegde and Mc Dermott (2003), Kluger et al. (1997), Li et 
al. (2003), Amihud et al. (2002), developed a theory that liquidity could be an explanation of 
 4 
 
PEAD. So therefore, based on the above explanations earning news pose to have an impact 
on stock liquidity, as a result of information asymmetry cost component and also on post 
earnings announcement drift. 
 
1.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY: 
Based on the foregoing sections highlighted problem, the main objective of this research is, to 
examine the relationship between stock liquidity and post earnings announcement drift and 
also 
 Examine the use of bid ask spread to fill in or alternate stock liquidity. 
  Examine the influence of information asymmetry cost component of bid ask spread 
on the impact of the event. 
  Conduct cross country comparism, between two different accounting systems i.e. the 
code law and common law systems in analysing PEAD. 
 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY: 
There are four categories of potential beneficiaries of this research:  
 Any the researcher who studies behavioural finance and microstructure of financial markets 
can be a beneficiary. The outcome of this research provides an incentive for them to explore 
and further develop their studies into the relationship between bids-ask spread and PEAD.  
 Any financial analyst involved in market microstructure and stock performance analysis can 
be a beneficiary. This research will provide more empirical and theoretical insight into the 
formulation and development of their earnings and pricing models. They can account the 
bids-ask spread and information asymmetry as factors that can affect stock price and returns 
behaviours. In addition, from my research, analysts will be able to determine the difference in 
the pattern of returns /market liquidity behaviour between small and large companies; they 
can anticipate the above impact being different between large and small sized companies.  
 Any investor or student who wants to gain a better understanding and to further enhance their 
expertise in this subject matter can do so from this research.  
 International accounting bodies can also be beneficiaries of this research for their institutional 
interests. Contribute to existing literature; this research demonstrates that PEAD means 
information disclosure is inadequate. In other words, markets do not fully understand 
information when information is released. PEAD means that markets need long time to digest 
disclosures. In such situation, there are two questions to be raised: (i) Are accounting 
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numbers such as earnings information really meaningful? (ii) Is the current method of 
disclosures appropriate? Perhaps we need a standard format for narrative disclosure. Further 
understanding about the above three issues can help the International Accounting bodies to 
setup more appropriate accounting standards.  
 
1.4.       OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: 
My data sample will covers three countries: the USA, South Africa, and France with firms 
listed in 7 indices, of which 3 indices are from Johannesburg Stock Exchange 3 indices from 
US Stock Exchanges, and 1 index from Paris Bourse. My samples will also cover two types 
of accounting systems, one is the common law system used in the US and the SA, and the 
other is code law based system used in France. There is a difference between code law and 
common law accounting systems. In the common law countries, earnings information is that 
stock information is released on the day of the event, whilst in the code law countries 
earnings information is released to the markets much earlier (month earlier) through a variety 
of channels before the official announcement date. Therefore the earnings news in code law 
based countries has already been digested by the markets and is no longer new news. 
This thesis intends starting with the event study method to examine stock market price’s 
response to the earnings events and in a later part to examine short term and long-term impact 
of earnings announcements on the bid-ask spreads. This methodology was introduced by 
Brown and Warner (1985), and subsequently used by Beneish and Gardner (1995), Gregoriou 
and Ioannidis (2006), Gregoriou, (2009) and many others event studies in literature have 
further modified the methodology. 
As the thesis progresses, I intend to use different regression models. There will also be 
empirical design parts to explain each of the methodology and explanatory variables. Based 
on the data collection, sample construction and methodology used I would be able to gather 
enough information to arrive at a meaningful conclusion on this topic. 
 
1.5.      OUTLINE OF THE STUDY: 
The study will unfold as follows. Chapter two will discuss a literature review on PEAD, the 
explanations for it, and the relationship between PEAD and stock liquidity, particularly with 
stock liquidity measured by bid ask spread and why I would use bid ask spread to alternate 
stock liquidity. Chapter three will performs a general task to describe the sample coverage, 
data selection process, variables and methodology approach intended to be used in this study. 
Chapter four will conducts different uni-variate analysis that includes price response impact, 
 6 
 
application of information cost liquidity hypothesis, the different impacts of earnings 
announcement in the previous chapter in a multi-variate analysis to explore the impact of 
earnings announcements on the stock market liquidity, Factors of the market response to 
earnings announcements, of which stock liquidity is the focus. Furthermore, this chapter will 
performs bid ask spread decomposition into information asymmetry and cost of trading 
components, it will also examine the relationship between information asymmetry component 
of Bid-Ask Spread and Post earnings announcement drift. In conclusion, Chapter five will 
sum up the findings and put forwards recommendations for further research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW OF PEAD AND EXPLANATIONS FOR IT 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review and discuss the literature on Post Earnings 
Announcement Drift. The persistence of PEAD involves numerous studies; it was first 
reported by Ball and Brown (1968) that PEAD is an anomaly that is inconsistent with market 
efficiency hypothesis which states that prices of stock should reflect all available information. 
PEAD was inconsistent with efficient market hypothesis where it was observed that after 
controlling for risk, it was still possible to earn high abnormal returns. This shows that stocks 
with positive surprise have high abnormal return and continue to grow, while stocks with 
negative surprise have low or negative abnormal return and continue to decline.  
What can an investor do to trade on PEAD? Chordia and Shiva Kumar (2006) suggest that 
investors can exploit this phenomenon by buying stocks with the highest earning surprise and 
short stocks with the lowest negative surprise to maximize the drift. This explains the role of 
PEAD and why PEAD is important to investors. The questions for researchers are: what are 
the effects of PEAD in the short term and long term and what the effects look like? What are 
the reasons behind these effects? 
The outlay of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 provides definition of PEAD 
and the reported evidence of PEAD. Section 2.2 to 2.4 reviews related theories, methodology 
to explore PEAD and the reported evidence of PEAD in the literature. Section 2.5 
summarizes possible explanations for PEAD and subsections discuss the literature with 
respect to stock liquidity, discusses the literature of stock liquidity in relation to earnings 
announcements and PEAD. Section 2.6 summarizes the possible measurement of stock 
liquidity, advantage and disadvantages of each measurement and why bid-ask spread can be 
used as an alternate to stock liquidity.  
 
2.1. DEFINITION OF PEAD 
 
PEAD is the tendency of stock cumulative abnormal return to drift in the direction of earning 
surprise for a period of time following the announcement period, and this is inconsistent with 
the efficient market hypothesis which states that stock price should reflect all available 
information in the market unlike PEAD that continues to drift in the direction of earning 
surprise several months even after the earning news. Studies showed that Ball and Brown 
(1968) were the first to note that stock prices continue to drift in the direction of earnings 
surprises for several months after earnings are announced, after earnings announcement 
abnormal returns of good news firm continues to drift up in positive direction while abnormal 
returns of bad news firms continue to drift in the opposite direction. Initially prices react to 
information on a large scale, but this reaction does not complete after the news, it continues 
to drift dependent on the direction of the news months later. 
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According to Bernard and Thomas (1989), studies showed that the majority of the drift takes 
place in the first 60days following the announcement of earnings. The drift lasts for 
approximately 9months for small firms and around 6 months for large firms. This is 
supported by Watts (1978) whose study established that the drift lasts for 6month for large 
firms. Bernard and Thomas (1989) found that a large amount of the drift that takes place in 
the first 60days following the announcement of earnings that occurs within the last 5days 
following the announcement of earnings. In fact, Bernard and Thomas(1989) established that 
the percentage of the drift that occurs within the first 5days following the announcement of 
earnings in relation to the drift that takes place in the first 60days following the 
announcement of earnings is 13% for small firms, 18% for medium firms, and 20% for large 
firms.  
The survival of this phenomenon has been confirmed by the work of Ball and Brown (1968) 
Hew, skeratt, strong and walker (1996); Liu and Strong (2003), Booth et al (1997) … so far 
there have been quite lots of attempts to solve the question of what causes Post Earning 
Announcement Drift. The possible explanations for it are analyst and investor’s under-
reaction to earnings surprises, information biased processing, deficient asset pricing model 
and misspecification of risk. 
 
2.2 EXPLANATION OF PEAD 
 
Though, there is not a generally satisfactory explanation, the existing explanation of PEAD 
falls in three categories: 1) under-reaction to earnings surprises 2) misspecification of risk 3) 
biased information processing. 
 
2.2.1 Under-reactions to earning surprise 
  
Under-reaction to earning surprise means that stock price does not reflect equilibrium in 
price. People including analysts, investors advised by analysts, under-react to positive or 
negative earnings news and when this happens they need time to assess and adjust to 
information through trading and these impact prices of stock. Bernard (1993) in his study 
shows that market participants do not recognize the positive autocorrelation in earning 
changes but believe that earnings follows random walk. In this case, investors do not fully 
reflect the news content of earnings announcement and a subsequent drift can be observed.  
The reason for under-reaction includes analyst under-reaction, investor’s under-reaction, and 
biased information processing. All these three factors lead to the market’s inability to respond 
rapidly and completely to the publicly available information. 
 
Analyst under-reaction 
 
Albarbanell and Bernard (1992) carried out a test, whether analyst over or underreact to 
earnings information is an explanation for PEAD. They tested if forecast errors can be 
explained by previous years earning change, the result showed that there is a positive 
relationship between the forecast errors and previous earning change, the interpretation is that 
analyst are cautious and do not believe that rise in earnings will continue, because if earnings 
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are rising, the forecast is smaller than the actual earnings at time t. this lead their test 
suggesting that analyst produce forecast that are less simple than the seasonal random walk 
model, however their test fail to recognize the extent to which earnings deviate from the 
announcements. 
 
Investors’ under-reaction 
 
Barberis, shleifer and vishnny (1998) provide a formal model to explain investor’s under-
reaction to earning announcements is related to investors conservatism, conservatism refer to 
the reluctance of individual to update their beliefs upon new information on earnings. 
Investors dependent on conservatism disregard the full information content of an earnings 
announcement because they tend to cling partially, on their prior estimates of earnings to 
their prior estimates of earning rather than update their estimates based on the new 
information contained in the earning announcement.  
  
Biased information processing  
 
Ball (1992), Bhuhsan (1994), Rangan and Sloan (1998), in their studies observed that 
methodological limitation in research model and abnormal return measurement required to 
process information is incomplete, leading to biased information processing. 
Ball (1992) in his study gave two explanations for PEAD (1) either the market truly is 
inefficient (2) the market is efficient but measurement used for data processing are incorrect, 
bias in information processing could be errors in estimating rates of returns, errors in 
measuring expected returns, overstated T-statistics all contribute to PEAD. 
 
2.2.2 MISPECIFICATION OF RISK 
 
Literatures have not measured risk properly, while drifts look at future performance and are 
always risk adjusted. Misspecification of risk includes beta risk measurement (CAPM) and 
liquidity or trading risk.    
MISPECIFICATION OF CAPM 
Ball, Kothari and Watts (1988) state that many PEAD studies assumed a stationary beta, 
where the outcome of abnormal returns generated is upward bias which leads to exploitation 
of the PEAD anomaly. They concluded that allowing for betas to shift annually results in an 
insignificant PEAD. 
FOS (1984) found that using security return model instead of Earning based model method 
does not suggest the existence of PEAD. Bernard and Thomas (1989) explains that when the 
Earning based model is used it reflects an unidentified risk premium which leads to PEAD 
been identified and this is because one of the problems security return model aims to alleviate 
is the risk adjustment problem of the Earning based model. 
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Bernard and Thomas (1989) does not support the conclusion that misspecification of the 
CAPM explains PEAD anomaly as the findings of their studies is inconsistent Ball, Kothari, 
and Watts (1988) findings in terms of stationary betas causing a significant upward bias in 
abnormal returns. For instance Bernard and Thomas (1989) established that the size of the 
estimated beta shifts in their study was only around 8% as great as would be required for a 
full explanation of the drifts magnitude.  
Additionally, Bernard and Thomas (1989) findings are inconsistent with the explanation that 
PEAD is a result of excluding risk factors apart from the systematic risk. For example they 
found a disproportionate amount of drift based round the earnings announcement of the 
subsequent quarter. 
 
LIQUIDITY RISK 
 
Individual stock liquidity evolves from both firm-specific and market factors, with links to 
market characteristics providing a stimulus for liquidity risk as a pricing factor. Acharya and 
Pederson (2005) find that the most important source of liquidity risk is the covariance of 
individual stock liquidity with market returns, so that investors value stocks that are liquid 
when market returns are low. 
Sadka and Sadka (2005) linked liquidity risk and post- earnings announcement drift because 
liquidity risk increases around earnings announcement. Chordia et al. (2007) and Vega (2007) 
suggest that random noise trader and strategic market maker liquidity provision provide a 
stimulus for drift in prices following earnings announcements. 
Battalion and Mendenhall (2005) show that, institutions and individual’s trade differently 
around earnings announcements, benchmarking to analyst forecasts and prior year earnings, 
respectively. These differential reactions suggest that investor flux occurs as analyst forecast 
and seasonal random walk earnings diverge. Investor flux can be represented by changes in 
the ratio of informed to noise traders, the ratio of informed to uninformed traders, or the mix 
of different institutions holding stock, which highlights the central role of institutional 
holdings and trading in determining flux. Indeed Woodruff and Senchack (1988) finds that 
positive earnings surprises are immediately followed by a large numbers of small trades and 
later followed by relatively fewer trades with higher volumes, implying that either retail 
investors enter the market earlier than institutions or, more likely, that institutions are not able 
to trade large blocks of shares immediately following these announcements, based on these 
larger institutional holdings serve to magnify investor flux around earnings announcements 
and thus increase liquidity risk in the market. 
Mendenhall (2004) shows that stocks with high arbitrage risk experience greater drift, 
because institutional trading prior to earnings announcements appears to temper investor flux 
at the announcement as institutions incorporate relevant information ahead of earning news. 
Likewise are post earnings announcements negatively related to liquidity risk, consistent with 
the challenge of trading large quantities of stock without price impact in response to earning 
news. Increased liquidity risk is reflected in the excess volatility of post- announcement 
returns, signifying the trouble that arbitrageurs face in trading at relatively unstable prices in 
the post- announcement market. 
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Anderson, Harris and So (2007) investigate liquidity risk and it relationship with PEAD 
discovered that earnings surprises change the composition of investors, this represent 
liquidity risk to those who might try to trade profitably against predictably drift returns. They 
characterize the determinants of unexplained volume at the earnings announcement and find 
that both liquidity levels (volume and spreads) and liquidity risk (flux in institutional 
holdings and retail trading activity) are significantly related to unexplained volume, so their 
result suggest that liquidity risk manifest in trading volume which leads to post earnings 
announcement drift. 
 
2.3. MEASURES OF EARNINGS SURPRISE AND DETECTION OF PEAD IN THE 
LITRETURE 
 
Three main measures of earning surprise have been used in the literature, to quantify new 
information in earnings and measure of PEAD. They are as follows: 
1) The Earnings based measure 
2) The Analyst forecast measure 
3) The Price based measure 
 
2.3.1. Earning based measure: Standardized unexpected earnings 
 
This measurement uses standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) to measure earnings 
surprise. Following Mendenhall (2004), SUE is defined as the difference between actual and 
expected earnings scaled by the standard deviation of the forecast errors during the estimation 
period, where expected earnings are estimated either from analysts’ forecast or from a time 
series model of earnings. 
   
    
    
 (    )
  
     [   ]
 (     [   ]
)
 
Where  
o SUEit   is the quarter t standardised unexpected earnings of stock i 
o     is the quarter t actual earnings per share reported by the firm i 
o  [   ]  is the quarter t expected value of     
o  (     [   ])  is the quarter t standard deviation of unexpected earnings 
This methodology was used by Bernard and Thomas (1989), Bidwell (1979) and Chan et al 
(1996). A major downside of SUE is that, although it captures the earnings surprises, it 
neither captures other new information that might be unveiled around earnings announcement 
dates; nor does it capture market reactions to the information. 
Three influential models used to calculate  [   ] are  
1) The naïve random walk model 
 [   ]=           
 
Where  
o  [   ] is the expected earnings of stock i at quarter t 
o    is the drift term  
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o          is the actual earnings at quarter t-4 
 
2) The first order autoregressive earning expectation model by Foster (1977)  
  [   ]=              (                 ) 
Where 
o  [   ] is the expected earnings of stock i at quarter t 
o    is the drift term  
o          is the actual earnings at quarter t-4 
o  (                 ) Is the first order autoregressive term that account for the positive but 
decaying autocorrelations in seasonally differenced earnings. 
 
3) Brown and Rozeff (1979) used uni-variate time series model of quarterly accounting earning 
per share. 
The Brown and Rozeff (1979) earnings expectation from this model is expressed as follows 
 [   ]=              (                 ) +         
                      Is a seasonal moving average term at the four lag to account for the observed 
negative correlation in year to year seasonally differenced earnings. 
The SUE involves uni-variate time series earnings forecasting model described above, might 
omit other important variables or information that could be meaningful in the explanation 
process. 
 
2.3.2. Analyst forecast based measure: Analyst forecast error and earnings forecast 
revision   
 
Brown et al (1997) supports the direct use of analyst forecasts of earnings to measure 
earnings surprise. Due to the analysts’ ability to use information and timing in their forecasts, 
they are able to revise their forecast which reflects up to date information in a timely manner. 
Analysts forecast earnings based measure of earnings surprise uses analyst forecast error. It is 
computed as the difference between the actual earnings and forecast of reported earnings. 
Forecast error is usually scaled by security price for cross-sectional comparability purpose. 
 
 
 𝐹 𝑖𝑡 = 
     [   ]
   
 
 
Where,   
 
o 𝐹 𝑖𝑡 is forecast error 
o  𝑖𝑡 is actual reported earnings for stock i at time t.  
o F [ 𝑖𝑡] is the forecast of reported earnings for stock i at time t.  
o 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is stock i price at time t. 
Freeman and Tse (1989) used this methodology to measure earning surprise and detect PEAD 
which lead to them suggesting that the future abnormal returns should be positively 
correlated with the most recent earnings forecast error. An alternative analyst forecast based 
measure of earnings surprise is forecast revision, which is calculated as the change in analyst 
 13 
 
earnings forecasts divided by stock price. The insight is if there is a greater change in analyst 
earnings forecasts then there is a greater earnings surprise. 
 
 𝑅 𝑉𝑖𝑡= 
 [   ]  [     ]
   
 
 
Where,  
 
o 𝑅 𝑉𝑖𝑡 is earnings forecast revision 
o F [ 𝑖𝑡] is the forecast of reported earnings for stock i at time t. 
o F [ 𝑖, −1] is the forecast of reported earnings for stock i at time t-1. 
o 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is stock i price at time t 
 
 This methodology was used by Mendenhall (1991); REV should be positively associated 
with future abnormal return.  
There is also a slightly different measure of REV by Chan, Jegadeesh and Timan (1996), 
which is a six month moving average of past changes in earning forecast by analysts. By 
using this moving average of past changes in earnings forecasts by analysts, information is 
assumed to be released gradually over time. O’Brien (1988); Abarnbanell and Bernard 
(1992), established the shortcoming of this measure, that there is a potential for bias while 
using analyst forecasts due to lags in publication of analysts’ forecasts.  
 
 
2.3.3. Price-based measure: Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Buy Hold Abnormal 
Return  
 
Supporters of this measure are Beaver et al (1980); Beaver et al (1987), Chan et al (1996), 
and Bernard and Thomas and Wahlen (1997). In this method the calculation of surprise 
involves the abnormal return, which is the difference between individual stock return and 
market stock return. Abnormal stock return can be calculated either by a market adjusted 
model, market model, CAPM, multi-factor model, or Matched-firms returns. Among these 
models, the first two models are the most often used. 
 
i) In the market adjusted return model, defined by Brown and Warner (1985), 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡−𝑅𝑚𝑡  
 
Where,  
 
o 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is abnormal return of stock i at time t  
o 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is single stock return at time t  
o 𝑅𝑚t is market stock return at time t  
 
The use of market adjusted return seems doubtful because it does not adjust for basic CAPM 
β risk. However, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) found that the simple mean returns model 
often yields results similar to those of the more sophisticated models, because the variance of 
abnormal returns is not reduced much by choosing a more sophisticated model.  
ii) In the market model, abnormal return is calculated as:  
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𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =𝑅𝑖𝑡−𝛼𝑖𝑡−𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑡  
Where  
o 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is abnormal return of stock i at time t  
o 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is single stock return at time t  
o 𝑅𝑚t is market stock return at time t  
o 𝛼𝑖𝑡 is constant.  
o Β is systematic risk.  
This model assumes the risk free interest rate included in α is constant, whereas market 
returns are assumed to change.  
iii) The basic CAPM model:  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =𝑅𝑓*𝛽(𝑅𝑚𝑡− 𝑅𝑓)  
Where  
o 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is return of stock i at time  
o 𝑅𝑚 is market stock return at time t  
o Β is systematic risk.  
o 𝑅𝑓 is the risk free rate.  
iv) The multi factor models such as Fama-French 3 factor model, Carhart 4 factor model or 
APT model:  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡− 𝛼𝑖 −  ∑𝛽    
Where  
o 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is abnormal return of stock i at time t  
o 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is single stock return at time t  
o 𝛼𝑖𝑡 is constant.  
𝛽𝑗 is risk associated with each individual factor 𝐹𝑗  
v) Matched-firms returns/sort  
This methodology assumes that there are factors that affect returns. All returns will be sorted 
into 10 deciles by size and then each decile continues being sorted by other factor e.g. book-
to-market value. The expected return for each group will then be computed and used as 
“normal return” for that group. The deviation of a stock return from “normal return” of the 
group it belongs to, will be the abnormal return. This method is problematic because the 
results change when sorted by different characteristics therefore its level of accuracy is low.  
In addition to different ways to calculate abnormal returns, there are two ways to test the non-
normal distribution in order to find out the influence of news by time, which are Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR) and Buy and Hold Abnormal returns (BHAR) and this was first 
established by Brown and Wanner (1985). 
CAR is cumulative abnormal returns, which is the sum of the differences between the 
expected return on a stock and the actual return that comes from the release of news to the 
market, calculated by the following formula:  
CAR
i
t, t+k = Σk ARi, t+k 
Where  
ARi, t+k is the abnormal returns on stock i on the day t+k  
CAR
i
t, t+k is the cumulative abnormal returns on stock i over the period t to t+k  
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Following the main-stream literatures, we assume that if there is no influence of earnings 
news, CAR will follow normal distribution.  
CAR
i
t, t+k ~ N (0, σ2i, t+k)  
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (“BHARs”) measure the difference between the 
compounded actual return and the compound predicted return. BHAR is calculated by  
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅it = ∏   [  𝑅  ]  ∏   [     ]
 
 
 
  
Where:  
Rit is the time t arithmetic return (including dividends) on security i  
Rmt is the time t arithmetic return on the market weighted index  
Similarly, following the law of large numbers of studies we assumed BHAR will follow 
normal distribution if there is no influence of news.  
BHARit ~ N (0, σ
2
i, t+k)  
When there are N firms in the category, we use average across the number of firms. The t test 
for normality will be used to detect the drifts.  
tCAR  =  𝐴𝑅    /( ( 𝐴𝑅  ) √  ) 
Or 
TBHAR   = 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅     ( (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅  √  )  
 
In a not so long event window length using CAR or BHAR is almost similar. For long 
horizons, BHAR seems conceptually better. BHAR tends to be right skewed (bounded from 
below). 
Amongst the three measures of PEAD, the price based method focused on price reaction to 
the earnings news and suggests that the surprise is well reflected directly by the change of 
daily price around the event. This price-based method is therefore widely and commonly used 
especially with the first two measures of abnormal returns: market adjusted model and market 
model. For this reason, this thesis will demonstrate and use the price based measure, CAR for 
the market-adjusted model first established by Brown and Wanner (1985), and also used 
frequently by other researchers such as Beneish and Gardner (1995); Gregoriou (2006) 
among others , due to its accuracy, and popularity. 
 
2.4. EVIDENCE OF PEAD 
 
Using different methodologies which were listed in the previous parts, most of empirical 
analysis over the last 4 decades, against the market efficient hypothesis, proves that PEAD 
exists everywhere both in the developed and the emerging markets.  
Securities with positive earnings surprises will drift further than normative predicted prices, 
and securities with negative earnings surprises will drift below the predicted prices.  Ball and 
Brown, (1968) first reported that estimated cumulative abnormal returns continue to drift up 
after every quarterly earnings announcement for good news firms and down for bad news 
firms. The return residuals for earnings surprises portfolio persisted for as long as two months 
after the announcement. Their sample includes 261 firms in the nine fiscal years 1957 to 
1965. The sample does not include young firms or that have failed, those firms that do not 
report on December 31 and those not represented on Compustat, the CRSP tapes and Wall 
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street Journal. Their method is to construct two alternative models of what the market expects 
income to be and then investigate the market’s reaction when its expectations prove false. 
They investigate net income and earnings per share using time series regression model and 
earnings per share using a naïve model. The distribution of the residuals then shows the 
behaviours of the drift. The subsequent study by Jones and Litzenberger (1970) on two 
groups from Compustat, one group of 510 companies for the period 1962-1965, and the 
second of 618 companies for the period 1964-1967 shows drift for positive surprises but not 
for negative surprises; by Latane, Joy and Jones (1977) test on 975 standardised unexpected 
earnings shows drifts for both positive and negative surprises.  
Foster (1977) test using time series model for 96 firms during the period 1946-1974 show 
drifts for day -20 to day +20. In fact there are numerous studies that demonstrate evidence of 
PEAD since its first discovery. Ball (1978) reviews the PEAD studies in the ten years 
following Ball and Brown. Ball’s review includes not only evidence of PEAD but also 
explanations for the cause of PEAD as systematic experimental error, market imperfections 
and private costs of information processing, and failure of the two-parameter model. While 
most of the early studies on the PEAD suffered from limitations such as a small sampling 
size, sample selection bias and risk measurement error, the latter research on the PEAD 
shows continuous improvement in data selection process and research methodologies.  
The extensive and detailed documentation of the PEAD in the following period are from: 
Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984); Bernard and Thomas (1989), (1990); Albarbanell and 
Bernard (1992); Ball (1992); Bhushan (1994); Hew, Skeratt, Strong, and Walker (1996); 
Chan et al (1996); Rangan and Sloan (1998), Brown and Han (2000). More recently are 
Mendenhall (2004); Battalio and Mendenhall (2007). Most of these studies provide evidence 
against EMH because market failed in reflecting earnings news into stock prices while trying 
to explore the reasons behind PEAD phenomenon.  
Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984) use a sample of more than 56000 observations from 2,053 
companies’ quarterly data over the period from 1974-1981 on Compustat. They report that 
earnings are partially anticipated but if there is a positive (negative) surprise, then there is a 
positive (negative) drift of up to 13 weeks after earnings announcement. Drifts are persistent 
phenomenon over the study period with no concentration in any specific period. Consistent to 
common findings in previous literature, this paper intensively documented that the drift is 
negatively related to firm size variable and positively related to the sign and magnitude of 
earnings-surprise variable.  The sign and magnitude of earnings forecast error independently 
explains 81% the variation in PEAD, and firm size independently explains 61% the variation 
in PEAD. This tests result based on the two earnings based models one scaled by the absolute 
value of earnings and the other scaled by the standard deviation of the forecast error. Their 
price based models and do not show drifts.  
Bernard and Thomas (1989) study 84,792 firms’ quarter data for NYSE/AMEX during the 
period 1974-1986 and 15,475 firm quarter data for OTC stocks on NASDAQ system during 
the period 1974-1985. Their research provides intensive evidence of the PEAD. They 
reported that most drifts occur during the first 3 months subsequent to the earnings 
announcement and there is little evidence that drift exists beyond 180 trading days. In 
addition they also find the magnitude of the drift is positively related to the magnitude of the 
unexpected earnings and the absolute value of the drift is inversely related to the firm size. 
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The methodology that Bernard and Thomas (1989) use is earnings based model to forecast 
standardised unexpected earnings.  
In their following study Bernard and Thomas (1990) studied 2,697 firms from 1974-1986, 
and found PEAD exists for the four quarters following earnings announcement. A large 
proportion of drift happened within 5 days around earnings announcement. In this study they 
focused on the explanation for the reason of PEAD. There hypothesis showed that price fails 
to reflect the extent to which the time series behaviour of earnings deviates from a naïve 
expectation. Their conclusion is that market price adjusts slowly to earnings information. 
Again in this study they use earnings based measure. Firms are assigned to one of 10 
portfolios based on standardised unexpected earnings.  
Following Bernard and Thomas (1989), Freeman and Tse (1989) worked on a sample of 1054 
firm’s quarterly data during the period 1984-1988. Their explanation for the existence of 
PEAD in their report said “as investors obtain post announcement information, they revise 
their initial estimates of persistence by reassessing the implications of past earnings for future 
earnings. As a result, post announcement security returns and continue to be influenced by 
previously announced earnings” (page 50).  
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) examined 178 firms for up to 44 quarters over the period 
1976-1986. They formed portfolio of quintiles based on the magnitude of analysts‟ earnings 
forecast errors, and calculated cumulative abnormal (sized adjusted) returns up to and 
including the fourth subsequent announcement and found drifts.  
Up to the early 1990s, the anomaly had been remarkably over time. In addition it was not 
explained by either the size or the book/market factor3. Finally, although there were a lot of 
speculations, including the fact that people used such a naïve forecasting model, nobody 
knew what was going on in this phenomenon. A survey of the literature up to the early 1990s 
is provided by Ball (1992). He characterized "the 'drift' in abnormal returns after quarterly 
earnings announcements" as being one of the two principal versions of the earnings-price 
anomaly. He then concluded there are two classes of explanation for earnings-price 
anomalies: the first one being the market truly is inefficient, and the other one being the 
market is efficient but the measurements were incorrect4.   
Bhuhsan (1994) undertook the study of 2,642 firms with 85,056 quarterly announcements on 
NYSE/AMEX covering the period 1974-86. Bhushans findings confirm the relationship 
between the firm sizes and drift which was reported previously. It is interesting that he 
concluded that the different abilities to process information among investor in relation to 
transaction cost cause the PEAD. His methodology is earnings based measure.  
Recently, studies on the PEAD have become more and more complex, from different angles 
and intuitively. Mendenhall (2002) study sample consists of 107589 firm-quarter 
observations from 4910 firms giving the conclusion that drift exists, but independent from 
historical persistence. In the following study in 2004, Mendenhall test result is consistent 
with Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002); found the strong relationship between the PEAD and 
the risk faced by the arbitrageurs. Liu, Strong and Xu (2003) provide another test for the 
existence of PEAD in the UK by a sample of 835 stock and 13,848 half year earnings figures 
over the period 1988-1998. Their conclusion is that whatever the measure of earnings 
surprises used there is evidence of PEAD in the UK; however, the different measures will 
give different drift effects.  
 18 
 
Asthana Sharad (2003) use the research design controls for firms size, magnitude, and sign of 
the forecast error, investor sophistication and value relevance/information content of earnings 
on 27260 quarter observations for 1613 firms. He found that drift declines significantly with 
the growth of information technology revolution and explain that the information technology 
reduces the trading friction and improves the market information efficiency.  
 
2.5. New explanation for PEAD: Stock Liquidity and measures of stock liquidity in 
relation to PEAD 
 
As discussed above, liquidity effect in fact is a type of risk misspecification which could be 
the cause of PEAD. This part will focus on the multi-dimensional characteristics of stock 
liquidity, manifested through different measurements in literature.  
Stock liquidity by definition is the ability to trade the stock rapidly with little price impacts. It 
is an important characteristic without which the investors cannot trade. Highly liquid stocks 
will attract more investors than low liquid stocks. A growing number of researches show that 
there is an inverse relation between stock liquidity and returns. Examples are Amihud and 
Mendenson (1986) Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Brennan, Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) Easley, Hvidjaker, and O’Hara (2002) among others. This flags the 
possibility that PEAD and liquidity have some determinant relationship.  
Stock liquidity comes in a multi-dimensional form; therefore there have been less agreement 
on a particular method in the measures of stock liquidity. Existing literatures have used 
different measures of stock liquidity, of which the following listed below are the most 
frequently used ones.  
 
Trading volume and standardised trading volume  
 
Trading volume in fact is a popular measure of liquidity; it was used by Brennan et al (1998) 
among others and it seen that Stock with high liquidity will be traded at high volume and 
stock with low liquidity will be traded at low volume. However, there is a potential problem 
in using trading volume as it does not take into account the differences in the number of 
shares outstanding and number of shareholders. 
  
Standardised trading volume  
 
This is the ratio of trading volume divided by the number of share outstanding. Amihud et al 
(1986) mentioned that stock liquidity is correlated with trading frequency so we can observe 
the trading frequency and use it to proxy liquidity. Datar et al (1998) Chordia et al (2001); 
Hedge and Mc Dermott (2003), Gregoriou (2008) used the standardised trading volume as a 
proxy for stock liquidity.  
 
Firm size  
 
Though the firm size is not directly related to liquidity according to the liquidity definition, 
the firm size is correlated to other factors such as trading volume, number of shareholders, 
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stock price continuity, and the number of market makers.  Garbade, (1982); Stoll (1985) and 
Kluger et al (1997) discovered this.  
 
 
 
 
Price impacts  
 
Price impact is the response of price to the large orders. Price impact can be measured using 
the transaction prices. This formal liquidity measure even though widely used, is only 
available for large trade so I cannot use it in this framework. Kraus and Stoll (1972) made the 
findings. Its adequacy as a liquidity measure is still questioned, this was observed by Matei 
Demetrescu (2006); Stange et al (2008).  
 
Effective commission rate  
 
Effective commission rate is also being used to proxy for market liquidity in Jinliang Li et al 
(2003) research, this measurement however is subjectively dependent on an individual trader, 
thus is not commonly used.   
 
Standardised turnover-adjusted zero-volume day  
 
This measure is developed by Liu (2006) and it takes into account many factors such as 
trading quantity, trading cost and especially the trading speed that is the continuity of trading 
and potential delay in executing an order.  
LMix = ZVix +1/ T0ix/deflator * 21x/Ni 
Where,  
 LMix is the stock i
th
 standardised turnover-adjusted zero-volume days over the period x 
month, x= 1,6,12  
 ZVix is the stock ith number of zero-volume trading days over prior x month. 
T0ix is the stock ith turnover the prior x-month, calculated as the sum of daily turnover the 
prior x month where daily turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded on a given day 
to the number of shares outstanding at the end of that day.  
21 is standard number of trading day in a month. 
 Ni is the total number of trades per day, in the market over the prior x month, Deflator is 
arbitrarily chosen to ensure that the ratio 0<1 /T0ᵢx/deflator< 1 for all sample stocks. It is equal 
to 11,000 where x=6, 12 and equal 480000 where x = 1.  
This measure uses the pure number of zero trading days over the prior x month to identify the 
least liquid stock and rely on the turnover to indicate the most liquid stock among frequently 
traded stocks classified by the pure number of zero-volume trading days. This measure 
however contains a potential problem as it excludes the less frequently traded stock. 
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Amihud illiquidity ratio  
 
This is the average of the ratio of daily absolute return to the daily volume in dollars; 
developed by Amihud et al (2002) following the Kyle (1985) model.   
𝑃    
1
Dit
∑
 𝑅    
 𝑉   
dit
t 1
 
Where,  
 𝑃    Is the stock it is illiquidity ratio,  
  \Ritd\ is the absolute value of daily return 
DVitd is the absolute value of daily return is the daily dollar volume (in millions) on day d 
month t for stock i  
 
Dit  is the number of valid days in month t for stock i  
Amihud illiquidity ratio is designed to capture the cost of trade. The cost of trade in fact is 
normally captured in bid-ask spreads which would be mentioned in the next section below.   
However, an advantage of Amihud illiquidity ratio is to account for the cross sectional 
variation within the sample.  In this thesis, my samples are split into different indices, already 
taking into account the cross sectional variation. It becomes unnecessary to use Amihud ratio 
in such a framework. Lastly, if stock trading volume is zero on a particular day its Amihud 
illiquidity ratio cannot be calculated, so it excludes the effect of trading absence.  
 
Bid-ask spread 
 
In organized stock exchanges, liquidity is maintained by the market makers, the people who 
are conferred the right by the stock exchange authority, to set up different price level of buy 
and sell. The market makers create the market to trade the stocks by buying at bid price and 
selling at a higher ask price. The difference between and ask price, the bid-ask spreads, is the 
source for market makers to compensate their ability and costs to provide the market for 
traders. Due to the above nature, size of the bid-ask spreads have been frequently used to 
measure liquidity of stocks. The more liquid a stock is, the smaller the bid-ask spreads, 
leading to a lower the risk, so also the higher the bid ask spread, higher the risk. By looking at 
impacts of earnings announcements on the bid ask spread around the news, one could see 
how bid-ask spreads can measure liquidity risk around public disclosures.  
Given the advantages and disadvantages of the above measures of stock liquidity, (i.e. 
Trading volume does not take into account the differences in the number of shares 
outstanding and number of shareholders; the firm size is not directly related to liquidity 
according to liquidity definition; Price impact is only available for large trades) I would use 
the bid ask spread as the main measure of stock liquidity. 
 
2.6. Bid-ask spread and the PEAD  
2.6.1. Bid-ask spread measures  
 
Bid-ask spreads are measured in three different terms; 
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 a) The quoted bid-ask spreads which is the difference between the ask price quoted by a 
dealer and the bid price quoted by a dealer at a point of time. 
 b) The relative bid-ask spreads defined as the ask price minus the bid price, divided by the 
mid-price, which is the average of the bid and ask prices.  
C) The effective bid-ask spreads which is computed as twice the absolute value of the 
difference between a transaction price and the mid-price in effect at the time of the trade.  
An important key studies such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Grossman and 
Miller(1988), and Vijh (1990) use quoted bid-ask spreads to proxy stock liquidity;  Ofeck and 
Recharson (2003) use relative bid-ask spreads; meanwhile, effective bid-ask spreads was 
used as a proxy for liquidity by Heflin and Shaw (2000), Hedge and McDermott (2003) and 
Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006), Gregoriou (2010).   
 Relative spread was commonly used, Roll (1984) first pointed out, this proxy was 
problematic due to the fact that the actual trading occurs mostly within the bid ask bound. For 
a more accurate measure of that reason, Lee et al (1993), Heflin and Shaw (2000), Hedge and 
McDermott (2003) and Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006), and Gregoriou (2010) included 
effective spread to proxy for liquidity in their research. Unfortunately, both measures of 
relative bid-ask spreads and effective bid-ask spreads included mid-price. Which caused other 
problems such as changes in the mid-price and also changes in the bid ask spreads. To 
minimize the shortcomings of the above two methods, they included the quote bid-ask spread 
in their study, which I would also use in this study. 
 
2.6.2. Bid-ask spread decomposition  
 
Historically, there have been three main theoretical models of decomposing bid-ask spreads 
1) The trade indicator regression models pioneered by Glosten and Harris (1988) 
2) The time series co-variance models pioneered by Stoll (1989) 
 3) The combination of the above two models first applied by Huang and Stoll (1997) 
Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997) extended from these two and other models were built 
from them. 
Spreads was first decomposed in permanent and transitory components using trade indicator 
regression form by Glosten and Harris (1988). Permanent component is due to the inventory 
costs and transitory component is due to information asymmetry costs. Their test results 
prove that significant fractions of NYSE common stock spread are due to information 
asymmetry. Researchers also using trade indicator regression model are Mahavan, 
Richardson, and Roomans (1997). They decompose spreads with adverse selection and order-
processing components; inventory holding cost is assumed to be zero. They conclude that 
adverse information cost increases through the day of information shock, while the order-
processing components cost decrease.  
Stoll (1989) pioneered a model of time series behaviour of spreads and specified the 
relationships between the quoted spread and realized spread.  Based on that, he establishes a 
relationship between a quoted spread and the co-variance estimate of the spread that depends 
on two parameters, which is the probability of a price reversal and the amount of a price 
reversal. By using data from the NASDAQ on quoted spread and transaction prices, he used 
these two parameters, from which he was able to calculate the relative proportions of three 
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spread components: order processing cost, inventory holding cost, and information 
asymmetry cost for data set from October, November and December 1984. Following Stoll, 
George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991).also used series co-variance, but their model assumes 
a zero inventory cost.   
Huang and Stoll (1997) in “The components of the Bid-ask spread” found that existing bid 
ask models, which includes trade indicator regression model and series co-variance models, 
did not decompose the spread fully. They made two extension tests to the trade indicator 
regression model to separate the effects on order processing and inventory costs. Their study 
also shows that spread components vary depending on the size of a trade.  
However, there are also studies that do not give results that can be interpreted as in the above 
three components, for example Winne and Majors (2007) among others support the 
hypothesis of no inventory holding costs in order-driven markets.   
In another direction, empirical studies also show that bid-ask spreads are related to some of 
the characteristics of stock such as stock price, trading volume, volatility of return, number of 
market dealers, the risk of stock and other factors, for example,  
Atkins and Dyl (1997) Gregoriou, Ioannidis and Skerratt (2005). Gregoriou et al (2005) tests 
the model with a multi variant linear relationship between Spread and 4 independent 
variables: Variance of Forecast, Variance of Returns, stock Market Value, Volume of stock 
trading to explain spread.  Information asymmetry in this study is proxied by Variance of 
forecasts. From the tests, authors found that not only the volatility of returns but also 
disagreement among analysts were significant. Volatility captures information uncertainty 
about current period to the end of the year; it reflects economy wide aspects of uncertainty. 
Disagreement related to firm specific issues, for example poor results add to volatility. Poor 
performance causes delay in reporting the year end results and cause additional information 
asymmetry between market maker and market investors. For the statistical significance of the 
Variance of Forecast  in the presence of the other variables that are regularly included in 
modelling spread, their explanation is that disagreement among analysts affects the behaviour 
of market makers, and those market makers act to protect themselves from informed traders 
by increasing spreads. Market makers cannot recognize the different types of traders they are 
dealing with; some have information advantages, while others do not. As a result market 
makers protect themselves from those informed traders by increasing the spread. The study 
toward the direction that bid ask spread related to characteristics of securities such as stock 
price, trading volume, volatility of return, number of market dealer, the risk of stock and 
other factors is still being developed. Though these multi-variant models of bid ask spread in 
study such as Gregoriou et al (2005) do not decompose spread into three different cost 
components, rather the role of adverse selected information component is emphasized.  
At current time, in terms of costs, the existing market microstructure theories imply that bid 
ask spread must cover three costs faced by a dealer: The order processing costs, inventory 
holding costs and adverse information cost. The third component is sometimes known as 
information asymmetry cost. The inventory holding cost is the fee associated with risk of 
holding inventory of the stock, which is first argued by Demsetz (1968) and Tinic (1972). 
The order processing cost, conceptualized by Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Stoll (1978), 
is the actual cost charged by the market makers to process the order which includes labour, 
communication, clearing and record keepings. Finally, the information asymmetry or adverse 
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information cost is established by Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
and recently by Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Madhavan et al (1997).  
 
2.6.3 How is bid-ask spread an explanation for PEAD?  
2.6.3.1. Earnings announcements and bid-ask spreads  
 
 There have been less number of studies on the subject of market liquidity impacts of 
earnings announcements with liquidity measured by bid ask spread. Kim and Verrecchia 
(1994) suggested a theoretical model that information disadvantage of the market makers 
increases the bid-ask spreads. Information asymmetry increases around earnings 
announcements due to information flows from public disclosures. The informed traders will 
exploit their ability to process public information. In turn, investors have to increase bid-ask 
spreads to protect themselves from informed traders. Increase in bid-ask spreads suggest that 
market liquidity decreases due to the event.  
Other studies of the behaviour of the bid-ask spreads around earnings announcements in 
NYSE are Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Krinsky, and Lee (1996). These studies use 
intraday data. The first papers finding is that order processing cost does not account much for 
the change in bid-ask spreads, while information asymmetry dominates this change. Krinsky 
and Lee’s finding is that the total bid-ask spreads might not change significantly because 
information asymmetry increases while order processing cost and inventory holding cost 
decrease.  
In a working paper, Voetman (2000-2006) uses Stoll’s methodology to provide evidence 
from Copenhagen Stock Exchange that quote bid-ask spreads does not change significantly 
because of earnings announcements even though information asymmetry increases. His 
findings also show that positive earnings have less uncertainty than negative earnings. This is 
a study on a code law country using daily data.  
Acker et al (2002) provides evidence from London Stock Exchange using daily data over the 
period from 1986-1994. Due to earnings announcements bid ask spreads fall and trading 
volumes and returns volatility rise.  
Recently, Gregoriou (2008) investigated the impact of earnings announcements on the 
components of bid-ask spreads on the London Stock Exchange using intraday data. 
Information asymmetry cost has been found to dominate the change in the bid-ask spreads, 
resulting in bid-ask spreads to decrease.   
Above studies stay only at the point to explore the impact of earnings announcement on stock 
liquidity; they have not explored the relationship between liquidity and the PEAD.   
  
2.6.3.2. Bid-ask spread as a measure of stock liquidity in relation to PEAD  
 
Based on Kim and Verrechia (2001) suggestion, in explaining drift, spread has two Potential 
roles:  
1. To indicate the cost of transacting. A large spread might discourage trading, and therefore 
might lead to a lag in information getting in to prices. (But this wouldn’t explain the long 
term results)  
2. as a measure of risk. Information causes the risk of the stock to increase.  
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Though still very limited, there are two directions in studies on the linkage between PEAD 
and spread as measure of stock liquidity: implication of transaction cost to explain PEAD and 
information based explanation.  
 
Transaction cost (proxied by spread)  
 
Bhushan (1994) is the first researcher who indirectly examined the relationship between 
liquidity and the PEAD, by relating transaction cost and the PEAD. He redefines Bernard and 
Thomas (1990) model with a transaction cost framework. However, he uses annual trading 
volume in money to proxy for the inverse of indirect cost of trading, and stock price to proxy 
for direct cost of trading. Stocks with high transaction cost have lower volume of trading and 
vice versa.  His work shows that stocks with high transaction costs drifted more. Especially 
after control for transaction cost, firm size and analysts play no role in explanation of PEAD.  
However in this study, there is an absence of the direct link between liquidity and PEAD.  
Brown (1997) indicates that PEAD is not evident throughout so it challenges transaction cost 
as an explanation of PEAD. In addition, Spiegel and Wang (2006) questions should 
transaction costs be proxied by previous year trading volume? Trading volume can indicate 
the degree of liquidity but it does not tell us the cost of trading so this methodology in fact 
goes around.  
Although all of the above studies were after Bhushan (1994) provided the link between 
transaction cost and PEAD, transaction cost has not been used to provide an explanation of 
PEAD, until a recent study by Ng et al (2008).   
To the best of my knowledge the only two studies directly linking the relationship between 
bid ask spread and the PEAD are Ng et al (2008) and Chordia et al (2009).  
Ng et al use bid ask spread to proxy for transaction cost. They provide evidence that stocks 
with higher transactions cost have a smaller reaction to the earnings announcement, and the 
drift is larger for stock with high transaction cost. The results confirm that spread provides an 
explanation for the PEAD. This study uses US data only. In addition there is absence of 
information factor in the explanation.  
Chordia et al (2009) use a multiple measures on transaction cost (proportional effective bid-
ask spreads, dynamic institutional trading costs, and the market impact costs) following Kim 
and Madhavan (1997), Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) and Chen, Stanzl, and Watanabe (2004) 
and indicates that transaction cost can possibly be an explanation for the PEAD. Chordia et al 
prove that “transaction costs account for 66% to100% of the potential paper profits from the 
long-short strategy designed to exploit the earnings drift”. Their research however, excluded 
illiquid stocks, i.e. stock with price lower than £5 and stocks with at least ten days of trades 
each month, meanwhile stocks with less frequently trading largely drives liquidity premium. 
In addition,  
Chordia et al (2009) construct one month liquidity measures in that research fail to capture 
information from stocks that have zero trading volume over the whole month.  
According to Bhushan and Chordia et al PEAD will not be exploitable after transaction cost. 
Chorda’s analysis of transaction cost (proxied by bid-ask spreads, market impact costs, and 
institutional transactions costs) proves that most of the net profits disappear upon accounting 
for trading costs. However, previous studies generally rule out transaction cost as an 
 25 
 
explanation of PEAD. Moreover, Ball (1992) and Battalio and Mendenhall (2006) studies 
claim that PEAD is too large to be bounded by transaction cost. Mendenhall provides 
evidence that after transaction cost investor can still earn a 14% hedged portfolio return a 
year.  
 
Information biased factor  
 
There are very few studies indirectly linking the information based factor and the PEAD. Lee 
and Swaminathan (2000) investigate interaction between price momentum and previous 
trading volumes to predict cross-sectional returns. They documented that earnings surprise is 
caused by higher (or lower) future earnings of low (or higher) volume stocks. Investor’s 
expectation affects not only stock returns but also the stock trading activity; therefore the 
information content of trading volume is related to market misperception of stock future 
earnings.  
 Chambers, Jennings and Thompson (2004) use proportion of zero return trading day in the 
past twelve months as proxy for liquidity, firm with high proportion is expected to have low 
flow of information and high resolution of uncertainty around earnings announcement, and 
vice versa. They found that returns are concentrated around earnings announcements for 
firms with low information flow than for firms with high information flow. However, their 
studies have the problem of lack of news and the assumption of equal transaction cost across 
firms is not realistic.  
Sadka (2006) is another researcher who studied indirectly the link between PEAD and 
liquidity. His studies use price impact to proxy for stock liquidity and then follow Glosten 
and Harris (1998) model, propose to decompose liquidity into two components, the fixed 
component (associated with market-wise information) and variable component (associated 
with firm specific information). Unexpected systematic (market-wide) variations of the 
variable component rather than the fixed component of liquidity are shown to be priced 
within the context of momentum and post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) portfolio 
returns. The variable component of price impact in his study therefore explains part of PEAD 
and price momentum. He finally suggests that a bench mark model to explore PEAD should 
include information based on liquidity risk factor.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
DATA SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY  
 
There are two techniques that will be used. The first one is to describe the data collection and 
sample construction to obtain the final sample. The second is to describe the methodology 
used in the research.   
My data sample covers three countries: the United States of America, South Africa, and 
France, with firms listed in 7 indices, of which 3 indices are from Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange, 3 indices from US Stock Exchanges, and 1 index from Paris Bourse. My samples 
include both liquid and illiquid stocks from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, covering two 
types of accounting systems which are the common law and code law system, the common 
law system is used in the US and the SA, and the other is the code law system used in France. 
Ball, Korathi and Robin (2000) used code law and common law accounting systems in their 
analysis. The difference between code law and common law accounting systems, in the 
common law countries, earnings announcement on stock information is released on the day of 
the event, whilst in the code law countries earnings information is released  to the markets 
much  earlier (month earlier) through a  variety of  channels before the official announcement 
date. Therefore the earnings news in code law based countries has already been digested by 
the markets and is no longer new news at the time the official news release.  
 
3.1 Companies and Indices covered  
 
3.1.1. Johannesburg Stock Exchange  
Data was collected from Bloomberg and I-Net PDF files.  
JSE TOP 40 INDEX 
It is the capitalization-weighted index of the share prices of the 40 largest companies  
(Based on market capitalization) traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.  
JSE MID CAP INDEX 
 It is the capitalization-weighted index of 61 companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
that are quarterly selected as being the 41st to 101th largest companies.  
JSE SMALL CAP INDEX  
It is the capitalization-weighted-index consisting of companies outside of the 101th largest 
companies in South Africa on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
3.1.2 US Stock Exchanges  
The Dow Jones Industry Average (DJIA)  
It is the price-weighted index created by 30 of the largest and most widely held public 
companies in the United States.  
NASDAQ 100  
It is the modified capitalization-weighted index comprising of the 100 non-financial largest 
stocks traded on the NASDAQ Stock Exchange. 
S&P 100  
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It is the capitalization weighted index of 100 largest companies by market capitalization in 
the S&P 500.  
3.1.3 Euronext Paris  
CAC40  
It is the float capitalization-weighted index comprising of the 40 largest and most liquid 
stocks trading on the Paris Bourse.   
The data obtained is modified quarterly by the end of March, June, September, and 
December. It should be noted that firms with the largest market caps tend to have the largest 
influence on the index; the index value is modified to keep any issues from having an 
"overwhelming" effect on the index results. While the composition of the NASDAQ-100 
changes in the case of delisting, the index is only rebalanced once a year, in December, when 
NASDAQ reviews its components and makes the appropriate adjustments. 
 Float means that the weightings of each of the index's components are determined by the 
value of shares outstanding to the public. This prevents a large company that only issues a 
small amount of its shares from having a disproportionate amount of influence on the index’s 
value. 
 
3.2. Data collection and calculation  
 
Daily stock closing prices, price indices, daily closing bid price, daily closing ask price, daily 
turnover by volume and daily price high and low were obtained from Bloomberg data base 90 
days before and 90 day after the earnings announcements. The numbers of companies that 
have data available for each index are:  
CAC40: 40 companies; DJIA: 30 companies; JSE top 40: 40 companies; JSE mid cap: 
60companies; JSE Small Cap: 60 companies; NASDAQ100: 96 companies, S&P100: 100 
companies. The selection criteria, is similar to that of Hedge and Mc Dermott (2003), my 
final data will include stocks that have:  
a) Not been involved in a merger during the period of 90 days before and after earnings 
announcement  
b) Not been involved in a split during the period of 90 days before and after earnings 
announcement  
c) Data available on the stock exchanges and on Bloomberg database 90 days before and after 
earnings announcement. We exclude firms that do not have data available of at least 10 day 
before an earnings announcement.  
Quote bid-ask spreads, relative bid-ask spreads, effective spread are all calculated based on 
closing bid price and ask price. Quote bid-ask spread is calculated as the difference between 
bid price and ask price. Relative spread is calculated as the difference between bid prices and 
ask price divided by average of bid price and ask price (mid-price). Effective spread is 
calculated as twice as much as absolute value of the difference between executed price and 
mid-price.  
Trading volume is calculated as turnover by volume times the average of the high price and 
low price on the day.  
Pre-earnings announcement period is defined as period from day -90 to day -1. Post earnings 
announcements period is defined as period from day 0 to day +90.  
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3.3. Earnings announcements dates  
 
In the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, dates of preliminary report of fourth quarter and final 
earning, results were taken from JSE’s website through Regulatory News Services for 2010-
2012. For companies that reported fourth quarter and annual preliminary earning results 
separately, the annual preliminary report dates was selected. These dates are then compared 
to sources from companies’ websites and also date of earliest earnings announcements 
released to the public, through various means of media such as press release, conference call, 
Internet, etc. Basically, companies are required to submit the earning reports before 5PM on 
the day before announcement day. On the next day, the announcement days, information will 
be available on the stock exchange for most companies at around 7AM, before the market 
open’s. The analyst conference then will be held in the morning and reason for this is that 
different companies have different way of calling their earnings announcement dates. Usually 
they call this “annual/final and fourth quarter financial results” date. Sometime they call it 
“earning results” date only. But notice that, the turnover or sale report could also be called the 
final results. We must take a look at each report to make sure that is preliminary earning 
reports, which included profit and loss account, earning information and was firstly released 
to the investors through conference call, web-cast, or press.  
In the United States Stock Exchanges, earnings announcements dates were earliest fourth 
quarter and annual earnings release dates, taken directly from companies’ websites, for 2010-
2012. These are also the dates of reporting to SEC, by regulation, on form 8-K, which is 
classified as “current reports” or “report of unscheduled material events or corporate event”.  
Foreign companies provide form 6-K of Foreign Private Issuer instead of the form 8-K. The 
releases were through the press, conference call, Internet etc. Usually, the press releases come 
first on the announcement day. The announcements will then be made through conference 
and webcast either before market open or after market close.  
For various reasons, there are a few companies in the US, where the filing dates are not on 
the same day as press/internet release and conference call dates. However this is only for a 
very few, and the filing dates are not too far from dates of other means of publication.an  
example is a company listed in NASDAQ100 – AMGEN INCORPORATED. There are also 
some companies that do not report earning on form 8-K after a delaying period. Instead, they 
report directly on form 10K, the annual report, which provides a comprehensive overview of 
the company for the past year, on the same day with press release and conference call and 
Internet; an example is a company listed in NASDAQ 100 – ECHOSTER 
COMMUNICATION CORPORATION. In such cases, the earliest earnings announcements 
date to the public, which normally start with a press release date, was taken.  
For both SA and US equity market, companies sometimes provide a corrected/amended 
version of their announcement. If the amended version affected earning results, I took the 
amended date as the announcement date.   
At the Paris Bourse, the earnings announcements dates are the final earning results report 
dates taken from the Euronext Paris websites, and then compared to sources from companies’ 
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websites. The earliest earning release dates are selected in the same pattern. Press releases 
usually come first, followed by conference and other means of media.  
During the process of collecting data, it was confirmed that companies listed in different 
stock exchanges have different ways of presenting their earnings announcements, however 
they all go through the same process: press release, filing to the stock exchange, 
investor/analyst conference calls, and webcast.    
In addition, in their preliminary earning reports, some companies release fewer details than 
others. For the United States market, one might not provide a full balance sheet on form 8-K 
like many others but only selected financial results. The full details will appear later on the 
annual 10-K. The same situation is applied to companies on the JSE, but the companies on 
JSE tend to provide more comprehensive reports than in the US and companies in CAC40 
provide the most comprehensive final results.  
By selecting data from the SA, France, and US in this thesis I also want to make a 
comparison between common law countries, as in SA and US; and code law countries, of 
which France is one. In general, the role of accounting statements in the common law 
countries is to inform the stock market about the Company’s financial status. When earnings 
announcements are made, that is actually new information.  
Conversely, in the code law countries, the role of accounting statements is not to inform the 
shareholders because those people already know company financial situation through other 
internal means. The role of earnings announcements here is to announce what dividend the 
company should pay and what tax the company has to pay. Therefore leading to the 
expectation of different reactions to earnings announcements from the two different systems.  
Common law has its origin in England and hence it is found in UK and many former British 
colonies. Common law is a result of individual action in the private sector. It emphasizes the 
following legal procedure over rules, as explained by David and briefly, 1985, p.24; Posner, 
1996 Common laws including accounting standards have evolved by being commonly 
accepted in practice. Private sector bodies codify generally accepted rules and make them 
binding on their members; such standards arise not in government, but in an accounting 
market. Thus it can be said that common law enforcement is a private matter which involves 
civil litigation, whereas Code-law originates from collective planning in the public sector.  
Code-law enforcement is a government function, which involves administrative bodies 
undertaking criminal prosecution for code violation as explained by Ball, 2000, (p.13-18). 
The countries following common law accounting system have, ‘shareholder ‘corporate 
governance model in which shareholders alone elect the governing board, while the countries 
following code law have ‘stakeholder’ model for resolving information asymmetry by public 
and private communication. As a result of quicker incorporation of economic losses, 
accounting income in common-law countries is significantly timelier as compared to code-
law countries. In code-law countries information asymmetry is more likely resolved by 
institutional features other than timely and conservative public financial statements. This is 
done mostly by major shareholders.  One of the major differences between common-law and 
code-law countries are the manner in which information asymmetry between mangers and 
potential users of accounting income is resolved. As compared to the common-law countries 
there is strong political influence on accounting at national and firm levels, in the code-law 
countries. The Governments in these countries establish and enforce national accounting 
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standards with representation from major political groups such as labor unions, banks and 
business associations.  
On the firm level the political influence leads to a stakeholder governance model. Due to this, 
it can be said that the accounting income is divided among different groups such as dividends 
to shareholders, taxes to governments and bonuses to managers and employees. The demand 
for accounting income under code law is influenced more by the payout preferences for labor, 
capital and government, and less by the demand for public disclosure. The groups agents are 
represented in corporate governance hence the insider communication solves the information 
asymmetry between the managers and stakeholders. On the contrary in common-law 
countries the shareholders elect members of the governing board and hence payouts are less 
closely linked to current-period accounting income and public disclosure is more likely 
solution for the information asymmetry problem. The properties of accounting income are 
determines mostly in the disclosure market. 
 
3.4. A broad view of techniques employed in the thesis  
 
This thesis starts with the event study method to examine stock market prices response to the 
earnings events and in a later part to examine short-term and long-term impact of earnings 
announcements on the bid-ask spreads. This methodology was introduced by Brown and 
Warner (1985), and subsequently used by Beneish and Gardner (1995); Gregoriou and 
Ioannidis (2006); Gregoriou (2008) and many others event studies in the literature.    
Abnormal return (AR) is calculated as difference between individual stock return and market 
index returns, and then averaged across number of firms in the sample each day t to form 
average abnormal return (AAR). Average abnormal return AAR is cumulated over interval of 
k days from day t to t + k for different event windows to obtain cumulative average abnormal 
return (CAAR). Equally weighted portfolio standard deviation of AAR series is calculated, 
and t- statistics used to test the hypothesis that: 
CAAR = 0.  
This research has chosen different short-term event windows as [-1, 1], [-2, 2], [-3, 3],  
[-4, 4]; [-5, 5]; and long-term even windows as [-90, 0]; [-80, 0]; [-70, 0]; ... [-10, 0];  
[0, 10]; [0, 20].... [0, 90].  
This traditional market model will contain shortcomings inside if the events are clustered as 
explained by Brown and Warner, 1985. If all of our firms are exposed to earnings 
announcements at the same time, the abnormal returns for each firm will unlikely be 
independent due to contemporary correlation of return across firms. However, in my samples, 
different firms have different earnings announcement dates so abnormal returns are less likely 
to suffer from correlations. The test for correlation also supports this.  
In this thesis, good and bad news are defined by positive and negative returns over the short-
term event window [-5, 1] for the reason that we assume that the news is leaked to the market 
a couple of days before the official announcement date. The outcome of the positive and 
negative returns will not be affected by slight changes in the short term window. Pre-earnings 
announcement period is defined as a period from day -90 to day -1. Post earnings 
announcements period is defined as a period from day 0 to day +90.  
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Stock trading volume is calculated as the number of shares traded on the day multiplied by 
the average of high and low price of that day.  
As explained in chapters two, I will use the three measures of bid-ask spread including quote 
bid-ask spread, relative bid-ask spread and effective-bid ask spread as direct measures of 
stock market liquidity. Daily trades and quotes from Bloomberg database are used to 
calculate relative bid ask spread and effective bid-ask spread.  
Relative spread = (PA – PB)/ (PA +PB)/2 
The relative bid-ask spread is calculated as the difference between bid price and ask price 
divided by the mid-price.  
Effective spread = 2*P – [(PA +PB)/2] 
The effective bid-ask spread is calculated as twice as much as the absolute value of the  
difference between trading price and the mid-price.  
As discussed in the literature review chapter, the reason I would use the  three measures of 
bid ask spreads is because large trades are more likely to be executed outside the quoted 
spreads, so it can be said that quoted spread and relative spread are not an accurate measure, 
as noted in Roll (1984).  In addition, relative spread and effective spread take into account the 
mid-price so it ignores price movement leading to mid-price change and the relative and 
effective spread also change. For this reason it is necessary to take into account the three 
spread measures in the analysis as well.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
IMPACT OF EARNINGS ANNOUCEMENT ON STOCK LIQUIDITY                         
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTIC AND MULTI-VARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
Earnings announcement is a major event of information at the public level that captures stock 
market prospect because the information contained, strongly affects investor’s decisions. It 
has been observed that investors tend to trade more heavily and frequently around earnings                       
announcement. As mentioned previously, stock liquidity refers to the ability to trade the stock 
quickly at any time with lowest price impact. It is an important characteristic that every                             
investor looks for when trading in the market. Given the importance of earnings information, 
in this chapter I would like to explore the impact of earnings announcements on the stock 
market liquidity. This chapter has three objectives. First is to examine evidence of post 
earnings announcement drift and price reaction to the earnings announcements on 
Johannesburg stock exchanges, with comparison of other important indices from the US and 
French markets, and by the separation of the large, medium and small securities. Second 
objective of this thesis is to explore the trading volume effect in both short term and long 
term of earnings announcement. Finally I would test the information cost liquidity 
hypothesis, which was first established in 1970 by Van Horn. Given the possibility of an 
alternative information environment after earnings announcements, I will examine whether 
there is increase/decrease in market liquidity following earnings announcement.  
 
The layout is as follows. Section 4.1 describes the descriptive statistic employed. Section     
4.2 describes the methodology and investigates the stock prices response to earnings                         
announcement. Section 4.3 present the spread effects of earnings announcement. Section 4.4 
investigates the use of multivariate analysis on earnings announcement’s long term impact on 
stock liquidity. Section 4.5 investigates the implication of bid-ask spread and information 
asymmetry cost component. Section 4.6 summary. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Johannesburg stock exchanges 
 
Table 4.1.1 present descriptive statistics of samples of 40 firms listed on the JSE Top 40, 60 
firms listed on the JSE Mid Cap, 60firms listed on the JSE Small Cap, in the                               
period 90 days before earnings announcement and 90days after earnings announcement. It 
was observed that JSE Top 40 companies are large firms with high market liquidity because 
of the high market value and low relative bid-ask spreads. In fact, these firms account for 
about 81% market value of the whole Johannesburg stock exchange. Daily trading volume 
per market value is also evidence of high liquidity. Firms listed in JSE Mid Cap are medium 
sized firms. The stocks are still of high liquidity but less so compared to JSE Top 40 firms 
with a relative higher bid-ask spreads. In addition, the large daily trading volume per market 
value is evidence of high liquidity of stocks, but this number is lower than that of the JSE 
Top 40 firms. Firms listed in JSE Small Cap are smaller than firms listed in JSE Top 40 and 
JSE Mid Cap and also with a lower market value. The bid-ask spreads is relatively higher 
than the above two indices, this suggests low liquidity. The daily trading volume per market 
value of the JSE Small Cap is lower than the above two indices, stocks of these firms are 
illiquid.  
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America stock exchanges  
 
Table 4.1.2. Presents descriptive statistics for samples of 30 firms listed in DJIA, 96 firms 
listed in NASDAQ100 and 100 firms listed in S&P100 in pre-earnings announcements 
period. We observe that firms in DJIA are large and the stocks are of high liquidity because 
of the high market value and low bid-ask spreads. In addition, high daily trading volume per 
market value is also evidence of high liquidity. Statistics also show that the NASDAQ100 are 
large firms with high market value in the US stock exchanges. The low bid-ask spread 
indicates high liquidity of stocks. Another evidence of high liquidity is daily trading volume 
per market value, relatively high compared to the stock prices. Finally, firms in the S&P100 
index are also large firms. Low bid-ask spreads are indicators of stocks with high liquidity. 
Moreover, the daily trading volume per market value is relatively high compared to the stock 
prices. This is further evidence of high liquidity.  
 
Paris Bourse  
Table 4.1.3 presents descriptive statistics for final samples of 40 firms listed in CAC40 in 
pre-earnings announcements period. High market values suggest that the CAC40 firms are 
large, low quoted bid-ask spreads shows that the stocks are liquid. Additionally, liquidity of 
firms stock is reflected by high daily trading volume per market value.  
 
Table 4.1.1.  JSE– Pre-earnings and Post earnings announcements descriptive statistics.  
Variables  Stock 
Price  
Quoted 
Spread  
Relative 
Spread  
Effective 
Spread  
Market 
value  
Trading 
Volume 
Stock 
Return  
Daily 
TV per 
MV  
Unit  ZAR (Cents) (%)  (Cents) (Millions 
ZAR)  
(1000ZAR)  (%)  (Per 
1000)  
JSE Top 40        
Pre EA          
Mean 8.64 1.85 0.25 1.27 14077 80995 0.096 7.13 
Std. Dev.  6.27 2.18 0.33 1.63 20877 120453 1.43 6.89 
Skewness 1.45 3.82 7.53 3.82 2.94 4.14 0.43 19.33 
Kurtosis  5.18 25.54 77.32 30.98 12.08 29.41 9.11 883.98 
Jarque-
Bera  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Post EA          
Mean 9.16 1.84 0.23 1.26 14272 99582 0.058 8.63 
Std. Dev.  6.57 2.31 0.3 1.7 20073 13650 1.7 7.54 
Skewness 1.48 7.31 9.54 7.88 2.86 3.79 0.24 7.15 
Kurtosis  5.34 145.9 156.4 201.7 11.64 25.83 20.12 113.57 
Jarque-
Bera  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
         JSE Mid cap        
Pre EA          
Mean 5.38 5.25 0.96 3.15 976 6222 0.012 5.42 
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Std. Dev.  5.4 12.6 1.5 9.03 597 12261 1.7 7.77 
Skewness 3.87 8.32 7.21 11.17 1.29 20.13 -1.33 10.82 
Kurtosis  25.21 97.72 92.61 165.86 4.3 972.95 64.57 287.76 
Jarque-
Bera  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Post EA          
Mean 5.78 4.97 0.86 2.94 1045 7339 0.049 6.07 
Std. Dev.  5.58 10.53 1.31 6.77 628 12166 1.9 9.46 
Skewness 3.26 6.57 7.23 8.45 1.25 9.03 0.11 20.85 
Kurtosis  18.53 65.71 95.38 114.83 4.19 186.83 12.06 862.58 
Jarque-
Bera  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
JSE Small Cap  
Pre EA  
Mean 3.77 11.41 3.23 4.96 192.61 596.73 0.068 2.72 
Std. Dev. 14.85 49.33 4.56 21.54 100.62 2035.33 1.81 8.03 
Skewness 15.42 15.08 6.84 18.62 1.51 15.91 -1.32 16.25 
Kurtosis 253.56 274.1 99.79 481.52 7.57 438.57 55.97 461.56 
Jarque-
Bera 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Post EA  
Mean 3.95 11.16 3.12 4.8 200.69 615.47 0.025 2.77 
Std. Dev. 15.17 48.18 4.53 21.06 97.52 1860.2 1.86 7.9 
Skewness 15.14 15.03 10.16 22.44 1.09 14.42 -0.121 16.56 
Kurtosis 244.23 264.7 264.63 715.71 4.96 365.39 19.22 478.3 
Jarque-
Bera 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Table 4.1.2. The U.S. Stock Exchanges Pre-earnings and Post earnings announcements 
 Descriptive statistics 
Variabl
es 
Stock 
Price 
Quoted 
Spread 
Relativ
e 
Spread 
Effectiv
e 
Spread 
Market 
value 
Trading 
Volume 
Stock 
Return 
Daily 
TV per 
MV 
Unit  ($US)  (cents)  (%)  (cents)  (Million
s )$  
($1000)  (%)  (per 
1000)  
DJIA  
Pre EA  
Mean  49.45 3.41 0.07 2.3 133162 607129 0.075 5.62 
Std. Dev.  18.34 3.07 0.057 3.25 96176 582951 1.16 6.12 
Skewness  0.55 14.36 12.67 13.02 1.32 7.33 -1.87 10.07 
Kurtosis  2.55 440.5 377.4 334.74 4.61 135.68 26.26 185.29 
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Jarque-
Bera  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Post EA  
Mean  52.22 3.45 0.067 2.38 140793 684247 0.101 6.06 
Std. Dev.  19.13 2.52 0.048 2.88 98981 495393 1.14 4.99 
Skewness  0.58 3.88 8.2 9.82 1.2 2.13 0.28 4.85 
Kurtosis  2.81 41.79 185.82 221 4.23 10.07 7.95 44.07 
Jarque-
Bera  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NASDAQ100  
Pre EA  
Mean  44.56 1.8 0.048 3.85 20181 274136 0.069 15.07 
Std. Dev.  51.7 2.87 0.061 7.6 32709 505879 1.96 14.32 
Skewness  6.61 5.18 0.56 39.51 4.17 6.77 -0.13 4.79 
Kurtosis  54.12 95.03 11.51 2485.73 24.98 106.08 14.63 54.51 
Jarque-
Bera  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Post EA  
Mean  44.54 2.33 0.061 3.47 20885 285698 0.072 15.08 
Std. Dev.  50.35 3.04 0.064 4.42 35775 545093 1.95 14.31 
Skewness  6.47 3.59 0.61 7.65 4.43 6.1 0.15 5.88 
Kurtosis  53.52 44.68 15.33 119.22 27.14 64.49 20.91 73.99 
Jarque-
Bera  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
S&P100  
Pre EA  
Mean  54.32 3.72 0.076 2.9 73509 419912 0.091 7.22 
Std. Dev.  49.4 3.54 0.056 5.1 74930 524184 1.238 7.96 
Skewness  6.39 6.42 4.88 14.22 2.24 5.72 -0.45 6.23 
Kurtosis  53.8 122.46 133.44 407.54 9.13 85.25 13.7 79.33 
Jarque-
Bera  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Post EA  
Mean  56.78 3.9 0.077 3.11 76167 489259 0.087 8.18 
Std. Dev.  49.89 4.12 0.162 6.94 76876 560221 1.32 7.73 
Skewness  5.89 11.63 75.9 44.1 2.15 4.6 -0.041 4.27 
Kurtosis  47.79 352.76 6593 2988 8.65 45.96 12 35.27 
Jarque-
Bera  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 4.1.3. CAC40– Pre-earnings announcements descriptive statistics.  
Variables Stock 
Price 
Quoted 
Spread 
Relative 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Market 
value 
Trading 
Volume 
Stock 
Return 
Daily 
TV 
per 
MV 
Unit  (€)  (Cents)  (%)  (Cents)  (Millions 
€)  
(1000€) (%)  (Per 
1000)  
CAC40         
Pre EA          
Mean  64.28 6.04 0.089 5.48 32283 126724 0.101 4.77 
Std. Dev.  41.83 8.74 0.107 8.21 27535 121315 1.34 3.68 
Skewness  1.45 11.11 23.36 12.87 1.68 3.05 0.16 4.43 
Kurtosis  5.22 230.2 785.55 294.45 5.64 18.36 6.59 42.03 
Jarque-
Berra  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Post EA          
Mean  70.02 3.98 0.058 3.63 35023 159508 0.09 5.41 
Std. Dev.  46.37 6.37 0.056 5.97 28849 156920 1.47 3.92 
Skewness  1.5 5.92 2.41 6.31 1.61 3.66 0.26 3.54 
Kurtosis  5.57 60.94 11.57 71.48 5.37 28.2 6.22 28.12 
Jarque-
Berra  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
4.2. Stock Price response to earnings announcements. 
4.2.2. Empirical design 
 
In this section, samples have been split into good news and bad news groups. Good news and 
bad news firms are defined by positive and negative returns respectively over the short event 
window period [-5, 1], for the reason that we assume information has been leaked to the   
market a couple of days before the event and up to day + 1 markets already have enough time 
to recognize the news direction. In fact the results will not change if we vary this window. 
For each group, the standard event study method for a window of 181 days around earnings 
announcements date [-90; +90] was used. The stock price reaction to the earnings               
announcements around the event date 0 was analysed using the market adjusted model of   
abnormal returns, which is the difference between rates of return of individual stock and rate 
of return of the index due to its simplicity and popularity. This market-adjusted model (or 
constant mean return model) was used by Brown and Warner (1985), Hedge and McDermott 
(2003) and Gregoriou (2006). In fact, Brown and Warner find that the simple mean returns 
model often yields results similar to those of more sophisticated models because the variance 
of the abnormal returns is not reduced much by choosing a more sophisticated model. 
 
ARit = Rit - Rmt                                                                                                                                          (1) 
Where, 
 
          Rit is the rate of stock i on day t,Rit = ln Pit – ln Pi (t-1) 
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          Rmt is the rate of return of the index on day t,Rmt = lnPit – lnPI(t-1).                                                       
It is value weighted market return of stock index in the abnormal returns ARit then are 
averaged across the number of firms in the sample on each day t to form an average excess 
returns, (AARt). 
 
For the purpose of testing the reaction, Aggregate abnormal returns (AARt) are cumulated 
from day 0 through intervals of k days, k = 10, 20, 30, ...90, and k = -10, -20, -30 ....-90 to 
test the short run and long run effect of earnings announcements on the stock market. We also 
cumulate 10 days around earnings announcement. 
 
  𝐴𝐴𝑅     ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
 
                                                                                              (2) 
                                                                                         
The variance of the sample is obtained by the following formula:  
                                                     
         SAAR
2
 
 
       
∑ (𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡       𝐴𝐴𝑅 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ )
2
                                                                   (3)              
 
 𝐴𝐴𝑅  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ is the mean of average excess returns AARt for 181 trading day period.  
 
If there is no reaction,  𝐴𝐴𝑅    outcome will be. 
 
  𝐴𝐴𝑅   𝑡      (    𝑡 𝑡   )                                                                                                    
(4) 
 
 
The t statistic used to test the hypothesis CAAR equal the zero is calculated as: 
 
                                t- statistic = 
         
√(   )     
                                                                    (5) 
 
The t-statistics for all indices are presented in 6 tables in the following section.                    
The short-term effect around a five-day event window [-5, +5] is presented in Panel A. The 
Long term effects for up to 90 days following earnings announcement is presented in Panel 
B, at 10-day interval. The result shows significant positive stock price reactions to the good 
news earnings announcements, and significant negative stock price reaction to the bad news 
earnings announcements for all indices. The good and bad news are defined by positive and 
negative returns over the short-term event window [-5, 1]. I assume there is leakage of       
information before the news. Liquidity effects occur for all indices in the short term, and 
persist longer in the long term for good news firms than for the bad news firms. This happens 
as we would expect, the reaction occur until the news has ended its effects on stock prices. 
All of the tables also show that the increases or decreases in price are permanent, (i.e., after 
the change, the price does not go back down or up to the original level).  
 
4.2.2. Results and explanations of stock price response to earnings announcement on the 
Johannesburg stock exchange  
 
4.2.2.1. JSE TOP 40  
The test result for cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR)  for JSE TOP40, presented in 
table 4.1.2.1 indicate that stock returns of firms included in JSE TOP40 are significantly 
affected by the earnings announcements, not only after earning announcements but also 
before earnings announcements.  
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Before Event 
For good news the t-values are mostly insignificant, pre earnings announcements as we can 
see from Table 4.2.2.1 in Panel A and Panel B there was no previous reaction before the news 
was released. T-statistics in the short term are 1.43 for the window frame [-3, -1], 0.74 for     
[-2,-1] and 0.23 for [-1,-1]. T-statistics for long term are 1.35 for the window frame [-40,-1], 
1.21 for [-30,-1] and 1.00 for [-20,-1].  
 
For the bad news t-values are totally insignificant in the short term period, as we can see in 
Table 4.2.2.1 in Panel A. T-statistics are -1.08 for the window frame [-5,-1], 0.13 for [-3,-1], -
0.48 for [-2,-1] and -0.80 for [-1,-1]. T-statistics for long term are 1.51 for the window frame 
[-80,-1], 0.93 for [-50,-1] and 0.39 for [-10,-1] in panel B.  
 
After Event 
For good news the t-values are strongly significant as we can see from Table 4.2.2.1 Panel A 
and Panel B. T-statistics in the short term are 7.79 for the time frame [1, 0], 6.93 for [3, 0] 
and is 6.23 for [4, 0]. T-statistics for long term are 4.14 for the time frame [10, 0], 2.14 for 
[40, 0] and 2.59 for [70, 0]. 
 
For bad news t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we can see in table 4.1.2.1 
Panel A. T statistics are -5.82 for the time frame [1, 0], -4.74 for [2, 0] and -3.58 for [5, 0].     
T statistics for the long term are -0.56 for the window frame [20, 0], 0.18 for [40, 0] and 0.20 
for [70, 0] in panel B. 
 
Overall there are positive reactions happening for the good news and negative reaction for 
bad news. The largest abnormal return occurred on the event day 0 with t statistic for the 
good news firm’s equal 9.98, and for bad news firms are -7.35. Also there is an evidence of 
abnormal return persisting over the long term, especially for good news firms. However, bad 
news reaction ends more quickly. The reaction is considerably more expressive on the good 
news firms and stock prices continue to react while bad news stock prices go back to 
equilibrium within a shorter time frame. Since there is significant price response to the 
earnings news, there is possibility of change in liquidity due to the announcement. 
 
 
Table 4.2.2.1.Abnormal Returns around JSE TOP 40 index earnings announcement. 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Returns 
 
                   GOOD NEWS 
  
 
                  BAD NEWS 
Event day  CAAR  t-
statistic  
Event 
day  
CAA
R  
t-statistic  
[-5, -1]  0.013  2.33***  [-5, -1]  -0.007  -1.08  
[-4, -1]  0.009  1.89*  [-4, -1]  -0.004  -0.72  
[-3, -1]  0.006  1.43  [-3, -1]  0.001  0.13  
[-2, -1]  0.003  0.74  [-2, -1]  -0.002  -0.48  
[-1, -1]  0.001  0.23  [-1, -1]  -0.002  -0.80  
[0, 0]  0.024  9.98***  [0, 0]  -0.021  -7.35***  
[1, 0]  0.027  7.79***  [1, 0]  -0.023  -5.82***  
[2, 0]  0.033  7.88***  [2, 0]  -0.023  -4.74***  
[3, 0]  0.034  6.93***  [3, 0]  -0.024  -4.19***  
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[4, 0]  0.034  6.23***  [4, 0]  -0.025  -3.91***  
[5, 0]  0.031  5.18***  [5, 0]  -0.025  -3.58***  
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level  
 
Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS  BAD NEWS  
Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  
[-90, -1]  0.051  2.23**  [-90, -1]  0.047  1.77*  
[-80, -1]  0.055  2.50***  [-80, -1]  0.038  1.51  
[-70, -1]  0.037  1.81*  [-70, -1]  0.033  1.40  
[-60, -1]  0.038  1.99**  [-60, -1]  0.025  1.16  
[-50, -1]  0.034  1.96**  [-50, -1]  0.019  0.93  
[-40, -1]  0.021  1.35  [-40, -1]  0.014  0.77  
[-30, -1]  0.016  1.21  [-30, -1]  0.016  1.03  
[-20, -1]  0.011  1.00  [-20, -1]  0.004  0.29  
[-10, -1]  0.015  1.91*  [-10, -1]  0.003  0.39  
[10, 0]  0.033  4.14***  [10, 0]  -0.029  -3.06***  
[20, 0]  0.030  2.73***  [20, 0]  -0.007  -0.56  
[30, 0]  0.033  2.46***  [30, 0]  -0.003  -0.21  
[40, 0]  0.033  2.14**  [40, 0]  0.003  0.18  
[50, 0]  0.046  2.64***  [50, 0]  0.000  -0.02  
[60, 0]  0.045  2.36***  [60, 0]  0.003  0.13  
[70, 0]  0.053  2.59***  [70, 0]  0.005  0.20  
[80, 0]  0.051  2.34***  [80, 0]  0.003  0.12  
[90, 0]  0.054  2.33***  [90, 0]  -0.006  -0.24  
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level  
 
In the table above the sample consists of 40 stocks listed on the JSE TOP 40 index. 
Cumulative average abnormal returns CAAR are computed using the market model and the 
standard event study methodology. The estimation window for computing the market model 
parameters is the event time interval [-90, 90]. CAAR is tested for significance using t-
statistics. 
 
4.2.2.2 JSE MID CAP  
 
The test result for cumulative average abnormal result for JSE Mid Cap in table 4.2.2.2 
indicates that stock returns of the firms included in the index are significantly affected by the 
earnings announcements. There is significant change before and after the event date.  
 
Before Event  
For good news the t-values are mostly significant in pre earnings announcements as we can 
see from table 4.2.2.2 Panel A and Panel B. The t-statistics in the short term before the event 
are strongly significant. T-statistics in the short term are 1.78 for the window frame [-1, -1], 
2.53 for [-2,-1] and 2.43 for [-3,-1]. As we can see from the table the t-statistics in the long 
term are mostly significant. T-statistics for long term are 2.47 for the time frame [-10,-1], 
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1.85 for [-30,-1] and 1.51 for [-50,-1]. For the bad news t-values are totally insignificant in 
the short term period, as we can see in table 4.1.21.2 Panel A. T-statistics are -2.23 for the 
window frame [-2,-1], -3.00 for [-3,-1] and -03.05 for [-4,-1]. T-statistics for bad news for 
long term before the announcement are 0.22 for [-20,-1], 0.66 for [-30,-1] and 0.29 for           
[-50,-1] in panel B.  
 
After Event  
For good news the t-values are strongly significant as we can see from table 4.2.2.2 Panel A 
and Panel B. The t-statistics for good news in the short term are mostly significant.                 
T-statistics in the short term are 9.28 for the time frame [1, 0], 8.07 for [3, 0] and is 7.26 for 
[4, 0]. As we can see from table 4.1.2.2 Panel B, the t-statistics are mostly significant.           
T-statistics for long term are 5.37 for the time frame [10, 0], 2.91 for [40, 0] and 1.94 for the 
time frame [70, 0].  
For bad news after the event t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we can see 
in table 4.1.2.1 Panel A. T statistics in the short term are -7.46 for the time frame [1, 0], -5.68 
for [2, 0] and -2.77 for [5, 0]. The t-statistics in the long term are totally insignificant.                   
T statistics for bad news in the long term are -1.08 for the time frame [20, 0], -0.36 for the 
time frame [40, 0] and -0.44 for the time frame [50, 0] in panel B. 
 
Overall there are positive reactions happening for the good news and negative reaction for 
bad news. The largest abnormal returns happen on day 0 with t statistic equal to 9.77 for good 
news firms and on day 1 with t statistic are -7.46 for bad news firms. For long term, stock 
prices continue to change after earnings announcements until the end of 90 day for good 
news firms. There is no reaction for bad news firms in the long term as the bad news ends 
quickly. Possibly there is a liquidity effect caused by earnings announcements for the good 
news company in the long term.  
 
Table 4.2.2.2.Aggregate Abnormal Returns around JSE MID CAP index earnings 
announcements  
 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Returns 
 
  
                   GOOD NEWS  
 
 
                BAD NEWS  
Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  
[-5, -1]  0.015  3.34***  [-5, -1]  -0.013  -2.90***  
[-4, -1]  0.013  3.09***  [-4, -1]  -0.012  -3.05***  
[-3, -1]  0.009  2.43***  [-3, -1]  -0.011  -3.00***  
[-2, -1]  0.007  2.53***  [-2, -1]  -0.006  -2.23**  
[-1, -1]  0.004  1.78*  [-1, -1]  -0.003  -1.35  
[0, 0]  0.020  9.77***  [0, 0]  -0.015  -7.23***  
[1, 0]  0.027  9.28***  [1, 0]  -0.022  -7.46***  
[2, 0]  0.028  8.02***  [2, 0]  -0.020  -5.68***  
[3, 0]  0.033  8.07***  [3, 0]  -0.015  -3.60***  
[4, 0]  0.033  7.26***  [4, 0]  -0.014  -3.02***  
[5, 0]  0.035  6.95***  [5, 0]  -0.014  -2.77***  
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns  
 
                   GOOD NEWS 
 
 
                   BAD NEWS  
Event 
day  
CAAR  t-
statistic  
Event 
day  
CAAR  t-
statistic  
[-89, -1]  0.015  0.78  [-89, -1]  -0.006  -0.30  
[-80, -1]  0.012  0.65  [-80, -1]   0.002   0.10  
[-70, -1]  0.012  0.70  [-70, -1]   0.006   0.35  
[-60, -1]  0.016  1.02  [-60, -1]   0.003   0.21  
[-50, -1]  0.022  1.51  [-50, -1]   0.004   0.29  
[-40, -1]  0.023  1.77*  [-40, -1]   0.001   0.11  
[-30, -1]  0.021  1.85*  [-30, -1]   0.007   0.66  
[-20, -1]  0.020  2.16**  [-20, -1]   0.002   0.22  
[-10, -1]  0.016  2.47***  [-10, -1]  -0.004  -0.65  
[10, 0]  0.036  5.37***  [10, 0]  -0.011  -1.56  
[20, 0]  0.037  3.93***  [20, 0]  -0.010  -1.08  
[30, 0]  0.040  3.49***  [30, 0]  -0.009  -0.77  
[40, 0]  0.038  2.91***  [40, 0]  -0.005  -0.36  
[50, 0]  0.037  2.53***  [50, 0]  -0.006  -0.44  
[60, 0]  0.033  2.05**  [60, 0]  -0.005  -0.34  
[70, 0]  0.033  1.94*  [70, 0]  -0.005  -0.29  
[80, 0]  0.037  2.02**  [80, 0]  -0.010  -0.56  
[90, 0]  0.042  2.16**  [90, 0]  -0.005  -0.28  
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
 In the table above the sample consists of 60 stocks listed on JSE Mid Cap index with data 
available Cumulative average abnormal returns CAAR are computed using the market model 
and the standard event study methodology. The estimation window for computing the market 
model parameters is the event time interval [-90, 90]. CAAR is tested for significance using t-
statistics. 
 
4.2.2.3 JSE SMALL CAP  
 
The test result for cumulative average abnormal returns for JSE Small Cap indicates that 
stock returns of firms included in the index are significantly affected by the earnings 
announcements; there is significant change before and after the event date.  
 
Before Event  
For good news the t-values are totally significant in the short term in pre earnings                              
announcements as we can see from table 4.2.2.3 Panel A. T-statistics in the short term are 
2.91 for the window frame [-4, -1], 2.69 for [-2,-1] and 2.02 for [-1,-1]. For the t-statistics in 
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the long term there is no significant change in the stock returns. T-statistics for long term are 
0.77 for the window frame [-40,-1], 0.98 for [-30,-1] and 1.47 for [-20,-1].  
 
For the bad news t-values are totally significant in the short term period, as we can see in   
table 4.2.2.3 Panel A. T-statistics are -3.33 for the window frame [-5,-1], -2.57 for [-3,-1],       
-2.19 for [-2,-1] and -0.66 for [-1,-1]. The t-statistics in the long term for bad news show no 
significant changes in the stock returns. T-statistics for long term are 0.75 for the window 
frame [-80,-1], 1.28 for [-50,-1] and -0.62 for [-10,-1]  
 
After Event  
For good news the t-values are strongly significant as we can see from table 4.2.2.3 Panel A 
and Panel B. The t-statistics in the short term after the announcement are mostly significant. 
T statistics in the short term are 9.64 for the time frame [1, 0], 8.02 for [3, 0] and is 7.49 for 
[4, 0]. The t-statistics after the announcement are strongly significant. T-statistics for long 
term are 5.05 for the time frame [10, 0], 2.99 for [40, 0] and 1.88 for [70, 0]. 
 
For bad news t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we can see in table 4.2.2.3 
Panel A. T statistics in the short term are -5.37 for the time frame [1, 0], -4.23 for [2, 0] and    
-2.49 for [5, 0]. The t-statistics for bad news in the long term show no                       
significant changes except in the end of the study period. T statistics for the long term are                  
-0.98 for [20, 0], -1.38 for [40, 0] and -1.81 for [70, 0].  
 
Similar to JSE Mid Cap, for JSE Small Cap there is reaction in the pre-announcement period 
for both good and bad news in the short term. There is no significant change in the long term 
for bad news. The reactions are significant for both the news in the short term. In the long 
term pre and post event there is no reaction for the bad news. 
 
Overall there are positive reactions happening for the good news and negative reaction for 
bad news. The largest average abnormal return is on the event day 0 for good news firms and 
on day 1 for bad news firms with t statistic is 10.18 and -5.37 in the short term respectively. 
For long term, stock prices continue to drift after earnings announcements up to 90 days post 
earnings announcement for good news firms; however there is no significant evidence of 
price reaction for the bad news firms after 5 days. There is possibility of change in liquidity 
due to the announcement, especially with good news firms. 
 
Table 4.2.2.3.Aggregate Abnormal Returns around JSE Small Cap index earnings  
Announcements 
Panel A. Short-term abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS  BAD NEWS  
Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  
[-5, -1]  0.017  3.34***  [-5, -1]  -0.014  -3.33***  
[-4, -1]  0.013  2.91***  [-4, -1]  -0.010  -2.78***  
[-3, -1]  0.010  2.49***  [-3, -1]  -0.008  -2.57***  
[-2, -1]  0.009  2.69***  [-2, -1]  -0.006  -2.19**  
[-1, -1]  0.005  2.02**  [-1, -1]  -0.001  -0.66  
[0, 0]  0.023  10.18***  [0, 0]  -0.009  -4.79***  
[1, 0]  0.031  9.64***  [1, 0]  -0.014  -5.37***  
[2, 0]  0.034  8.84***  [2, 0]  -0.014  -4.23***  
[3, 0]  0.036  8.02***  [3, 0]  -0.012  -3.34***  
[4, 0]  0.037  7.49***  [4, 0]  -0.014  -3.34***  
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[5, 0]  0.037  6.68***  [5, 0]  -0.011  -2.49***  
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns  
                   GOOD NEWS   BAD NEWS  
Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  
[-90, -1]  -0.004  -0.17  [-90, -1]  0.013  0.72  
[-80, -1]  0.000  0.01  [-80, -1]  0.012  0.75  
[-70, -1]  0.005  0.27  [-70, -1]  0.018  1.18  
[-60, -1]  0.012  0.67  [-60, -1]  0.017  1.19  
[-50, -1]  0.008  0.51  [-50, -1]  0.017  1.28  
[-40, -1]  0.011  0.77  [-40, -1]  0.007  0.61  
[-30, -1]  0.012  0.98  [-30, -1]  0.010  0.97  
[-20, -1]  0.015  1.47  [-20, -1]  0.009  1.06  
[-10, -1]  0.016  2.21**  [-10, -1]  -0.004  -0.62  
[10, 0]  0.037  5.05***  [10, 0]  -0.008  -1.36  
[20, 0]  0.035  3.44***  [20, 0]  -0.008  -0.98  
[30, 0]  0.039  3.16***  [30, 0]  -0.010  -0.97  
[40, 0]  0.043  2.99***  [40, 0]  -0.016  -1.38  
[50, 0]  0.044  2.77***  [50, 0]  -0.015  -1.14  
[60, 0]  0.039  2.25**  [60, 0]  -0.025  -1.77*  
[70, 0]  0.035  1.88*  [70, 0]  -0.028  -1.81*  
[80, 0]  0.041  2.03**  [80, 0]  -0.036  -2.16**  
[90, 0]  0.046  2.13**  [90, 0]  -0.042  -2.40**  
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
 In the table above the sample consists of 60 stocks listed on JSE Small Cap index 
Cumulative average abnormal returns CAAR are computed using the market model and the 
standard event study methodology. The estimation window for computing the market model 
parameters is the event time interval [-90, 90]. CAAR is tested for significance using                      
t-statistics. 
 
4.2.2.4 DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE (DJIA) 
 
The test result for cumulative average abnormal returns for the DJIA in Table 4.2.2.4 
indicates that stock returns of firms included in the DJIA are strongly affected by the earnings 
announcements.  
 
Before Event  
 
For good news the t-values are totally insignificant in the short term in pre earnings 
announcements as we can see from table 4.2.2.4 Panel A. T-statistics in the short term are 
0.84 for the window frame [-4, -1], 0.41 for [-2,-1] and 0.02 for [-1,-1]. The t-statistics in the 
long term before the event are totally insignificant as we can see from the Panel B. T-
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statistics for long term before the event are -0.45 for the window frame [-80,-1], -0.19 for [-
30,-1] and -0.25 for [-20,-1].  
 
For the bad news t-values are mostly insignificant in the short term period, as we can see in 
table 4.1.2.5 Panel A. T-statistics are 0.31 for the window frame [-5,-1], 0.25 for[-3,-1] and                     
-0.14 for [-2,-1]. In panel B, the t-statistics in the long term for bad news show no significant 
changes in the stock return. T-statistics for long term are 0.36 for the window frame [-80,-1], 
0.60 for [-50,-1] and 0.27 for [-10,-1]. 
 
After Event  
For good news the t-statistics in the short term after the announcement are mostly significant. 
T statistics in the short term are 5.75 for the time frame [1, 0], 3.92 for [3, 0] and is 3.68 for 
[4, 0]. The t-statistics after the announcement in the long term are mostly significant.                    
T-statistics for long term are 2.33 for the time frame [10, 0], 2.11 for [40, 0] and 0.66 for [70, 
0].  
For bad news t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we can see in table 4.2.2.4 
Panel A. T statistics in the short term are -6.29 for the time frame [1, 0], -4.69 for [2, 0] and                 
-3.22 for [5, 0]. The t-statistics for bad news after the announcement period show no reaction 
at all .T statistics for the long term are -1.07 for the window frame [20, 0], -1.24 for [40, 0] 
and 0.26 for [70, 0].  
 
Overall, similarly as other previous indices, stock prices drift significantly after earnings                       
announcement, as t value reject null hypothesis. Largest abnormal return happened on day 1 
for both news with t statistic is 5.75 for good news firms and is – 6.29 for bad news firms. 
There is evidence of change in liquidity in the short term for both types of news; however, the                          
evidence of abnormal returns happens only for good news up to 50 days post earnings                         
announcement. In addition, as expected, many firms in the US have earnings announcement 
at the end of the day after market close, and that is the reason why it has been observed that 
the reaction is most significantly on the day 1 instead of day 0 as in SA.  
 
Table 4.2.2.4. Aggregate Abnormal Returns around DJIA index earnings 
announcements  
 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Returns 
                     GOOD NEWS                       BAD NEWS  
Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  
[-5, -1]  0.006  1.03  [-5, -1]  0.002  0.31  
[-4, -1]  0.004  0.84  [-4, -1]  0.002  0.39  
[-3, -1]  0.005  1.11  [-3, -1]  0.001  0.25  
[-2, -1]  0.002  0.41  [-2, -1]  -0.001  -0.14  
[-1, -1]  0.000  0.02  [-1, -1]  -0.002  -0.62  
[0, 0]  0.011  4.19***  [0, 0]  -0.011  -3.89***  
[1, 0]  0.022  5.75***  [1, 0]  -0.026  -6.29***  
[2, 0]  0.021  4.47***  [2, 0]  -0.024  -4.69***  
[3, 0]  0.021  3.92***  [3, 0]  -0.024  -4.06***  
[4, 0]  0.022  3.68***  [4, 0]  -0.024  -3.66***  
[5, 0]  0.022  3.35***  [5, 0]  -0.023  -3.22***  
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level  
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Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns 
                     GOOD NEWS                       BAD NEWS  
Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  
[-90, -1]  -0.014  -0.54  [-90, -1]  0.014  0.49  
[-80, -1]  -0.011  -0.45  [-80, -1]  0.009  0.36  
[-70, -1]  -0.013  -0.58  [-70, -1]  0.010  0.42  
[-60, -1]  -0.004  -0.18  [-60, -1]  0.013  0.58  
[-50, -1]  0.010  0.53  [-50, -1]  0.012  0.60  
[-40, -1]  0.002  0.09  [-40, -1]  0.006  0.32  
[-30, -1]  -0.003  -0.19  [-30, -1]  0.016  0.98  
[-20, -1]  -0.003  -0.25  [-20, -1]  -0.003  -0.22  
[-10, -1]  0.008  1.01  [-10, -1]  0.002  0.27  
[10, 0]  0.020  2.33***  [10, 0]  -0.015  -1.55  
[20, 0]  0.024  2.02**  [20, 0]  -0.014  -1.07  
[30, 0]  0.027  1.86*  [30, 0]  -0.020  -1.20  
[40, 0]  0.036  2.11**  [40, 0]  -0.023  -1.24  
[50, 0]  0.035  1.86*  [50, 0]  -0.023  -1.11  
[60, 0]  0.028  1.35  [60, 0]  -0.009  -0.40  
[70, 0]  0.015  0.66  [70, 0]  0.006  0.26  
[80, 0]  0.022  0.91  [80, 0]  0.019  0.72  
[90, 0]  0.031  1.21  [90, 0]  0.005  0.19  
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level  
 
In the table above the sample consists of 40 stocks listed on DJIA index. Cumulative average 
abnormal returns CAAR are computed using the market model and the standard event study 
methodology. The estimation window for computing the market model parameters is the 
event time interval [-90, 90]. CAAR is tested for significance using t-statistics. 
 
4.2.2.5 NASDAQ100  
 
The test result for cumulative average abnormal returns in table 4.2.2.5 indicate that 
cumulative average abnormal return significantly changed after the earnings announcement 
event in the short term event windows. 
  
Before Event  
For good news the t-values are totally insignificant in the short term in pre earnings                              
announcements as we can see from table 4.1.2.6 Panel A. T-statistics in the short term are 
1.36 for the window frame [-4, -1], 0.88 for [-2,-1] and 1.08 for [-1,-1]. For the t-statistics in 
the long term before the event there is no significant change in stock return. T-statistics for 
long term are 1.42 for the window frame [-70,-1], 0.55 for [-40,-1] and 1.73 for [-10,-1].  
 46 
 
For the bad news t-values are totally insignificant in the short term period, as we can see in 
table 4.1.2.6 Panel A. T-statistics are -0.66 for the window frame [-5,-1], -0.29 for [-3,-1] and 
-0.46 for [-1,-1]. The t-statistics in the long term for bad news show no significant changes in 
the stock return. T-statistics for long term are 0.40 for the window frame [-80,-1], 0.32 for                     
[-50,-1] and -0.32 for [-10,-1]  
 
 
After Event  
For good news the t-statistics in the short term after the announcement are mostly significant. 
T statistics in the short term are 9.19 for the time frame [1, 0], 6.27 for [3, 0] and is 5.63 for 
[4, 0]. The t-statistics after the announcement in the long term show no significant changes 
except for up to 20 days after the event. T-statistics for long term are 3.47 for the time frame 
[10, 0], 0.96 for [40, 0] and 1.17 for [70, 0]. 
 
For bad news t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we can see in table 4.2.2.5 
Panel A. T statistics in the short term are -8.97 for the time frame [1, 0], -7.71 for [2, 0] and                
-5.80 for [5, 0]. The t-statistics for bad news in the long term show significant changes.                     
T- Statistics for the long term are -3.47 for [20, 0], -2.64 for [40, 0] and -1.99 for [70, 0]. 
 
Overall, the largest abnormal return happens on day 1 with t statistic being 9.19 for good 
news firms and -8.97 for bad news firms. Similarly as explained above in the DJIA index, 
most of the US firms hold earnings announcement presentation at the end of the day after 
market close, therefore we expect the largest effects on day 1 unlike firms in the SA, the 
strongest effect happens on the same day with earnings announcements. In the long term, 
there is evidence of price response to earnings announcements.  
 
 
Table 4.2.2.6.  Aggregate Abnormal Returns around NASDAQ100 index earnings  
Announcements  
 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Returns 
                      GOOD NEWS                        BAD NEWS  
Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  
[-5, -1]  0.012  1.57  [-5, -1]  -0.006  -0.66  
[-4, -1]  0.009  1.36  [-4, -1]  -0.006  -0.72  
[-3, -1]  0.004  0.78  [-3, -1]  -0.002  -0.29  
[-2, -1]  0.004  0.88  [-2, -1]  -0.005  -0.93  
[-1, -1]  0.004  1.08  [-1, -1]  -0.002  -0.46  
[0, 0]  0.012  3.69***  [0, 0]  -0.014  -3.65***  
[1, 0]  0.043  9.19***  [1, 0]  -0.050  -8.97***  
[2, 0]  0.039  6.71***  [2, 0]  -0.053  -7.71***  
[3, 0]  0.042  6.27***  [3, 0]  -0.055  -6.98***  
[4, 0]  0.042  5.63***  [4, 0]  -0.054  -6.13***  
[5, 0]  0.043  5.22***  [5, 0]  -0.056  -5.80***  
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level  
 
 
Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns 
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                      GOOD NEWS                        BAD NEWS  
Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  
[-90, -1]  0.041  1.28  [-90, -1]  0.019  0.50  
[-80, -1]  0.034  1.13  [-80, -1]  0.014  0.40  
[-70, -1]  0.039  1.42  [-70, -1]  0.022  0.65  
[-60, -1]  0.023  0.89  [-60, -1]  0.006  0.18  
[-50, -1]  0.023  0.97  [-50, -1]  0.009  0.32  
[-40, -1]  0.012  0.55  [-40, -1]  0.004  0.18  
[-30, -1]  0.011  0.58  [-30, -1]  0.001  0.06  
[-20, -1]  0.017  1.11  [-20, -1]  0.002  0.09  
[-10, -1]  0.018  1.73  [-10, -1]  -0.004  -0.32  
[10, 0]  0.038  3.47***  [10, 0]  -0.058  -4.44***  
[20, 0]  0.033  2.16**  [20, 0]  -0.063  -3.47***  
[30, 0]  0.030  1.60  [30, 0]  -0.051  -2.31**  
[40, 0]  0.020  0.96  [40, 0]  -0.067  -2.64***  
[50, 0]  0.028  1.19  [50, 0]  -0.071  -2.50***  
[60, 0]  0.040  1.55  [60, 0]  -0.058  -1.87*  
[70, 0]  0.033  1.17  [70, 0]  -0.066  -1.99**  
[80, 0]  0.035  1.17  [80, 0]  -0.062  -1.76*  
[90, 0]  0.043  1.35  [90, 0]  -0.050  -1.32  
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
In the table above the sample consists of 96 stocks listed on NASDAQ100 index. Cumulative 
average abnormal returns CAAR are computed using the market model and the standard 
event study methodology. The estimation window for computing the market model 
parameters is the event time interval [-90, 90]. CAAR is tested for significance using                       
t-statistics. 
 
4.2.2.6 S&P100  
 
The test result for cumulative average abnormal returns in table 4.2.2.6 for the S&P 100 
index indicates that stock returns of the firms included in the index are significantly affected 
by the earnings announcements. There is significant change before and after the event date.  
 
Before Event  
There is little evidence that for good news prices react before the event in the short term.     
T-statistics in the short term showing reactions are 2.76 for the window frame [-5, -1] and 
2.07 for [-4,-1]. The t-statistics showing no significant reaction three days before the event 
are 1.55 for the time frame [-3,-1], 0.55 for [-2,-1] and 0.48 for [-1,-1]. The t-statistics in the 
long term before the event show no significant reaction except for ten days prior to the event 
day. T-statistics for long term are 0.53 for the window frame [-70,-1], 0.43 for [-40,-1] and 
2.43 for [-10,-1].  
 
For the bad news t-values are totally insignificant in the short term period, as we can see in 
table 4.2.2.6 Panel A and Panel B. T-statistics is -0.33 for the window frame [-5,-1], -0.63 for 
[-3,-1] and -0.58 for [-1,-1]. The t-statistics in the long term for bad news show no significant 
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changes in the stock returns. T-statistics for long term are 0.54 for the window frame [-80,-1], 
0.17 for [-50,-1] and -0.20 for [-10,-1].  
 
After Event  
For good news the t-statistics in the short term after the announcement are mostly significant 
for both short and long term. T statistics in the short term are 8.31 for the time frame [1, 0], 
6.69 for [3, 0] and is 6.49 for [4, 0]. The t-statistics after the announcement in the long term 
are strongly significant. T-statistics for long term are 5.09 for the time frame [10, 0], 3.32 for 
[40, 0] and 3.14 for [70, 0].  
 
For bad news t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we can see in table 4.2.2.6 
Panel A. T statistics in the short term are -7.76 for the time frame [1, 0], -5.74 for [2, 0] and               
-3.84 for [5, 0]. The t-statistics for bad news in the long term show no significant changes. T 
statistics for the long term are -1.50 for [20, 0], -0.98 for [40, 0] and -0.55 for [70, 0]. 
 
Overall, the largest abnormal returns happen on day 1 with t statistic for good news firm is 
8.31 and for bad news firms is-7.76. There is significant positive abnormal return that persists 
over the long term for good news firms but for bad news firms this ends very quickly. 
 
Table 4.2.2.6. Aggregate Abnormal Returns around S&P100 index earnings 
announcements 
 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Returns 
                      GOOD NEWS                       BAD NEWS  
Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  
[-5, -1]  0.012  2.76***  [-5, -1]  -0.001  -0.33  
[-4, -1]  0.008  2.07**  [-4, -1]  -0.001  -0.35  
[-3, -1]  0.005  1.55  [-3, -1]  -0.002  -0.63  
[-2, -1]  0.002  0.55  [-2, -1]  -0.002  -0.89  
[-1, -1]  0.001  0.48  [-1, -1]  -0.001  -0.58  
[0, 0]  0.012  5.83***  [0, 0]  -0.011  -5.54***  
[1, 0]  0.023  8.31***  [1, 0]  -0.021  -7.76***  
[2, 0]  0.026  7.62***  [2, 0]  -0.019  -5.74***  
[3, 0]  0.028  6.96***  [3, 0]  -0.022  -5.77***  
[4, 0]  0.029  6.49***  [4, 0]  -0.019  -4.38***  
[5, 0]  0.030  6.22***  [5, 0]  -0.018  -3.84***  
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns 
                      GOOD NEWS                        BAD NEWS  
Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  
[-90, -1]  0.018  0.94  [-90, -1]  0.016  0.86  
[-80, -1]  0.018  1.02  [-80, -1]  0.009  0.54  
[-70, -1]  0.009  0.53  [-70, -1]  0.005  0.34  
[-60, -1]  0.006  0.42  [-60, -1]  0.004  0.27  
[-50, -1]  0.014  0.96  [-50, -1]  0.002  0.17  
[-40, -1]  0.005  0.43  [-40, -1]  0.002  0.13  
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[-30, -1]  0.008  0.70  [-30, -1]  0.009  0.89  
[-20, -1]  0.007  0.80  [-20, -1]  0.005  0.54  
[-10, -1]  0.015  2.43***  [-10, -1]  -0.001  -0.20  
[10, 0]  0.033  5.09***  [10, 0]  -0.016  -2.46***  
[20, 0]  0.039  4.30***  [20, 0]  -0.013  -1.50  
[30, 0]  0.045  4.05***  [30, 0]  -0.012  -1.13  
[40, 0]  0.049  3.84***  [40, 0]  -0.012  -0.98  
[50, 0]  0.047  3.32***  [50, 0]  -0.011  -0.83  
[60, 0]  0.049  3.15***  [60, 0]  -0.012  -0.81  
[70, 0]  0.052  3.14***  [70, 0]  -0.009  -0.55  
[80, 0]  0.062  3.47***  [80, 0]  -0.007  -0.41  
[90, 0]  0.062  3.25***  [90, 0]  -0.007  -0.36  
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
The sample consists of 100 stocks listed on S&P100 index. Cumulative average abnormal 
returns CAAR are computed using the market model and the standard event study                    
methodology. The estimation window for computing the market model parameters is the 
event time interval [-90, 90]. CAAR is tested for significance using t-statistics. 
 
4.2.2.7 CAC40 
 
The test result for cumulative average abnormal returns in Table 4.2.2.7 for CAC 40 index 
indicates that stock returns of the firms included in the index are significantly affected by the 
earnings announcements. There is significant change before and after the event date.  
 
Before Event  
For good news there are significant changes in the short term and long term period.                              
T-statistics in the short term are 3.65 for the time frame [-5,-1], 1.96 for [-2,-1] and 1.86 for       
[-1,-1]. The t-statistics in the long term before the event are mostly significant. T-statistics for 
long term are 2.19 for the window frame [-70,-1], 1.90 for [-40,-1] and 2.16 for [-10,-1].  
 
For the bad news t-values are totally insignificant in the short term and long term period, as 
we can see in table 4.2.2.7 Panel A and Panel B. T-statistics is -1.57 for the window frame                 
[-5,-1], -0.31 for [-3,-1] and -0.68 for [-1,-1]. The t-statistics in the long term for bad news 
show no significant changes in the stock returns. T-statistics for long term are 0.68 for the 
window frame [-80,-1], -0.01 for [-50,-1] and -0.70 for [-10,-1].  
 
After Event  
For good news the t-statistics in the short term after the announcement are totally significant. 
T statistics in the short term are 4.70 for the time frame [1, 0], 4.14 for [3, 0] and is 3.50 for 
[4, 0]. The t-statistics after the announcement in the long term show significant changes up to 
thirty days after the event day and later no significant changes. T-statistics for long term 
showing significant changes are 3.00 for the time frame [10, 0], 3.32 for [20, 0] and 2.55 for 
[30, 0]. The t-statistics showing no significant change are 1.52 for the time frame [40, 0], 0.69 
for [60, 0] and 1.12 for [80, 0].  
 
For bad news t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we can see in table 4.1.2.8 
Panel A. T statistics in the short term are -6.03 for the time frame [1, 0], -4.30 for [2, 0] and            
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-4.09 for [5, 0]. The t-statistics for bad news in the long term show significant changes up to 
forty days and then after that no significant changes till the study period. T statistics for the 
long term are -2.20 for the time frame [20, 0], -2.26 for [30, 0], -2.04 for [40, 0], -0.69 for 
[60, 0] and -0.41 for [70, 0].  
 
Overall, in the short term, the largest abnormal returns happen on day 1 for both news with t 
statistics is 4.70 for good news firms and is -6.03 for bad news firms. In the long term, there 
is evidence of pre-announcement abnormal return for the good news firms. 
 
In the CAC 40 index, earnings announcements play less of a role as information is conveyed 
to the market much earlier, which is normal in a code law country. However when collecting 
data, I chose the earnings  announcement day as the day that the news is first released instead 
of the day that formal presentations are made. The results are the same as above indices in the 
US and the SA except the fact that stocks prices react even before the first piece of news were 
available through public channel. 
 
Table 4.2.2.7. Aggregate Abnormal Returns around CAC40 index earnings                           
announcements  
 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Returns 
                      GOOD NEWS                        BAD NEWS  
Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  
[-5, -1]  0.020  3.65***  [-5, -1]  -0.011  -1.57  
[-4, -1]  0.018  3.74***  [-4, -1]  -0.008  -1.29  
[-3, -1]  0.013  3.09***  [-3, -1]  -0.002  -0.31  
[-2, -1]  0.007  1.96**  [-2, -1]  0.001  0.19  
[-1, -1]  0.005  1.86*  [-1, -1]  -0.002  -0.68  
[0, 0]  0.007  2.75***  [0, 0]  -0.016  -5.10***  
[1, 0]  0.016  4.70***  [1, 0]  -0.027  -6.03***  
[2, 0]  0.018  4.15***  [2, 0]  -0.024  -4.30***  
[3, 0]  0.020  4.14***  [3, 0]  -0.029  -4.52***  
[4, 0]  0.019  3.50***  [4, 0]  -0.028  -3.91***  
[5, 0]  0.021  3.52***  [5, 0]  -0.032  -4.09***  
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level  
 
Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns 
                     GOOD NEWS                        BAD NEWS  
Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  Event day  CAAR  t-statistic  
[-90, -1]  0.055  2.39***  [-90, -1]  0.024  0.78  
[-80, -1]  0.054  2.46***  [-80, -1]  0.019  0.68  
[-70, -1]  0.045  2.19**  [-70, -1]  0.011  0.41  
[-60, -1]  0.035  1.85*  [-60, -1]  0.005  0.21  
[-50, -1]  0.032  1.86*  [-50, -1]  0.000  -0.01  
[-40, -1]  0.029  1.90*  [-40, -1]  0.012  0.60  
[-30, -1]  0.036  2.73***  [-30, -1]  0.007  0.43  
[-20, -1]  0.020  1.80*  [-20, -1]  0.004  0.29  
[-10, -1]  0.017  2.16***  [-10, -1]  -0.007  -0.70  
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[10, 0]  0.024  3.00***  [10, 0]  -0.036  -3.44***  
[20, 0]  0.037  3.32***  [20, 0]  -0.032  -2.20**  
[30, 0]  0.035  2.55***  [30, 0]  -0.040  -2.26**  
[40, 0]  0.024  1.52  [40, 0]  -0.042  -2.04**  
[50, 0]  0.016  0.89  [50, 0]  -0.021  -0.93  
[60, 0]  0.013  0.69  [60, 0]  -0.017  -0.69  
[70, 0]  0.009  0.43  [70, 0]  -0.011  -0.41  
[80, 0]  0.025  1.12  [80, 0]  -0.011  -0.37  
[90, 0]  0.033  1.43  [90, 0]  -0.017  -0.57  
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level  
 
The sample in above table consists of 40 stocks listed on CAC40 index. Cumulative average 
abnormal returns CAAR are computed using the market model and the standard event study               
methodology. The estimation window for computing the market model parameters is the 
event time interval [-90, 90]. CAAR is tested for significance using t-statistics. 
 
 
4.2.3. Summary 
 
In summary, the results from this part of my analysis show that, in a code law country such as 
France, the pre-earnings announcements indicates stock price react since earnings news is                          
conveyed to the markets before the earnings announcement date. In the common law                                  
countries such as US and SA, we see some evidence of pre-earnings announcement                       
reaction however this happens very close to the announcement date. 
 
Besides that, in most cases the strongest reaction happened on the event day (0), the            
exceptions being some cases in the US with the strongest reaction happened on day (1). Note 
that in the US there are number of companies who released earnings news in the morning   
before market open and a number of companies who released earnings news in the afternoon 
after the market close. The noises in the results between day 0 and day 1 are due to this fact.  
 
The strength level of reaction is still very strong in the short-term window periods, but       
reduced over time. In the long-term, we could see that good news reaction last longer and bad 
news end quicker for most indices except the NASDAQ 100. For example in the                         
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, good news reactions in the case of JSE Top 40, JSE Mid Cap, 
JSE Small cap, are up to the whole studied period of 90 days post announcement; in the US, 
good news reactions for the DJIA are up to 50 days, for the S&P100 good news reactions are 
up to the whole studied period of 90 days; As for bad news, in the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange, JSE Top 40 reacts up to 10 days, JSE Mid Cap, JSE small cap react within 5 days 
after earnings announcements in the US, the DJIA react within 5 days, S&P bad news react 
up to 10 days. The two cases that are different are NASDAQ 100 and CAC 40. NASDAQ100 
has good news reaction lasting up to 20 days while bad news reaction lasting up to 80 days. 
In France, the CAC 40 good news reacted up to 30 days and bad news react within 40 days.  
 
In addition, the increases and decreases in price are permanent. After the change has taken 
place, prices do not go back up or down the original level as shown statistically.  
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Finally, with good prospects, for the good news firms, this allows the price to continue to 
drift up in the long time. Meanwhile on the psychological side, there is not much room for the 
investors to act with the bad news, hence their reactions end quickly, as it was explained by 
Debont and Thatler (1990) among others. The case of the NASDAQ looks a bit different. The 
fact that NASDAQ contains 100 high tech firms could be an answer, more weight for the bad 
news than for the good news, thus it leads to longer reaction. The case of the CAC 40 in 
France releases its news before the actual announcement day; however, stocks still react 
strongly and most vigorously on the earnings announcement day than on any prior day.  
 
The situation in the French market relates to the fact that France is a code law accounting          
system, where earnings news is released to the markets through different channel before the 
official earnings announcement. The uncertainty therefore has been digested since                           
pre-earnings announcement period. As mentioned in chapter three data selection process, the 
event day for French market is defined not by the date of the official earnings announcement 
but the day of the first unofficial release of even partial news regarding the earnings of a firm. 
The possibility of partially implies that the different reaction of the French market to the                
arrival of earnings news compared to the US and the SA markets may be a statistical artefact 
caused by the definition of event date. In the other words it might be possible that if the 
French market received full information on the event day it might well react in the same way 
as the SA and the US market, this leading to the cumulative abnormal returns behaviour in 
this chapter. 
 
4.3. Spread effect of earnings announcement 
 
 4.3.1. Empirical specification 
 
According to Van Horne (1970), Beinesh and Gardner (1995), Hedge and McDermott (2003), 
and Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006) in their studies explained that Information Cost Liquidity 
Hypothesis is a good information that creates significant improvement in stock performance. 
Given that there is a richer information environment, this part aims to examine whether there 
is increase/decrease in market liquidity.  
 
Stock market liquidity is measured by the quoted, relative, and effective bid-ask spreads. 
Quoted bid-ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price. Relative bid-ask spread 
is defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid             
-ask spread is defined as twice the absolute value of the difference between the transaction 
price and the mid-price in effect at the time of the trade. All ratios in the table are computed 
as the ratio of the average bid-ask spreads of each individual stock over the indicated event 
time period to the average bid-ask spreads measure on day -90. The null hypothesis state that 
the mean of the reported ratio is equal to 1 is tested using a standard t-statistic. 
 
To analyse the impact of earnings announcement on the short term liquidity of indices, ratios 
of the three daily averages bid-ask spreads over the various interval event windows pre and 
post earnings announcements. Quoted bid-ask spreads is defined as the ask price minus the 
bid price. Relative bid-ask spreads is measured as the ask price minus the bid price divided 
by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid-ask spreads is measured as twice the absolute value of 
the difference between the transaction price and the mid-price in effect at the time of the 
trade. I compute all three ratios for quote bid-ask spreads, relative bid-ask spreads and                        
effective bid-ask spreads because each ratio has its own shortcomings. Relative bid-ask 
spreads is not an accurate method to measure the stock liquidity as trades often occurs                      
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between the quoted ask price and the bid price. This shortcoming was observed by Lee and 
Ready (1991) they explained relative spread over states the trading cost of a stock for its            
failures to take in to account the price increase tendency after a purchase, and a decrease                    
tendency after a sale also using only relative and effective bid-ask spreads only. These two 
measures will face the problem of price increasing around earnings announcements. The                     
effective spread which is computed will reduce the shortcoming of the other two measures. 
  
All spread ratios are computed as the ratio of the average bid-ask spreads of each individual 
stock over the indicated event time period to the average bid-ask spreads measure over the 90 
day pre earnings announcement. The null hypothesis that the mean of the reported ratio is 
equal to 1 is tested using a standard t statistics. Results are reported in table 4.3.2.1 to 4.3.2.3. 
Effective spread is the best indicator in some cases when three ratios show different results 
for the shortcoming of the other two measures mentioned above. 
 
The results showed that, spread ratios increased significantly around the earnings events then 
gradually decrease for the JSE Top 40, and the JSE Small Cap, on the                           
Johannesburg Stock Exchange and DJIA, NASDAQ100 and S&P100 in the American Stock 
Exchanges (except two cases: the JSE Mid Cap and the CAC 40). This implies that for these 
indices, stock market liquidity decreases in the short term, and then gradually increases when 
the news ceases. Earnings announcement provides more uncertainty to the market. The                          
informed traders’ trade when there is the earnings news; this causes the market makers to         
increase spreads. In the long term, there are no more uninformed traders; that results in the 
spread going down. However, notice that even if the spread goes down in many cases at the 
end of this period, it is still greater than the average of the 90 days prior the event.  
 
The CAC40, spread decreases both in the short term and long term compared to the average 
of 90 days before the event in Euronext Paris for CAC40. This implies that market liquidity 
increased after earnings announcements both in the short and long term. However, the longer 
the event window period, the lower the ratio is. This implies that even though market 
liquidity increased due to the impacts of announcement in the short term, liquidity continues 
to increase by time in the long term.  
 
4.3.2. Results and explanations for short and long term effects of earnings 
announcement on stock market liquidity. 
 
4.3.2.1. Results and explanations of short and long term effect of earnings 
announcements on stock liquidity in the Johannesburg stock exchange. 
 
The results of the changes in liquidity of Johannesburg Stock Exchange stocks pre and post 
earnings announcement can be seen in table 4.3.2.1. There is clear evidence from this table 
that spread increases significantly for stocks in Johannesburg Stock Exchange after the     
earnings announcement. For example, on the actual day of the event, for firms in the JSE Top 
40, the aggregate quote spread ratios compared to an average of 90 day pre earnings           
announcement is 1.36, and thus highly significant. This indicates that the mean quoted spread 
is increased by 36% on that day compared to an average of 90 days pre event. In the [-5,+5] 
event window, the mean quoted spread ratio is 1.09, increased by 9%, and highly significant, 
this indicates that spreads are significantly increased over the 11 trading day period centred 
on the event day. For the relative and effective spread ratios in the FTSE100, the increases on 
event day are 19% and 44%, and the increases on [-5, 5] window periods are 4% and 6%     
respectively.  
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Another important thing to report here is, that the spread ratios between post and pre earnings 
announcement period decreased gradually. As we observed from table 4.3.2.1, at the           
beginning, spread ratios between day 0 and average of 90 day pre earnings announcement are 
1.36, 1.19, and 1.44 for quote, relative and effective bid asks respectively. After 30 days post 
earnings announcement period, spread ratios between average of 30 day post event and       
average of 90 day pre event reduce to 1.04, 0.95 and 1.03 for quote, relative and effective bid 
asks respectively. In the long term after 90 days post earnings announcement period, the 90 
days pre/post earnings announcement spread ratios were reduced to 1, 0.92 and 0.99. This led 
to another conclusion; though there is decrease compared to pre earnings announcement     
period, stock liquidity has increased over time.  
 
For firms in the JSE Mid Cap the aggregate quote spread on day 0 compared to an average of 
quote spread of 90 days pre earnings announcement is 1.10, and is highly significant. This 
indicates that the mean quote spread increased 10% on the event day.  In the [-5,+5] event 
period, the mean quote spread is 1.02, increased by 2%, and highly significant, this indicates 
that spreads are significantly increased over the 11 trading day period centred on the event 
day. For the relative spread ratios in the JSE Mid Cap, there is an 11% increase on the event 
day, and 1% increase over [-5,5] event period. However for effective spread, the change is 
not clear, the increase is insignificant around day of earnings announcement and only         
significant on the day after.  
 
Again, another important thing to report here is, that the spread ratios between post and pre 
earnings announcement period decreased over time for quoted and relative spread and in   
almost all event periods of effective spread. This led to another conclusion, indicating a     
decrease compared to the pre earnings announcement period, resulting in an increase in stock 
liquidity over time. In the long term at the end this ratio was slightly lower than 1 for all of 
the three spread ratios.  
 
For firms in the JSE Small Cap, the quote spread ratios when compared between aggregate 
average on day 0 and an average of 90 days pre earnings announcement is 1.18, and highly 
significant. This indicates that the mean quote spread increases by 18% on that day compared 
to an average of 90 days pre event. In the [-4,+4] event window, the mean quote spread is 
1.03, increased by 3%, and is highly significant, this indicates that spreads have significantly 
increased over the 9 trading day period centred on the event day. The results also show the 
significant increase in the mean relative and effective spreads in short term: 5% and 14%   
increase on the event day for the relative and effective ratios respectively; and 2% over 5 
trading day centred on event for relative ratio, 6% increase over 11 trading day centred on the 
event for effective ratio. In the long term, the spread ratios between post and pre earning    
announcement period also decreased over time, a few cases are not significant for quote 
spread but the rest are highly significant, especially for relative and effective spreads. 
 
4.3.2.2. Results and explanations of short and long term effect of earnings 
announcements on stock liquidity in the United States of America stock exchange. 
 
The results of the changes in liquidity of the US stock exchanges pre and post earnings       
announcement can be seen in table 4.3.2.2. There is clear evidence from this table that spread 
increases significantly for stocks in the US markets after the earnings announcement. For    
example, for firms in DJIA the quote spread ratios compared between mean quote spread on 
event day to an average quote spread of 90 day pre earnings announcement is 1.72, and is 
highly significant. This indicates that the mean quoted spread increases by 72% on that day 
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compared to an average of 90 days pre event. In the [-5,+5] event period , the mean quoted 
spread ratio is 1.13, increased by 13%, and is highly significant, which indicates that spreads 
are significantly increased over the 11 trading day period centred on the event day. For the 
relative and effective spread ratios in the DIJA, the increases on event day are 67% and 76%, 
and the increases on [-5, 5] event periods are 11% and 44% respectively.  
 
Similar to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, it was observed that the spread ratios between 
post and pre earnings announcement period decrease with time in the long term. The ratios 
between mean spreads on the day 0 and that of average of 90 days pre earnings                               
announcement are 1.72, 1.67 and 1.76 for quote, relative and effective bid ask spread                       
respectively. Mean relative spread ratio between 90 days post and pre earnings announcement 
period reduced to 0.96. Those for quote and effective spreads reduced as well but only clearly 
 (Significantly) up to day 10. This led to another conclusion, due to the impact of earnings 
announcement, in the short term, stock market liquidity decreases compared to pre earnings 
announcement period. In the long term stock liquidity increased gradually though the  
Increase does not last long as compared to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.  
 
For firms in the NASDAQ100, the quote spread ratios compared to an average of 90 day pre 
earnings announcement is 1.38, and is highly significant. This indicates that the mean quoted 
spread increase was 38% on that day compared to an average of 90 days pre the event. In the 
[-5, +5] event window, the mean quoted spread ratio is 1.07, increases 7%, and is highly  
Significant, this indicates that spreads are significantly increased over the 11 trading day                 
period centred on the event day. For the relative and effective spread ratios in the DIJA, the 
increases on event day are 35% and 57%, and the increase on [-5, 5] window periods are 8% 
and 8% for each.  
 
 Similar to the DIJA, another important thing to report for NASDAQ100 is, the spread ratios 
between post and pre earnings announcement period decreased with time over the long term. 
This led to a conclusion; though there is decrease compared to pre earnings announcement 
period, stock liquidity has increased over time. Over the long term at the end the spread ratio 
is slightly lower than 1, for effective spread mean ratio and still higher than 1, for quote 
spread mean ratio.  
 
For firms in the S&P100 the quote spread ratios compared to an average of 90 days pre                     
earnings announcement is 1.81, and highly significant. This indicates that the mean quoted 
spread increased 81% on that day compare to average of 90 days pre event. In the [-5,+5] 
event window, the mean quoted spread ratio is 1.13, increased by 13%, and highly                          
significant, this indicates that spreads are significantly increased over the 11 trading day         
period centred on the event day. For the relative and effective spread ratios in DIJA,                  
the increase on the event day are 66% and 99%, and the increase on the [-5, 5] event window 
periods are 10% and 24% respectively.  
 
Similarly as in the above indices in Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the DJIA and 
NASDAQ100, the spread ratios between post and pre earnings announcement period                         
decreased with time over the long term. This led to a conclusion, though there is decrease 
compared to pre earnings announcement period, stock liquidity increases over time. Over 90 
days spread ratios for this index are still higher than 1, it means that stock liquidity level has 
not recovered its original average level after 90 days.  
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4.3.2.3. Results and explanations of short and long term effect of earnings 
announcements on stock liquidity in the Euro next Paris stock exchange. 
 
The results of the changes in liquidity of the Euronext Paris stock exchange pre and post 
earnings announcement can be seen in table 4.3.2.3. There is clear evidence from this table 
that the spread decreased significantly for stocks in the CAC40 markets after earnings                          
announcement. For example, on the day of the event, for firms in the CAC40 the quote 
spread ratios compared to an average of 90 days pre earnings announcement is 0.80, and is 
highly significant. This indicates that the mean quoted spread decreased by 20% on that day 
compare to average of 90 days pre event. In the [-5,+5] event window, the mean quoted 
spread ratio is 0.72, decreased by 28%, and is highly significant, this indicates that spreads 
are significantly decreased over the 11 trading day period centred on the event day. For the 
relative and effective spread ratios in the CAC40, the decreases on event day are 16% and 
33%, and the decreases on [-5, 5] event periods are 23% and 27% respectively.  
 
Similarly as in the US and the SA markets it was observed, the spread ratios between post 
and pre earnings announcement period decreased with time in the long term. This led to the 
conclusion, though stock liquidity already increased compare to pre earnings announcement 
period, it increases by time. In the long term in the end spread ratios decrease up to 34%   
significantly.  
 
Table 4.3.2.1. Short-term and long-term effects of earnings announcements on Stock 
Market Liquidity – Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
                          Quote  Relative                      
Effective  
                    Ratio  t- 
statistic 
                  Ratio  t- statistic Ratio t- statistic 
JSE TOP 40 
[0, 0]  1.36***  47.08 1.19***  23.52 1.44***  49.74 
[-1, 1]  1.31***  40.19 1.23***  28.01 1.26***  29.5 
[-2, 2]  1.19***  25.06 1.12***  14.81 1.15***  17.23 
[-3, 3]  1.15***  19.61 1.09***  10.67 1.11***  12.35 
[-4, 4]  1.12***  15.49 1.06***  7.59 1.08***  8.68 
[-5, 5]  1.09***  11.42 1.04***  4.69 1.06***  7.2 
[0, 10]  1.04***  5.9 0.98***  -2.25 1.04***  4.87 
[0, 30]  1.04***  5.18 0.95***  -5.91 1.03***  2.84 
[0, 60]  1.01 1.23 0.94***  -7.6 1 -0.38 
[0, 90]  1 -0.54 0.92***  -9.27 0.99 -1.38 
JSE Mid Cap 
[0, 0]  1.10***  11.7 1.11***  12.2 1 -0.1 
[-1, 1]  1.13***  14.62 1.12***  13.51 1.03***  2.59 
[-2, 2]  1.03***  3.73 1.04***  4.77 0.97***  -2.69 
[-3, 3]  1.05***  6.08 1.04***  4.3 1.01 0.88 
[-4, 4]  1.05***  6.23 1.03***  3.13 1.02 1.74 
[-5, 5]  1.02***  2.78 1.01 1.33 0.99 -0.97 
[0, 10]  1 -0.45 0.97***  -3.02 0.95***  -4.51 
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[0, 30]  0.96***  -5.07 0.95***  -6.1 0.92***  -7.17 
[0, 60]  0.98***  -2.41 0.93***  -7.7 0.96***  -3.68 
[0, 90]  0.95***  -6.14 0.90***  -11.57 0.93***  -6.12 
JSE Small Cap  
[0, 0]  1.18***  20.74 1.05***  10.5 1.14***  8.8 
[-1, 1]  1.03***  3.76 1.02***  3.54 1.04***  2.66 
[-2, 2]  1.02***  2.91 1.02***  3.44 1.07***  4.63 
[-3, 3]  1.04***  4.87 1 0.49 1.10***  6.4 
[-4, 4]  1.03***  3.99 1 0.07 1.11***  7.27 
[-5, 5]  1.01 0.95 1 -0.49 1.06***  4.09 
[0, 10]  0.99 -1.08 0.96***  -8.3 0.96***  -2.56 
[0, 30]  1.01 0.65 0.95***  -11.14 1.01 0.7 
[0, 60]  0.98***  -2.02 0.96***  -8.2 0.96***  -2.37 
[0, 90]  0.98**  -1.91 0.97***  -6.15 0.98 -1.41 
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
In the table above Stock market liquidity is measured by the quoted, relative, and effective 
bid-ask spreads. Quoted bid-ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price. 
Relative bid-ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted 
mid-price. Effective bid-ask spread is defined as twice the absolute value of the difference 
between the transaction price and the mid-price in effect at the time of the trade. All ratios in 
the table are computed as the ratio of the average bid-ask spreads of each individual stock 
over the indicated event time period to the average bid-ask spreads measure on day -90. The 
null hypothesis state that the mean of the reported ratio is equal to 1 is tested using a standard 
t-statistic. 
 
 Table 4.3.2.2- Short-term and long-term effects of earnings announcements on Stock 
Market Liquidity – The US markets. 
Quoted spread  Relative spread Effective spread 
                   ratio t-
statistic 
               
ratio  
t-statistic  ratio  t-
statistic  
DJIA  
[0, 0]  1.72***  56.36 1.67***  57.61 1.76***  35.74 
[-1, 1]  1.48***  37.72 1.47***  40.47 1.88***  41.47 
[-2, 2]  1.30***  23.29 1.28***  24.34 1.56***  26.38 
[-3, 3]  1.19***  15.04 1.19***  16.51 1.50***  23.74 
[-4, 4]  1.16***  12.27 1.14***  11.9 1.42***  19.9 
[-5, 5]  1.13***  10.38 1.11***  9.68 1.44***  20.69 
[0,10 ]  1.05***  4.27 1.02*  1.85 1.14***  6.58 
[0, 30]  0.98 -1.46 0.96***  -3.66 1.02 0.73 
[0, 60]  0.97**  -1.98 0.95***  -4.69 0.99 -0.62 
[0, 90]  1.01 0.94 0.96***  -3.17 1.03 1.56 
NASDAQ100  
[0, 0]  1.38***  20.48 1.35***  21.57 1.57***  39.42 
 58 
 
[-1, 1]  1.31***  17.03 1.29***  18.14 1.43***  29.41 
[-2, 2]  1.23***  12.62 1.18***  11.09 1.24***  16.58 
[-3, 3]  1.17***  9.29 1.17***  10.33 1.19***  12.78 
[-4, 4]  1.12***  6.42 1.11***  7.1 1.13***  9.02 
[-5, 5]  1.07***  3.67 1.08***  4.91 1.08***  5.47 
[0, 10]  1.09***  5 1.11***  7.1 1.02 1.34 
[0, 30]  1.10***  5.45 1.14***  8.88 0.93***  -4.56 
[0, 60]  1.20***  10.59 1.23***  14.07 0.90***  -7.07 
[0, 90]  1.30***  15.99 1.30***  18.43 0.90***  -6.78 
S&P100  
[0, 0]  1.81***  84.34 1.66***  53.59 1.99***  57.45 
[-1, 1]  1.50***  51.76 1.45***  36.69 1.76***  44.23 
[-2, 2]  1.29***  29.69 1.24***  19.89 1.41***  23.63 
[-3, 3]  1.22***  22.64 1.18***  14.8 1.34***  20.01 
[-4, 4]  1.16***  17.12 1.13***  10.31 1.28***  16.05 
[-5, 5]  1.13***  14.03 1.10***  7.95 1.24***  13.92 
[0, 10]  1.08***  7.83 1.18***  15.05 1.20***  11.52 
[0, 30]  1.01 1 1.04***  2.99 1.08***  4.72 
[0, 60]  1.01 1.38 1.01 0.75 1.04***  2.53 
[0, 90]  1.05 4.88 1.02 1.33 1.07 4.29 
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
In the table above Stock market liquidity is measured by the quoted, relative, and effective 
bid-ask spreads. Quoted bid-ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price. 
Relative bid-ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted 
mid-price. Effective bid-ask spread is defined as twice the absolute value of the difference 
between the transaction price and the mid-price in effect at the time of the trade. All ratios in 
the table are computed as the ratio of the average bid-ask spreads of each individual stock 
over the indicated event time period to the average bid-ask spreads measure on day -90. The 
null hypothesis state that the mean of the reported ratio is equal to 1 is tested using a standard 
t-statistic. 
 
Table 4.3.2.3. Short-term and long-term effects of earnings announcements on Stock 
Market Liquidity in the Euronext Paris stock exchange 
 quoted spread Relative spread Effective spread 
 Ratio t-statistic Ratio t-statistic Ratio t-statistic 
[0, 0]  0.80***  -10.58 0.84***  -8.88 0.67***  -17.04 
[-1, 1]  0.73***  -14.59 0.85***  -8.7 0.72***  -14.82 
[-2, 2]  0.72***  -14.81 0.78***  -12.21 0.70***  -15.76 
[-3, 3]  0.75***  -13.64 0.80***  -11.27 0.74***  -13.77 
[-4, 4]  0.70***  -16.05 0.76***  -13.79 0.70***  -15.85 
[-5, 5]  0.72***  -15.16 0.77***  -12.89 0.73***  -14.31 
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[0, 10]  0.64***  -19.17 0.69***  -17.37 0.66***  -17.69 
[0, 30]  0.61***  -20.74 0.66***  -19.41 0.63***  -19.45 
[0, 60]  0.64***  -19.28 0.66***  -18.93 0.65***  -18.3 
[0,90]  0.66***  -18.29 0.66***  -19.23 0.66***  -17.59 
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
In the table above Stock market liquidity is measured by the quoted, relative, and effective 
bid-ask spreads. Quoted bid-ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price. 
Relative bid-ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted 
mid-price. Effective bid-ask spread is defined as twice the absolute value of the difference 
between the transaction price and the mid-price in effect at the time of the trade. All ratios in 
the table are computed as the ratio of the average bid-ask spreads of each individual stock 
over the indicated event time period to the average bid-ask spreads measure on day -90. The 
null hypothesis state that the mean of the reported ratio is equal to 1 is tested using a standard 
t-statistic. 
 
4.4 MULTI-VARIATE ANALYSIS OF THE LONG TERM IMPACT OF EARNINGS 
ANNOUNCEMENT ON STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY 
 
A multi-variate analysis of the long-term impacts of earnings announcements on stock market 
liquidity is carried out to control for some possible explanatory factors that was not obvious 
in the event study. 
 
This empirical analysis is derived from the approach used by Hedge and Mc Dermott (2003) 
and Gregoriou (2008) in their studies of the effect of addition to and deletion from an index 
on stock liquidity. A test was implemented using a log-linear panel regression model with 
GMM estimator. Gregoriou et al (2005) used this model in their studies and observed that the 
bid-ask spread increase with return volatility and decrease with stock price and trading 
volume in London Stock Exchange. Atkins and Dyl (1997) also used the model reported a 
similar relationship for the stock in NYSE and NASDAQ. After controlling for volatility of 
stock returns, average stock price and trading volume. This model will explores whether the 
average market liquidity of stock increase after earnings announcements. 
 
          Liquidityit =    𝛽    𝛽       𝑚    𝛽       𝑚       𝛽 (    𝑖       )  
                                      𝛽  𝑡           
Where,  
 i = 1, 2.... Number of stock in each sample index.  
 
 t = 1, 2; where t = 1 corresponds to the pre earnings announcements [-90,-1],                                                             
t = 2 correspond to the post earnings announcements period, [0, 90].  
 
 𝑖  𝑖 𝑖𝑡    Refers to either the natural logarithm of quoted, relative or effective bid-ask 
spreads for stock i at closing market at time t.  
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 lnVolumeit represents natural logarithm of trading volume for stock i at time t. Trading 
volume is calculated as the product of the average of high prices and low prices on the day 
times the number of shares traded on the day.  
 
 lnPriceit refers to natural logarithm of daily closing price for stock i at time t.  
 
Stdevit refers to moving standard deviation of daily returns for stock i with n=5 data points.  
The Dummy variable is equal to 1 in the post earnings announcements and equal to 0 pre 
earnings announcements.  
 
 αj capture the time-invariant unobserved stock specific fixed effect.  
 
In this model, an intercept dummy variable will be employed to discover any change in the 
stock liquidity due to the event. Trading volume and also an interaction term between the 
dummy and trading volume would be included to analyse the impact of earnings 
announcements on stock liquidity, I am mainly concerned with β1, the change in slope of 
dummy variable and β3, the change in the slope of trading volume, and β5, the change in the 
slope of stock price before and after the event. 
 
The estimation outputs using GMM method are presented from table 4.4.1.1 to 4.4.1.7 
 
4.4.1 Test and explanation of empirical results of multivariate analysis of the long term 
impact of earnings announcement on stock market liquidity in the Johannesburg, US 
and France equity markets. 
 
Table 4.4.1.1. JSE Top 40. Multi-variate analysis of the long term impact of earnings       
announcement on stock market liquidity 
 
Coefficient  Variables  
Quote 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Relative 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Effective 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Constant𝛼j Αi -1.56*** -1.56*** -2.51*** 
β1 Dt 0.30* 0.30* 0.38*** 
β2 lnVolume -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.19*** 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.02* -0.02* -0.03*** 
β4 lnPrice 0.83*** -0.17*** 0.79*** 
β5 lnPrice*Dt 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
β6 
Moving 
StDev 12.56*** 12.56*** 10.39*** 
𝛼j 
                             
[0.00] 
                             
[0.00] 
            
[0.00] 
AR(1) 
                             
[0.00] 
                             
[0.00] 
            
[0.00] 
J statistic 11 35 16 
Sargan test 
                          
[0.28] 
                          
[0.28] 
                
[0.56] 
NORM(2) 0 0 0 
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Adjusted R2 0.56 0.24 0.53 
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
The sample in the above table consists of 40 JSE TOP 40 firms that have data available for 
181 days around earnings announcement date in the financial year 2010-2011. A log linear 
panel fixed effects regression model estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) 
GMM estimator is used. The panel is used to determine whether the average market liquidity 
of the stock change after earnings announcement after controlling for stock prices, trading 
volume and volatility of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3 and 𝛽5 test if the slope coefficients on 
trading volume and price have changed following earnings announcement. The model has 
following specification: 
Liquidityit =    𝛽    𝛽       𝑚    𝛽       𝑚       𝛽 (    𝑖       )  
𝛽  𝑡           
 
For j=1, 2 ….90 and t 1, 2; where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 40 
firms on the JSE TOP40, [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement of 
40 firms on the JSE TOP40, [0, +90]. The dependant variable  𝑖  𝑖 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 correspondent to 
either quoted, relative or effective bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted spread is 
defined as the difference between the ask price and the bid price. Relative bid ask spread is 
defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted mid-price.                 
Effective bid ask spread is defined as twice as much as the absolute value of the difference 
between the transaction price and the mid-price in effect at the time of the 
trade.  𝑉   𝑚      𝑖     𝑡          𝑖 𝑡𝑖     Represent the traded volume in money, 
closing price and return volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable  𝑡 is equal to 1 in 
the post earnings announcement period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables apart 
from  𝑡 are taken in their natural logarithms. αj capture the time-invariant unobserved stock 
specific fixed effects. AR (1) is the first order Lagrange Multiplier test performed on the first 
difference of the residuals because of the transformations involved. Sargan test follow a Chi-
squared distribution with r degree of freedom under the null hypothesis of valid instruments. 
NORM (2) is the p-value for the Jarque-Bera normality test. The endogenous explanatory 
variables (all variables apart from  𝑡) in the panel are GMM instrumented setting z≥1.  
 
4.4.1. Empirical result and explanation for Johannesburg stock exchange 
 
4.4.1. Empirical result and explanation for JSE Top 40 
 
The constant 𝛼i for JSE Top 40 is significant in the entire three bids-ask spreads, which 
means that the differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the stocks are captured by GMM       
estimators.  
After controlling for the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, in the effective 
spread model, the significance of intercept dummy coefficient β1 shows that the quote and 
relative bid-ask spreads increase (liquidity decrease) on average by 0.30% after earnings                       
announcements; the effective spread increases on average 0.38% after earnings                                 
announcements. β2 indicates that quote and relative bid-ask spreads decrease by 0.25%, the 
effective bid-ask spreads decrease by 0.19% when average trading volume increases by 1%. 
The interaction term β3 is significant in three spread models showing that in the long term the 
decrease in quote, relative and effective bid-ask spreads due to 1% trading volume change are 
0.02%, 0.02%, and 0.03 % respectively. The interaction term β5 is statistically insignificant 
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in three spread models showing that the change due to event (associated with intercept          
dummy) is constant effect.  
 
β4 and β6 are significant for three measures of bid-ask spread, which shows that stock 
liquidity is explained by the price and price volatility.  
The J statistic is simply the Sargan statistic and the instrument rank larger than the number of 
estimated coefficient; Sargan statistics is also used as a test to detect over identifying 
restrictions. Under the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, the 
Sargan statistic is distributed as a 𝜒2, ( − ), where k is the number of estimated coefficients 
and p is the instrument rank. The p-value of 0.28, 0.28 and 0.63 in this example do not rejects 
null hypothesis of over-identifying instrumental variables, which is the error term is 
uncorrelated with the instruments. The R2 indicates that 56% of the variation in the liquidity 
is explained by the quote spread model; 24% for relative spread model and 53 % for the 
effective spread model.  
The panel does not pass the test of the residual serial correlation, and the normality test.  
 
Table 4.4.1.2. Mid Cap. Multi variate analysis of the long term impact of earnings                     
announcement on stock market liquidity 
 
Coefficient  Variables  
Quote 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Relative 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Effective 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Constant 
𝛼j Αi 1.13*** 1.13*** -0.23** 
β1 Dt 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.43*** 
β2 lnVolume -0.48*** -0.48*** -0.38*** 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04** 
β4 LnPrice 0.92*** -0.08*** 0.86*** 
β5 LnPrice*Dt -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 
β6 Moving StDev 12.74*** 12.74*** 12.05*** 
𝛼j [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(1) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
J statistic 56 56 41 
Sargan test 0.24 0.23 0.47 
NORM(2) 0 0 0 
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.3 0.31 
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
The sample in the table above consists of 60 JSE mid cap firms that have data available for 
181 days around earnings announcement date in the financial year 2010-2011. A log linear 
panel fixed effects regression model estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) 
GMM estimator is used. The panel is used to determine whether the average market liquidity 
of the stock change after earnings announcement after controlling for stock prices, trading 
volume and volatility of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3 and 𝛽5 test if the slope coefficients on 
trading volume and price have changed following earnings announcement. The model has 
following specification: 
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 liquidityit=   𝛽    𝛽       𝑚    𝛽       𝑚       𝛽 (    𝑖       )  
𝛽  𝑡           
 
For j 1, 2 ….90 and t 1, 2; where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 60 
firms on the JSE mid cap, [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement of 
40 firms on the JSE mid cap, [0, +90]. The dependant variable  𝑖  𝑖 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 correspondent to 
either quoted, relative or effective bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted spread is 
defined as the difference between the ask price and the bid price. Relative bid ask spread is 
defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid 
ask spread is defined as twice as much as the absolute value of the difference between the 
transaction price and the mid-price in effect at the time of the trade. 
𝑉   𝑚      𝑖     𝑡          𝑖 𝑡𝑖     Represent the traded volume in money, closing 
price and return volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable  𝑡 is equal to 1 in the 
post earnings announcement period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables apart from 
 𝑡 are taken in their natural logarithms. αj capture the time-invariant unobserved stock 
specific fixed effects. AR (1) is the first order Lagrange Multiplier test performed on the first 
difference of the residuals is because of the transformations involved. Sargan test follow a 
Chi-squared distribution with r degree of   freedom under the null hypothesis of valid 
instruments. NORM (2) is the p-value for the Jarque-Bera normality test. The endogenous 
explanatory variables (all variables apart from  𝑡) in the panel are GMM instrumented 
setting z≥1.  
 
4.4.1.2. Empirical result and explanation for JSE mid cap 
 
The constant 𝛼i for the JSE Mid Cap is significant in all three the bid-ask spreads, which 
means that the difference in the initial levels of liquidity of the stocks is captured by the 
GMM estimators.  
 
After controlling for the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, in the effective 
spread model, the significance of intercept dummy coefficient β1 shows that the quote and 
relative bid-ask spreads increase (liquidity decrease) on average by 0.53% after earnings   
announcements and the effective bid-ask spreads increase by 0.43%. β2 indicates that quote 
and relative bid-ask spreads decrease 0.48% and effective spread decrease 0.38% when    
trading volume increases by 1%. The interaction term β3 is significant showing that the          
bid-ask spreads due to 1% trading volume change are even further decreased by 0.04% for all 
the models: quote, relative and effective bid-ask spread models, due to the impact of earnings 
announcements. The interaction term β5 is statistically insignificant in three spread models 
showing that the change due to event (associated with intercept dummy) is constant effect. 
 
β4 and β6 are significant for three measures of bid-ask spread, which shows that stock  
Liquidity is explained by the price and price volatility. The Sargan test is insignificant, which 
means that the error term is uncorrelated with the instruments, in the other words, it rejects 
the possibility of over-identifying instrumental variables. The R2 indicates that 56% of the 
variation in the liquidity is explained by the quote bid-ask spreads model, 30% is explained 
by relative spread model and 31% by the effective model.  
 
However, the panel does not pass the normality test and the test of the first order residual       
serial correlation, which means a non-linear relationship exist between the variables.  
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Table 4.4.1.3 JSE small cap. Multi variate analysis of the long term impact of earnings 
announcement on stock market liquidity 
 
Coefficient  Variables  
Quote 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Relative 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Effective 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Constant 
𝛼j Αi 0.76*** 0.73*** -1.33*** 
β1 Dt 0.55** 0.54** 0.36* 
β2 lnVolume -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.23*** 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.06* -0.06* -0.03* 
β4 LnPrice 0.94*** -0.06*** 0.75*** 
β5 LnPrice*Dt -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0047 
β6 Moving StDev 15.49*** 15.41*** 13.89*** 
𝛼j [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(1) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
J statistic 24 24 7.55 
Sargan test 0.17 0.17 0.23 
NORM(2) 0 0 0 
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.31 0.31 
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
The sample in the above table consists of 60 JSE Small Cap firms that have data available for 
181 days around earnings announcement date in the financial year 2010-2011. A log linear 
panel fixed effects regression model estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) 
GMM estimator is used. The panel is used to determine whether the average market liquidity 
of the stock change after earnings announcement after controlling for stock prices, trading 
volume and volatility of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3 and 𝛽5 test if the slope coefficients on 
trading volume and price have changed following earnings announcement. The model has 
following specification: 
 Liquidityit =    𝛽    𝛽       𝑚    𝛽       𝑚       𝛽 (    𝑖       )  
𝛽  𝑡           
 
For j=1, 2 ….90 and t 1, 2; where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 60 
firms on the JSE small cap, [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement 
of 60 firms on the JSE small cap, [0, +90]. The dependant variable  𝑖  𝑖 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡                    
correspondent to either quoted, relative or effective bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. 
Quoted spread is defined as the difference between the ask price and the bid price. Relative 
bid ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted mid-price. 
Effective bid ask spread is defined as twice as much as the absolute value of the difference 
between the transaction price and the mid-price in effect at the time of the trade. 
𝑉   𝑚      𝑖     𝑡          𝑖 𝑡𝑖     Represent the traded volume in money, closing 
price and return volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable  𝑡 is equal to 1 in the 
post earnings announcement period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables apart from 
 𝑡 are taken in their natural logarithms. αj capture the time-invariant unobserved stock 
specific fixed effects. AR (1) is the first order Lagrange Multiplier test performed on the first 
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difference of the residuals is because of the transformations involved. Sargan test follow a 
Chi-squared   distribution with r degree of freedom under the null hypothesis of valid 
instruments. NORM (2) is the p-value for the Jarque-Bera normality test. The endogenous 
explanatory variables (all variables apart from  𝑡) in the panel are GMM instrumented 
setting z≥1.  
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.1.3. Empirical result and explanation for JSE small cap 
 
The constant 𝛼i for the JSE Small Cap is significant in the entire three bids-ask spreads, 
which means that the differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the stocks are captured by 
GMM estimators.  
 
After controlling for the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, in the effective 
spread model, the significance of intercept dummy coefficient β1 shows that the quote      
bid-ask spreads increase (liquidity decrease) on average by 0.55%, the relative bid-ask 
spreads increase by 0.54% and the effective bid-ask spreads increase by 0.36% the after   
earning announcements. β2 indicates that quote and relative bid-ask spreads decrease by 
0.47% and effective bid-ask spreads decrease by 0.23% when trading volume increases by 
1%. The interaction term β3 is significant, showing that the decrease in bid-ask spreads due 
to 1% trading volume change caused by the impact of earnings announcements are 0.06%, 
0.06%; 0.03% for quote spread, relative spread and effective spread respectively. Finally, the 
interaction term β5 is statistically insignificant in three spread models showing that the 
change due to event (associated with intercept dummy) is constant effect.  
 
β4 and β6 are significant for three measures of bid-ask spread, which shows that stock 
 Liquidity is explained by the price and price volatility.  
 
The Sargan test is insignificant, rejects the possibility of over-identifying instrumental        
variables, which means that the instruments are valid. The R2 indicates that 45% of the     
variation in the liquidity is explained by the quote model, 37% is explained by relative model, 
and 31% is explained by the effective model.  
 
However, the panel does not pass the normality test and the test of the first order residual   
serial correlation, proposes a non-linear relationship between variables. 
 
 
Table 4.4.2.1 DJIA Multi variate analysis of the long term impact of earnings 
announcement on stock market liquidity 
 
Coefficient  Variables  
Quote 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Relative 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Effective 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Constant 
𝛼j Αi -3.86*** -3.86*** -8.83*** 
β1 Dt 0.58 0.58** 2.06 
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β2 lnVolume -0.17*** -0.17*** 0.36** 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.04*** -0.04** -0.15 
β4 LnPrice 0.65*** -0.35*** -0.18 
β5 LnPrice*Dt 0.13 0.13 -0.07 
β6 Moving StDev 6.67*** 6.67*** 10.03 
𝛼j [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(1) [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] 
J statistic 21 21 19 
Sargan test 0.62 0.62 0.38 
NORM(2) 0.01 0 0 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.26 0.17 
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
The sample consists of 30 DJIA firms that have data available for 181 days around earnings 
announcement date in the financial year 2010-2012. A log linear panel fixed effects                       
regression model estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator is 
used. The panel is used to determine whether the average market liquidity of the stock change 
after earnings announcement after controlling for stock prices, trading volume and volatility 
of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3 and 𝛽5 test if the slope coefficients on trading volume and 
price have changed following earnings announcement. The model has following               
specification: 
 Liquidityit =    𝛽    𝛽       𝑚    𝛽       𝑚       𝛽 (    𝑖       )  
𝛽  𝑡           
 
For j=1, 2 ….90 and t 1, 2; where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 30 
firm [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement of 30 firms [0, +90]. 
The dependant variable  𝑖  𝑖 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 correspondent to either quoted, relative or effective bid 
ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted spread is defined as the difference between the 
ask price and the bid price. Relative bid ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid 
price divided by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid ask spread is defined as twice as much as 
the absolute value of the difference between the transaction price and the mid-price in effect 
at the time of the trade. 𝑉   𝑚      𝑖     𝑡          𝑖 𝑡𝑖     Represent the traded 
volume in money, closing price and return volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable 
 𝑡 is equal to 1 in the post earnings announcement period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the               
variables apart from  𝑡 are taken in their natural logarithms. αj capture the time-invariant        
unobserved stock specific fixed effects. AR (1) is the first order Lagrange Multiplier test               
performed on the first difference of the residuals is because of the transformations involved. 
Sargan test follow a Chi-squared distribution with r degree of freedom under the null                     
hypothesis of valid instruments. NORM (2) is the p-value for the Jarque-Bera normality test. 
The endogenous explanatory variables (all variables apart from  𝑡) in the panel are GMM 
instrumented setting z≥1.  
 
4.4.2. Empirical result and explanation for US stock exchange 
 
4.4.2.1 Empirical result and explanation for DJIA 
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The constant 𝛼i for DJIA is significant in all three bids-ask spreads, which means that the   
differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the stocks are captured by GMM estimators.  
After controlling for the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, in the quote 
and effective spread model, intercept dummy β1 is insignificant and shows that the effective 
bid-ask spreads are persistent over the long term after earnings announcements. However, the 
quoted and relative bid ask spreads increase (liquidity decrease) significantly due to the    
earnings announcement. The interaction term β3 in effective spread model is insignificant 
showing that the bid-ask spreads does not change due to trading volume change after earnings 
announcements. However, the interaction terms β3 for quoted and relative spread model are 
significant and shows that quoted and relative spreads decrease (stock liquidity increase) by 
0.04% due to the interaction of 1% increase in trading volume. Finally, the interaction term 
β5 is statistically insignificant in three spread models showing that the change due to event 
(associated with intercept dummy) is constant effect.  
β4 and β6 are significant for three measures of bid-ask spread, which shows that stock       
liquidity is explained by the price and price volatility.  
The Sargan test is insignificant, shows the appropriateness of the instrumental variables. The 
R2 indicates that 38% of the variation in the liquidity is explained by the quote model, 26% is 
explained by relative model, and 17% is explained by the effective model.  
Models might suffer from auto-correlation and outlier in data based on the result of first order 
Lagrange Multiplier test performed on the first difference of the residuals, and Jacque-Berra 
test for normality.  
 
 Table 4.4.2.2 NASDAQ 100. Multi variate analysis of the long term impact of earnings 
announcement on stock market liquidity 
 
Coefficient  Variables  Quote 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Relative 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Effective 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Constant 
𝛼j 
Αi -4.82*** -4.82*** -5.73*** 
β1 Dt 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.74*** 
β2 lnVolume -0.09*** -0.09*** 0.03*** 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.07*** 
β4 LnPrice 0.51*** -0.49*** 0.47*** 
β5 LnPrice*Dt 0.045 0.045 0.018 
β6 Moving StDev 3.10*** 3.11*** 6.70*** 
𝛼j [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(1) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
J statistic 15.9 15.9 11.98 
Sargan test 0.42 0.42 0.33 
NORM(2) 0 0 0 
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.35 0.13 
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
The sample in the table above consists of 96 NASDAQ 100 firms that have data available for 
181 days around earnings announcement date in the financial year 2010-2012. A log linear 
panel fixed effects regression model estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) 
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GMM estimator is used. The panel is used to determine whether the average market liquidity 
of the stock change after earnings announcement after controlling for stock prices, trading 
volume and volatility of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3 and 𝛽5 test if the slope coefficients on 
trading volume and price have changed following earnings announcement. The model has 
following specification: 
 Liquidityit =                                        (            )  
               
 
For j=1, 2 ….90 and t 1, 2; where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 96 
firms on NASDAQ 100, [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement of 
96 firms on NASDAQ 100, [0, +90]. The dependant variable  𝑖  𝑖 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 correspondent to 
either quoted, relative or effective bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted spread is 
defined as the difference between the ask price and the bid price. Relative bid ask spread is 
defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid 
ask spread is defined as twice as much as the absolute value of the difference between the 
transaction price and the mid-price in effect at the time of the trade. 
𝑉   𝑚      𝑖     𝑡          𝑖 𝑡𝑖     Represent the traded volume in money, closing 
price and return volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable  𝑡 is equal to 1 in the 
post earnings announcement period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables apart from 
 𝑡 are taken in their natural logarithms. αj capture the time-invariant unobserved stock 
specific fixed effects. AR (1) is the first order Lagrange Multiplier test performed on the first 
difference of the residuals is because of the transformations involved. Sargan test follow a 
Chi-squared distribution with r degree of   freedom under the null hypothesis of valid 
instruments. NORM (2) is the p-value for the Jarque-Bera normality test. The endogenous 
explanatory variables (all variables apart from  𝑡) in the panel are GMM instrumented 
setting z≥1.  
 
4.4.2.2. Empirical result and explanation for NASDAQ100 
 
The constant 𝛼i for the NASDAQ100 is significant in the entire three bid-ask spreads, which 
means that the differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the stocks are captured by GMM 
estimators.  
After controlling the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, the significance of 
β1 shows that the bid-ask spreads increased (liquidity decrease) on an average by 0.59%, 
0.59%, and 0.74% for quoted spread model, relative spread model and effective spread    
models respectively, after earnings announcements. β2 indicates that bid-ask spreads         
increases by 0.03% when trading volume increases by 1%. Finally the interaction term β3 is 
significant showing that the decrease in bid-ask spreads due to a 1% trading volume change is 
0.05%, 0,05% and 0.07% in quote spread model, relative spread model, and effective spread 
model respectively due to the long term impact of the earnings announcements. Finally, the 
interaction term β5 is statistically insignificant in three spread models showing that the 
change due to event (associated with intercept dummy) is constant effect.  
β4 and β6 are significant for three measures of bid-ask spread, which shows that stock        
liquidity is explained by the price and price volatility.  
The Sargan test rejects null hypothesis of over-identifying instrumental variables shows the 
appropriateness of the instrumental variables. The R2 indicates that 35% of the variation in 
the liquidity is explained by the quoted spread model; 35% is explained by the relative spread 
model, and 13% is explained by an effective spread model.  
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However, the panel does not pass the normality test and the test of the first order residual    
serial correlation, propose a non-linear relationship between variables. The test for normality 
also does not pass, thus propose outliers in the data set.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4.2.3. S&P 100. Multi variate analysis of the long term impact of earnings       
announcement on stock market liquidity 
 
Coefficient  Variables  Quote 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Relative 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Effective 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Constant 
𝛼j 
Αi -4.75*** -4.75*** -11.96*** 
β1 Dt 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.35*** 
β2 lnVolume -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.40*** 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.01 -0.01 -0.26*** 
β4 LnPrice 0.63*** -0.37*** 0.65*** 
β5 LnPrice*Dt 0.055 0.055 -0.006 
β6 Moving StDev -1.74 -1.74 10.92** 
𝛼j [0.00] [0.00] 0.04*** 
AR(1) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
J statistic 44 44 41 
Sargan test 0.31 0.31 0.49 
NORM(2) 0 0 0 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.14 0.04 
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
The sample in the table above consists of 100 S&P firms that have data available for 181 
days around earnings announcement date in the financial year 2010-2012. A log linear panel 
fixed effects regression model estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM 
estimator is used. The panel is used to determine whether the average market liquidity of the 
stock change after earnings announcement after controlling for stock prices, trading volume 
and volatility of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3 and 𝛽5 test if the slope coefficients on trading 
volume and price have changed following earnings announcement. The model has following                
specification: 
 Liquidityit =    𝛽    𝛽       𝑚    𝛽       𝑚       𝛽 (    𝑖       )  
𝛽  𝑡           
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For j=1, 2 ….90 and t 1, 2; where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 100 
firms on the S&P, [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement of 100 
firms on the S&P, [0, +90]. The dependant variable  𝑖  𝑖 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 correspondent to either 
quoted, relative or effective bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted spread is      
defined as the difference between the ask price and the bid price. Relative bid ask spread is 
defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid 
ask spread is defined as twice as much as the absolute value of the difference between the 
transaction price and the mid-price in effect at the time of the trade. 
𝑉   𝑚      𝑖     𝑡          𝑖 𝑡𝑖     Represent the traded volume in money, closing 
price and return volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable  𝑡 is equal to 1 in the 
post earnings announcement period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables apart from 
 𝑡 are taken in their natural logarithms. αj capture the time-invariant unobserved stock 
specific fixed effects. AR (1) is the first order Lagrange Multiplier test performed on the first 
difference of the residuals is because of the transformations involved. Sargan test follow a 
Chi-squared distribution with r degree of    freedom under the null hypothesis of valid 
instruments. NORM (2) is the p-value for the Jarque-Bera normality test. The endogenous 
explanatory variables (all variables apart from  𝑡) in the panel are GMM instrumented 
setting z≥1.  
 
4.4.2.3. Empirical result and explanation for S&P100 
 
The constant 𝛼i for the S&P100 is significant in the entire three bids-ask spreads, meaning 
that the differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the stocks are captured by GMM        
estimators.  
After controlling for the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, in the three 
measures of spread model, the significance of intercept dummy coefficient β1 shows that the 
quoted bid-ask spreads increased (liquidity decrease) on an average by 0.09% in quoted and 
relative spread model and 0.35 in effective spread model after earnings announcements. β2 
indicates that bid-ask spreads decreased (liquidity increase) 0.09%, 0,09%, and 0.40% in 
quote, relative and effective spread models respectively when trading volume increases by 
1%. Finally the interaction term β3 is significant in all of the three spread models showing 
that the decrease in bid-ask spreads (increase in liquidity) due to 1% trading volume change 
are 0.01%, 0.01%, and 0.26% for quoted, relative, and effective spread model respectively 
due to t impact of earnings announcements. The interaction term β5 is statistically                
insignificant in three spread models showing that the change due to event (associated with 
intercept dummy) is single effect.  
β4 and β6 are significant for three measures of bid-ask spread, which shows that stock        
liquidity is explained by the price and price volatility.  
The Sargan test is insignificant, shows the appropriateness of instrumental variables. The R2 
indicates that 27% of the variation in the liquidity is explained by the quote model; 14% of 
the variation in the liquidity is explained by relative spread model and 4% by effective spread 
model.  
However, the panel does not pass the normality test and the test of the first order residual    
serial correlation, propose a non-linear relationship between variables.  
 
 
 Table 4.4.3.1 CAC 40. Multi variate analysis of the long term impact of earnings                            
announcement on stock market liquidity 
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Coefficient  Variables  Quote 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Relative 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Effective 
Bid-ask 
spreads  
Constant 
𝛼j 
Αi -4.76*** -4.76*** -5.36*** 
β1 Dt 1.67*** 1.67*** 2.55*** 
β2 lnVolume -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.15*** 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.25*** 
β4 LnPrice 0.84*** -0.16*** 0.91*** 
β5 LnPrice*Dt -0.52 -0.52 -0.44 
β6 Moving StDev 7.37** 7.38** -1.51 
𝛼j [0.00] 0.282366 [0.00] 
AR(1) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
J statistic 36 36 11 
Sargan test 0.19 0.21 0.33 
NORM(2) 0 0 0 
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.26 0.06 
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
The sample in the table above consists of 40 CAC40 firms that have data available for 181 
days around earnings announcement date in the financial year 2010-2012. A log linear panel 
fixed effects regression model estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM 
estimator is used. The panel is used to determine whether the average market liquidity of the 
stock change after earnings announcement after controlling for stock prices, trading volume 
and volatility of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3 and 𝛽5 test if the slope coefficients on trading 
volume and price have changed following earnings announcement. The model has following                
specification: 
 Liquidityit =    𝛽    𝛽       𝑚    𝛽       𝑚       𝛽 (    𝑖       )  
𝛽  𝑡           
 
For j=1, 2 ….90 and t 1, 2; where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 40 
firms on the CAC40, [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement of 40 
firms on the CAC40, [0, +90]. The dependant variable  𝑖  𝑖 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 correspondent to either 
quoted, relative or effective bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted spread is              
defined as the difference between the ask price and the bid price. Relative bid ask spread is 
defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid 
ask spread is defined as twice as much as the absolute value of the difference between the 
transaction price and the mid-price in effect at the time of the trade. 
𝑉   𝑚      𝑖     𝑡          𝑖 𝑡𝑖     Represent the traded volume in money, closing 
price and return volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable  𝑡 is equal to 1 in the 
post earnings announcement period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables apart from 
 𝑡 are taken in their natural logarithms. αj capture the time-invariant unobserved stock 
specific fixed effects. AR (1) is the first order Lagrange Multiplier test performed on the first 
difference of the residuals is because of the transformations involved. Sargan test follow a 
Chi-squared distribution with r degree of freedom under the null hypothesis of valid 
instruments. NORM (2) is the p-value for the Jarque-Bera normality test. The endogenous 
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explanatory variables (all variables apart from  𝑡) in the panel are GMM instrumented 
setting z≥1. 
 
4.4.3. Empirical result and explanation for Euro next Paris 
 
4.4.3.1. Empirical result and explanation for Euro next Paris 
 
The constant 𝛼i for the Euro next Paris is significant in the entire three bids-ask spreads      
models, which means that the differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the stocks are 
captured by GMM estimators.  
After controlling for the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, in the three 
measures of spread models, the significance of β1 shows that the bid-ask spreads increase 
(liquidity decrease) on average by 1.67% after earnings announcements in quoted spread 
model, 1.67% in relative model, and 2.55% in effective spread model. β2 indicates that       
bid-ask spreads decrease (liquidity increase) by 0.17%% associated to 1% trading volume 
increase in quoted and relative spread models, and 15% in the effective spread model. Finally 
the interaction term β3 is significant, showing that the decrease in bid-ask spreads due to 1% 
trading volume change are 0.18%, 0.18%, and 0.25% in the quoted, relative and effective 
spread models respectively due to the impact of earnings announcements. The interaction 
term β5 is statistically insignificant in three spread models showing that the change due to 
event (associated with intercept dummy) is a single effect. β4 and β6 are significant for three 
measures of bid-ask spread, which shows that stock liquidity is explained by the price and 
price volatility. The Sargan statistic is insignificant, rejects the possibility of over identifying           
instrument variables. The R2 indicates that 48% of the variation in stock liquidity is           
explained by the quoted spread model, 26% of the variation in stock liquidity is explained by 
the relative spread model and only 6% of the variation in stock liquidity is explained by the 
effective spread model. The panel does not pass the normality test and the test of the first 
order residual serial correlation, which means theirs, is a non-linear relationship between 
variables and outlier in data set.  
 
4.5. Does information asymmetry account for changes in post earnings announcements 
drifts?  
4.5.1. Bid ask spread decomposition and Information asymmetry component 
 
This part aims at decomposing the bid-ask spread into trading cost and information                        
asymmetry components. As discussed previously in chapter two, it is usually considered that 
the spread helps to cover three different costs: The order processing cost, which includes any 
cost associated with order execution; the inventory holding cost, which includes any cost 
bearing the inventory risk; and finally the information asymmetry cost or adverse selection 
cost, which includes any cost bearing the risk of inferior information compared to other                  
parties. Over the last several decades, there are two important models by Lin, Sanger and 
Booth (1995) and Huang and Stoll (1997) which have been used in empirical studies for 
various purposes. 
 
The Huang and Stoll model (1997), partitions the total effective spread into informed                       
trading, order processing and inventory holding cost components. The model has the                         
following characteristics: Δ𝑃𝑅   𝑖, =𝛽1𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑡+𝛽2𝑖𝑄𝑖,−1+𝛽3𝑄𝐴,𝑡−1+ 𝑖,𝑡 In this model, Huang and 
Stoll (1997) denote  ΔPRICEi, t for a change from the previous retained trade Qit equals 1 if 
the trade at time t was a sale, and equals -1 if the trade at time t was a buy. Trades at prices 
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higher than the prevailing quote midpoint are defined as market maker sells (Qit=1) and 
trades at prices below the prevailing quote midpoint as market maker buys (Qit −1). 
 
 In this model, trades at mid-point are excluded. The QA, t−1 is the aggregate indicator for 
buy and sell, which is equal to 1, -1, or 0 if the sum of Qi, t−1 across all sample stocks is        
positive, negative or zero accordingly to capture market wide pressure on market makers                     
inventory levels. The estimate of β1, i is one half the estimated effective spread, and the                   
estimated adverse selection component is equal to 2(β2, i+β1, i). , is the error term. 
 
The tables below presents the results of coefficient regression from the Huang and Stoll 
(1997) model used to decompose bid ask spread in different window period after earnings 
announcement for indices in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The model has the following 
specification: ΔPRICEi, t β1iQit+β2iQi,t−1+β3QA,t−1+ei,t Where the dependent variable 
ΔPRICEi,t is the daily closing price change. Qit equal 1 (-1) if the trade at time t was a sell 
(buy). Trades at price above the prevailing quote midpoint as market maker sells (Qit=1) and 
trades at prices below the prevailing quote midpoint as market maker buys (Qit −1). In this 
model trades at midpoint are excluded. The QA,t−1 is the aggregate indicator for buy and 
sell, which equal 1, -1, or 0 if the sum of Qi,t−1 across all sample stocks is positive, negative 
or zero accordingly to capture market-wide pressure on market makers inventory levels. The 
estimate of β1, coefficient is one-half of the estimated effective spread. According to Huang 
and Stoll (1997), in their model explained that the estimated adverse selection component 
equal 2(𝛽1+𝛽2). HS information asymmetry cost components are reported in percentage. 
 
Table 4.5.1.1. Spread decomposition base on Huang and Stoll model – South Africa 
equity    market. 
 
Period after 
earnings 
announcement  
10 days  20 days  30days  60days  90 days  180 days 
JSE TOP 40 
𝛽1  1.826*** 
[0.00]  
1.661*** 
[0.00]  
1.636*** 
[0.00]  
1.328*** 
[0.00]  
1.291*** 
[0.00]  
1.008*** 
[0.00]  
𝛽2  -0.545*** 
[0.00]  
-0.384** 
[0.03]  
-0.378** 
[0.02]  
-0.444*** 
[0.00]  
-0.362*** 
[0.00]  
-0.231*** 
[0.00]  
HS information 
asymmetry 
component  
2.562 2.554 2.516 1.768 1.858 1.554 
Number of obs. 
(unbalanced 
panel)  
15 20 25 30 35 40 
JSE MID CAP 
𝛽1  0.863*** 
[0.00]  
0.807*** 
[0.00]  
0.796*** 
[0.00]  
0.697*** 
[0.00]  
0.690*** 
[0.00]  
0.662*** 
[0.00]  
𝛽2  -0.357*** 
[0.00]  
-0.391*** 
[0.00]  
-0.40*** 
[0.00]  
-0.360*** 
[0.00]  
-0.351*** 
[0.00]  
-0.315*** 
[0.00]  
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HS information 
asymmetry 
component  
1.012 0.832 0.79 0.674 0.678 0.694 
Number of obs. 
(unbalanced 
panel)  
20 25 30 35 45 60 
JSE SMALL CAP  
𝛽1  0.417*** 
[0.00]  
0.422*** 
[0.00]  
0.383*** 
[0.00]  
0.397*** 
[0.00]  
0.346*** 
[0.00]  
0.323*** 
[0.00]  
𝛽2  -0.307*** 
[0.00]  
-0.295*** 
[0.00]  
-0.24*** 
[0.00]  
-0.255*** 
[0.00]  
-0.228*** 
[0.00]  
-0.214*** 
[0.00]  
HS information 
asymmetry 
component  
0.22 0.252 0.28 0.284 0.236 0.218 
Number of obs. 
(unbalanced 
panel)  
20 25 30 35 45 60 
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,                
respectively. 
 
Table 4.5.1.1 presents that the information asymmetry component in bid-ask spread decreases 
over time in the SA equity market for large stock index such as the JSE Top 40 and JSE mid 
cap. In the JSE top40, the information asymmetry components for time frames: k=10, 20, 30, 
60 and 90 days are 2.562, 2.554, 2.516, 1.768, 1.858, 1.55469 respectively. In the JSE mid 
cap, the information asymmetry component for time frames of: 10, 20, 30, 60, and 90 days 
are 1.012, 0.832, 0.790, 0.674, 0.678, 0.694 respectively. For the smaller indices like the JSE 
Small Cap the information asymmetry component does not change much. 
 
Table 4.5.1.2. Spread decomposition base on Huang and Stoll model – US equity market  
 
Period after 
earnings 
announcement  
10 days  20 days  30 days  60 days  90 days  180 days 
DJIA 
𝛽1 
0.027 
[0.30] 
0.028 
[0.21] 
0.030 
[0.16] 
0.019 
[0.18] 
0.008 
[0.51] 
0.024*** 
[0.00] 
𝛽2 
0.009 
[0.49] 
0.014 
[0.31] 
0.011 
[0.49] 
-0.003 
[0.81] 
-0.017* 
[0.07] 
-0.022*** 
[0.00] 
HS information 
asymmetry 
component 
0.072 0.084 0.082 0.032 0.018 0.004 
Number of obs. 
(unbalanced 
panel) 
254 465 687 1338 2022 3760 
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NASDAQ 100 
𝛽1 
0.062*** 
[0.00] 
0.048*** 
[0.00] 
0.050*** 
[0.00] 
0.029*** 
[0.00] 
0.026*** 
[0.00] 
0.020*** 
[0.00] 
𝛽2 
-0.014* 
[0.08] 
0.004 
[0.56] 
0.003 
[0.61] 
0.004 
[0.36] 
-0.002 
[0.54] 
-0.004 
[0.24] 
HS information 
asymmetry 
component 
0.096 0.104 0.106 0.066 0.048 0.032 
Number of obs. 
(unbalanced 
panel) 
923 1574 2583 5110 7672 13899 
S&P100 
𝛽1 
0.035** 
[0.02] 
0.027** 
[0.02] 
0.038*** 
[0.00] 
0.031*** 
[0.00] 
0.028*** 
[0.00] 
0.033*** 
[0.00] 
𝛽2 
-0.006 
[0.58] 
0.006 
[0.45] 
0.009 
[0.24] 
-0.002 
[0.80] 
-0.015*** 
[0.01] 
-0.022*** 
[0.00] 
HS information 
asymmetry 
component 
0.058 0.066 0.094 0.058 0.026 0.022 
Number of obs. 
(unbalanced 
panel)  
866  1587  2348  4598  6966  12808  
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
In the US equity market, table 4.5.1.2 shows that the information asymmetry component in 
bid ask spread also seems to decrease over time, however, it is not as clear as in the SA 
equity market. Initially in the 10 days’ time frame, the information asymmetry components 
are not as large as they are in a 20 days period. After the 20 days period, the information 
component decreased for all the three indices DJIA, NASDAQ100, and S&P100. 
 
Table 4.5.1.3. Spread decomposition base on Huang and Stoll model – French equity 
market  
Period 
after 
earnings 
announce
ment  
10 days  20 days  30 days  60 days  90 days  180 days  
CAC 40  
𝛽1  0.094*** 
[0.00]  
0.083*** 
[0.00]  
0.069*** 
[0.00]  
0.068*** 
[0.00]  
0.058*** 
[0.00]  
0.050*** 
[0.00]  
𝛽2  -0.035* 
[0.07]  
-0.019 
[0.28]  
-0.037** 
[0.01]  
-0.030*** 
[0.00]  
-0.032*** 
[0.00]  
-0.024*** 
[0.00]  
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HS 
informatio
n 
asymmetry 
component  
0.118%  0.128%  0.064%  0.076%  0.052%  0.026%  
Number of 
obs. 
(unbalance 
panel)  
401  773  1111  2131  3268  6484  
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,                         
respectively. 
 
In the French equity market the Hung and Stoll model information asymmetry component 
also decreases over time. In a 10 , 20, 30 60 and 90 days window time frames, information 
asymmetry components are 0.118; 0.128; 0.064, 0.076, 0.052, 0.026 respectively . Overall it 
was noticed that the information asymmetry component is quite small in the case of JSE 
Small Cap, US market, and the CAC 40. 
 
 
4.5.2. Does information asymmetry explain post earnings announcements drifts?  
 
As discussed in chapter two, over the four decades literature documented that stock prices 
drift after the earnings news, and the size of earnings surprises are directly related to the size 
of drift. Ng et al (2008) reported that size of PEAD is related to size of earnings surprise, 
stock volatility and transaction cost. Ng et al (2008) approach presents that there are strong         
evidences of the relationship between price drift and earnings surprises, stock liquidity, and 
stock volatility. To explore the role of information asymmetry cost component in bid ask 
spread, in this section the panel estimated general least squared regression will be used as   
follows:  
 
𝑀    𝑡        =  𝐴𝑅 
   
                             = 𝛽  𝛽      𝛽       𝛽      𝑉   𝑡𝑖 𝑖𝑡           
 
Where, Market response is cumulative abnormal return of stocks i from event day 0 to day k.  
 
  𝑖, 0 is earnings surprise on the event day 0.  
 
News is the average adverse selection or information asymmetry component of stock i’s    
effective bid ask spread, from event day to day k, calculated based on Huang and Stoll (1997) 
model, presented in tables shown in above section 4.5.2.1. It is calculated as the percentage of 
effective spread time effective spread.  
 
Volatility is the standard deviation of stock i during 70 days pre-earnings announcement, 
from day -90 to day -21.  
 
 𝑖 is error term.  
 
This model uses panel estimated general least squared method. Its characteristics are almost 
similar as the model 4.5.1.1, except the two facts that i) liquidity variable was replaced by 
news; which is the information asymmetry component of the bid ask spread and ii) news are 
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allowed to vary over time instead of taking them as at the time of the event; i.e. news are 
associated with variation in event window length. By allowing news lengthening the post 
event window we capture more changes in the earnings related news. We are mainly concern 
with 𝛽1, the coefficient on the earnings surprise main effect, and 𝛽2, the interaction term 
between earnings surprise and news.  
To evaluate the impact of news on the PEAD, we are mainly concerned with 𝛽2 the 
coefficient of the interaction between earnings surprise and news. 
 
The tables below present the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine 
the market reaction to earnings news for different time frames. The dependent variable is         
cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0, 10]; [0, 20]; [0, 30]; [0, 60]; [0, 90] 
after the earnings announcement. Surprise is observed when the earnings surprise is measured 
as unexpected earning on the event day   𝑖, 0 with the indices that have the abnormal returns 
and trading volume reach its peak on day 1 there will be earnings surprise measured as 
unexpected earnings on day 1, due to many companies releasing information at the market 
close, leading to the largest reaction happening on day 1. News is the information asymmetry 
component in the bid ask spread infer from Huang and Stoll (1997) spread decomposition 
model, Volatility is standard deviation of stock return pre-earnings announcement during the 
period [-90,-20]. This panel fixed effect regression uses General Least Square method. 
 
The results are presented from table 4.5.2.1 to 4.5.2.7. Overall, the results for the SA and 
French equity markets are consistent with hypothesis that firms with higher information 
asymmetry costs have higher market response. The interaction between information variable 
and earnings surprises are significant in SA and French, however there are mixed results    
between positive and negative in the US markets, showing that the impact of information 
asymmetry component in this market is unclear. This might be due to the bias in the earnings 
measurement method or unknown market conditions. As mentioned before, at least we do not 
have specific time of earnings release for firms in the US. The weak results from the US 
stock markets could be a function of a measurement error in the unexpected                      
earnings/earnings surprise.  
 
As expected, earnings surprise main effects are positive and significant in the SA; however 
earnings surprise main effects are not clear in France. The main effects of earnings surprise in 
the US are strong for NASDAQ100 and S&P 100 but not quite strong for DJIA in the US.  
 
Table 4.5.2.1. JSE TOP 40 Market response to earnings announcement and information 
asymmetry cost.  
 
Window 
Period after 
earnings 
announcement  
10days  20days  30days  60days  90days  
Constant  0.0004  
[0.42]  
0.003***  
[0.00]  
0.005***  
[0.00]  
0.012***  
[0.00]  
0.017***  
[0.00]  
𝑼𝑬𝟎  0.740***  
[0.00]  
0.738***  
[0.00]  
0.562***  
[0.00]  
0.115**  
[0.02]  
-0.147***  
[0.00]  
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔  0.021***  
[0.00]  
0.035***  
[0.00]  
0.040***  
[0.00]  
0.053***  
[0.00]  
0.071***  
[0.00]  
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍
𝒊𝒕𝒚  
17.750***  
[0.00]  
13.643***  
[0.00]  
21.533***  
[0.00]  
50.442***  
[0.00]  
67.449***  
[0.00]  
𝑹𝟐  0.89  0.76  0.63  0.48  0.33  
Number of 
Observation  
15 20  25  30  40  
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*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,             
respectively.  
 
In table 4.5.2.1. The interaction term between earnings surprise and news is positive and     
significant; showing that the variation in news interacts with earning surprise can explain the 
change in stock reaction after earnings announcement. Other variable coefficients such as that 
of earnings surprise and the interactions term between earnings surprise and stock volatility 
are positive and significant in different event window lengths. The main effect of earning 
surprise in JSE Top40 is small compared to other indices. As expected, main effect of      
earnings surprise reduces over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5.2.2. JSE Mid Cap Market response to earnings announcement and                  
information asymmetry cost.  
 
Window 
Period after 
earnings 
announcement  
10days  20days  30days  60days  90days  
Constant  0.004***  
[0.00]  
0.005***  
[0.00]  
0.005***  
[0.00]  
0.007***  
[0.00]  
0.008***  
[0.00]  
𝑼𝑬𝟎  1.280***  
[0.00]  
1.392***  
[0.00]  
1.442***  
[0.00]  
1.395***  
[0.00]  
1.199***  
[0.00]  
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔  0.005***  
[0.00]  
0.005***  
[0.00]  
0.006***  
[0.00]  
0.012***  
[0.00]  
0.009***  
[0.00]  
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍
𝒊𝒕𝒚  
-14.670***  
[0.00]  
-19.191***  
[0.00]  
-21.523***  
[0.00]  
-21.669***  
[0.00]  
-  
12.617***  
[0.00]  
𝑹𝟐  0.76  0.71  0.64  0.51  0.36  
Number of 
Observation  
25 30  35  45  60  
*, **, *** Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,             
respectively 
 
In table 4.5.2.2. The interaction terms between earnings surprise and news are positively     
significant; showing that the variation in news interacts with earning surprise can explain the 
change in stock reaction after earnings announcement. Other variables, earnings surprise 
main effect coefficient is positive and significant in different event window lengths until the 
end of period of 90 days post earnings announcement. The interaction terms between        
earnings surprise and stock volatility are negative and significant. Earnings surprise main   
effects are larger than in the case of JSE Top 40. 
 
Table 4.5.2.3. JSE Small Cap - Market response to earnings announcement and            
information asymmetry cost.  
 
Window 
Period after 
earnings 
announcement  
10days  20days  30days  60days  90days  
Constant  0.003***  
[0.00]  
0.003***  
[0.00]  
0.004***  
[0.00]  
0.003***  
[0.00]  
0.002***  
[0.00]  
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𝑼𝑬𝟎  1.268***  
[0.00]  
1.414***  
[0.00]  
1.434***  
[0.00]  
1.590***  
[0.00]  
1.656***  
[0.00]  
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔  -0.002***  
[0.00]  
-0.003***  
[0.00]  
-0.004***  
[0.00]  
-0.004***  
[0.00]  
-0.004***  
[0.00]  
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊
𝒕𝒚  
-5.224***  
[0.00]  
-8.885***  
[0.00]  
-8.418***  
[0.00]  
-10.336***  
[0.00]  
-12.424***  
[0.00]  
𝑹𝟐  0.75  0.64  0.56  0.47  0.39  
Number of 
Observation  
25 30 35 45 60 
*, **, *** Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,             
respectively 
 
In table 4.5.2.3, the interaction terms between earnings surprise and news are negative and 
significant, showing that the variation in news when interacts with earnings surprise can     
explain the change in stock reaction after earnings announcement. Earnings surprise main 
effects and interaction with volatility is significant in different event window lengths.      
Earnings surprise main effects are larger compared to JSE Top 40 and JSE Mid Cap. 
 
Table 4.5.2.4 DJIA  
 
Window 
Period after 
EA  
10days  20days  30days  60days  90days  
Constant  0.0001  
0.76  
-0.002***  
0.00  
-0.001  
0.15  
0.001  
0.19  
0.004***  
0.00  
𝑼𝑬𝟎  1.273***  
[0.00]  
1.006***  
0.00  
0.500***  
0.00  
-0.490***  
0.00  
-0.751***  
0.00  
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔  -0.195*  
0.07  
0.201  
0.63  
0.447  
0.34  
1.067*  
0.09  
-0.666  
0.43  
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊
𝒕𝒚  
-5.460  
0.49  
13.895  
0.15  
65.409***  
0.00  
156.465***  
0.00  
166.255***  
0.00  
𝑹𝟐  0.83  0.70  0.62  0.47  0.28  
Number of 
Observation  
326  610  901  1769  2643  
*, **, *** Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,            
respectively 
 
In table 4.5.2.4, the interaction terms between earnings surprise and news are negative and 
significant over a 10 day window period, and positive and significant over a 60-day period; 
however over a 20, 30 and 90 day period, the interaction terms coefficients are insignificant. 
The results are mixed, providing that the variation in news do not explain for the market     
response after earnings announcement. Earnings news main effect and interaction between 
earnings news and volatility also have mix results. This could be due to the bias in the         
earnings surprise measurement in the US markets. The results provides no evidence that       
information asymmetry cost component can explain PEAD in this sub set of sample. 
 
Table 4.5.2.5 NASDAQ100  
 
Window 
Period after 
earnings 
announcement  
10days  20days  30days  60days  90days  
Constant  0.001  
0.16  
-0.002***  
0.01  
-0.002***  
0.00  
-0.006***  
0.00  
-0.007***  
0.00  
𝑼𝑬𝟎  1.073***  
0.00  
1.254***  
0.00  
1.299***  
0.00  
1.159***  
0.00  
0.519***  
0.00  
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔  -0.234  
0.39  
-0.248  
0.33  
-0.099  
0.71  
0.206  
0.34  
1.275***  
0.00  
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𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍
𝒊𝒕𝒚  
5.793***  
0.00  
-3.064*  
0.09  
-6.183***  
0.00  
1.956  
0.33  
29.652***  
0.00  
𝑹𝟐  0.81  0.70  0.62  0.46  0.25  
Number of 
Observation  
1029  1953  2878  5669  8454  
*, **, *** Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively 
 
As presented in table 4.5.2.5. main effect of earnings surprises are positive and significant, 
however, the interaction terms between news and earning surprise in this regression output 
are not significant for most event window periods, providing no evidence that information 
asymmetry cost component can explain the variation in market response after earnings       
announcement. The interaction terms between earnings surprise and volatility also have 
mixed results. We found no evidence that information asymmetry cost component can        
explain the PEAD in NASDAQ100. Again, the errors in earnings surprises measurement 
have not been taken into account. 
 
Table 4.5.2.6 S&P100  
 
Window 
Period after 
earnings 
announcement  
10days  20days  30days  60days  90days  
Constant  0.002***  
0.00  
0.004***  
0.00  
0.007***  
0.00  
0.011***  
0.00  
0.016***  
0.00  
𝑼𝑬𝟎  0.825***  
0.00  
0.797***  
0.00  
0.764***  
0.00  
0.569***  
0.00  
0.155**  
0.02  
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔  0.022  
0.46  
0.093  
0.29  
1.44  
0.13  
0.362  
0.16  
0.159  
0.40  
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍
𝒊𝒕𝒚  
21.658***  
0.00  
18.653***  
0.00  
22.141***  
0.00  
32.961***  
0.00  
56.360***  
0.00  
𝑹𝟐  0.74  0.64  0.56  0.37  0.21  
Number of 
Observation  
1078  2020  2989  5894  8799  
*, **, *** Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels              
respectively. 
 
Table 4.5.2.6 shows that main effects of earnings surprise are positive and significant; the 
interactions between earnings surprise and volatility are also positive and significant;        
however, the coefficient of interaction terms between news and earning surprise are           
insignificant, providing that the interaction between information asymmetry cost component 
and earnings surprise cannot explain the variation in the market response to earnings           
announcement. 
 
Table 4.5.2.7 CAC40  
 
Window 
Period after 
earnings 
announcement  
10days  20days  30days  60days  90days  
Constant  0.001***  
0.00  
0.004***  
0.00  
0.005***  
0.00  
0.005***  
0.00  
0.005***  
0.00  
𝑼𝑬𝟎  0.333***  
0.02  
0.078  
0.41  
0.331***  
0.00  
-0.713***  
0.00  
-0.642  
0.00  
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔  -1.392**  
0.02  
0.489**  
0.04  
1.749***  
0.00  
1.564***  
0.00  
0.930***  
0.00  
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊 62.634***  75.348***  58.788***  156.534***  143.671***  
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𝒕𝒚  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
𝑹𝟐  0.78  0.71  0.58  0.52  0.38  
Number of 
Observation  
440  835  1207  2333  3526  
*, **, *** Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively 
 
Table 4.5.2.7 shows a significant positive relationship between the interaction term and      
dependent variable, providing that the variation between information asymmetry components 
could provide explanation to the variation in the market response to earnings news. However, 
the single effects of earnings surprise are not clear in 20-day and 90-day window lengths. The 
situation in the French suit to the fact that France is a code law accounting system, where 
earnings news are released to the markets through different channel before the official      
earnings announcement. The uncertainty therefore has been digested in a longer time and 
since pre-earnings announcements period. As mentioned in chapter three in data selection     
process, the event day for French market is defined not by the date of the official earnings 
announcement but the days of the first unofficial release of even partial news regarding the 
earnings of a firm. The interaction between earnings surprise and volatility in French are 
positive and significant. 
 
4.6. Summary  
 
In summary, this part of research investigates if earnings announcement creates a new                     
information environment and how earnings news affects stock liquidity in different markets. 
My expectation is that with an improvement in the information environment, the stocks 
should be traded more and become more liquid. This part of the study however, shows that in 
post earnings announcement period, at first, bid ask spread increases (liquidity decrease) in 
the SA and the US markets. While bid ask spread decreases (liquidity increase) in the French 
market. The reason why bid ask spread increases (liquidity decrease)   in the SA and US                 
equity market is that, when news is released, not everyone react to news the same way and 
also there will be some investors who have advantages over other groups of investors.                    
Therefore, earnings news once released will create a gap between informed and uninformed 
traders. This gap has usually been referred to as information asymmetry component in the bid 
ask spread. When the earnings news is released, this gap increases and it will in turn make the 
total bid ask spread increase. The uninformed traders can infer the extra information the                      
insiders have by observing whatever they buy or sell.   
 Another reason for this is that bid ask spread can be decomposed into the information             
asymmetry component and cost of trading component (which includes inventory holding cost 
and order processing cost) it can also be observed that earnings news not only affect trading 
volume leading to the reduction in the cost of trading, but also increases the information 
asymmetry component in the bid ask spread. 
 
 The overall impact of earnings news on the bid ask spread will be the total of the above two 
effects. If the increase in information asymmetry component is dominant, then the total bid 
ask spread will increase (stock liquidity decreases). If the decrease in cost of trading        
component is dominant, then the total bid ask spread will decrease (stock liquidity increases).    
What happened on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and the US markets suggests that the 
information asymmetry component dominates bid ask spread (stock liquidity) in those two 
common law countries; what happened on the Euronext Paris market suggests that the cost of 
trading component dominated bid ask spread (stock liquidity) in French market.                 
This happened exactly as we expected from a code law country where earnings information is 
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released through different channel before the earnings announcement, and so it plays a less 
dominant role.  
 
Another point of notice in the results is that even though stock liquidity decreases (bid ask 
spread increases) in the common law countries as US and SA, while stock liquidity increases 
(bid ask spread decreases) in the code law country as France, for the period of 90 days post 
earnings announcement, it was observed that over time, stock liquidity increased (bid ask 
spread decreased) in all the three countries: the SA and the US and French markets.                      
This evidence is seen in the gradual decrease in the bid ask spread ratios if we look at the            
different short term periods in tables from 4.3.1.1 to 4.3.1.7. The reason for this, as the time 
passes the information asymmetry in the news have less impact while trading volume still 
increases due to the news and by its own time linear function, leading to the continuous                     
improvement in liquidity.  
 
From the findings using the multi variate analysis to observe the long term impact of earnings 
announcement on stock market liquidity it was observed that in the long term there are two 
side impacts of earnings announcement on stock liquidity and bid ask spread. Earnings 
announcements increase bid ask spread (decrease stock liquidity) as we observe from a 
significant positive intercept dummy variable coefficient 𝛽1. While the trading volume 
increases due to earnings announcement leading to the decrease in the bid ask spread (or 
improvement in stock liquidity) as we observe from significant negative β3. The overall                        
effect will be the total of both the above effects. This finding holds true in multivariate                      
analysis, and this also explains the results of spread effect on earnings announcements. In the 
short term, stock liquidity decreases (bid ask increases) due to immediate impacts of earnings 
announcement. Due to the increase in trading volume after earnings announcement, stock                 
liquidity gradually increases (bid ask spread decrease) by time. This helps to explain both       
situations in common law countries such as the US and the SA, where the information       
asymmetry cost component dominates bid ask spread and while in the code law country such 
as France, cost of trading (inventory holding and order processing cost components)                       
dominates bid ask spread. 
From the findings does information asymmetry cost account for changes in earning             
announcement drift. The regression based on Huang and Stoll (1997) effective spread                        
decomposition model. Huang and Stoll (1997) model directly showed information asymmetry 
cost component (and cost of trading component) in effective spread, this decreased in                  
percentage over time in JSE top 40 and JSE mid cap, and more or less kept at the same                       
percentage for other indices. The final regression is a panel fixed regression, this regression 
allows information component to vary by time. This regression examines whether the 
information component in liquidity play a role in explaining the PEAD. The results from this 
regression reveal that information asymmetry cost component in the bid ask spread account 
for post earnings announcement drift in all the four indices in Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
and for the CAC40 in French market. However, there is very less statistical evidence that 
information asymmetry cost component have relationship with post earnings announcement 
drift in the US market. This problem might be due to the earnings surprise measurement on 
the event as already stated above, that there are a number of firms which announce earnings 
results at the beginning of the market open, and the remainder release earnings information 
after market close. 
 86 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS  
 
Post Earnings Announcement Drift is an anomaly that is robust with a longest history in 
behavioural finance. Over the last four decades, there have been many attempts to solve the 
question what causes the PEAD, however, the main reason for it remains hidden in literature. 
Given the importance of a phenomenon that drives the investors’ behaviours on their way to 
exploit benefits through PEAD, in this thesis I have addressed the three issues:  
 
1)  Evaluated the impacts of earnings news and the effects it has on stock liquidity  
2) Answered the question: Can stock liquidity explain the Post Earnings Announcement 
Drift? i.e. PEAD.  
3) Answered the question does information asymmetry account for change in the Post 
earnings announcement drift? This can be seen in the difference in behaviour demonstrated 
by informed and uninformed traders around the new earnings news. 
 
Given the nature of data set that I collected, this thesis mainly uses three measures of bid ask 
spread to proxy for stock liquidity. The days of earnings announcement were collected with 
great care, in this study. The data sample of this thesis covers 426 firms listed in different 
indices from Johannesburg Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, CBOE, S&P and the Euronext Paris. 
Data samples were collected according to each individual index group with similar 
characteristics, i.e. factors such as firm size, book to market values are all considered the 
same in each index when performing analysis. This assumes that there are no cross-sectional 
variations across firms within one index.  
 
Within the framework of this thesis, not only the highly liquid but also less liquid and illiquid 
stocks in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are being covered. Moreover, this thesis makes a 
comparison between common law accounting countries (US, and SA) and code law 
accounting country (France). With different characteristics of the two types of accounting 
systems, earnings news played different roles, the reason being that in the common law 
system earnings news is released at the announcement date whilst in the code law system, 
earnings news is conveyed to the market up to 3-4 weeks in advance of the earnings 
announcement through various channels. However, it is interesting that in this thesis I have 
observed almost the same types of reactions on the event in both systems: The strongest 
reaction happened on event day [0] and then gradually reduced over time even in the code 
law country as France. The differences are: firstly, there is evidence of pre-earnings 
announcement drift in the code law system; secondly, in the code law system the cost of 
trading component dominates the bid ask spread and stock illiquidity while in the common 
law system the information asymmetry component dominates the bid ask spread and stock 
illiquidity. This thesis has also observed that when the news is released, investors react by 
trading more with both liquid and illiquid stocks, however, when the news ceases, investors 
tend to follow the larger stock and few investors follow small and illiquid stocks. 
  
Chapter Four which was based on descriptive statistic, event study and multivariate analysis 
explores the impact of earnings announcement on stock liquidity in different short term and 
long term scenarios. The analysis is conducted over a period of 90 days prior to actual 
earnings announcement and 90 days after earnings announcement date, based on a sample of 
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426 ordinary 160 common stocks from 3 indices in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 226 
stocks from three main indices in the United States, and 40 major stocks from Euronext Paris 
that have data available on Bloomberg and I-Net database. The methodologies employed in 
this chapter: the market adjusted model of stock returns following traditional event study, 
Multivariate analysis, using the approach of Hedge and Mc Dermot (2003) and Gregoriou 
and Ioannidis (2006); the application of Information Cost Liquidity Hypothesis established 
by Van Horne (1970), Beinesh and Gardner 1995, Hedge and McDermott 2003, and 
Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006). And also the Huang and Stoll (1997) model in explaining 
stock liquidity and PEAD. 
 
Significant positive (negative) stock price reactions to the good (bad) earnings 
announcements are reported, providing a clear evidence of earrings news’s impact on price 
after earnings announcement. The increases and decreases in price are permanent, after the 
change has taken place; price does not go down or up to the original level as shown 
graphically and statistically. The good news has a longer impact while bad news ends 
quickly, except in the case of the NASDAQ100 where the good news for high tech firms 
seems to have more weight. Similarly as in the common law countries such as the US and the 
SA and in the code law country such as France, though earnings information were conveyed 
to the markets up to one month before the earnings announcement date, the reaction is still 
strongest on the announcement date and gradually reduces over subsequent days. 
 
Due to earnings announcement, the information environment is richer and stock will be 
traded more and become more liquid. However, evidence from JSE and from 
NYSE/NASDAQ/CBOE shows that bid ask spread increases and stock liquidity decreases 
after the earnings announcement while evidence from Paris Bourse shows that bid ask spread 
decreases and stock liquidity increases after earnings announcement.  
 
The component of stock liquidity, information asymmetry cost, must dominate in the US and 
SA. Meanwhile, an overall increase in the liquidity in the French market must be dominated 
by inventory holding cost and order processing cost components (or cost of trading 
component). The information content in the common law countries such as the US, and SA 
plays an important role while the information content in stock liquidity in France seems to 
play a less dominant role. Again, this happens as we expected due to the differences in the 
common law countries and code law country, earnings announcement provide more 
uncertainty in the common law system than in the code law system, due to the fact that news 
is conveyed to the market since 1 month before the announcement date through different 
channels. However, note be taken that there is still something surprising here, even though 
the news has been leaked before the announcement, we still see the post earnings 
announcement drift after the official announcement dates.  
 
In the long term, stock liquidity in both common law and code law systems increases with 
time after earnings announcement. This is due to the fact that the information content 
becomes less impacting and diminishes with time, while the trading volume effects caused by 
earnings news still continues, leading to the continuous improvement in liquidity. In both the 
cases, it points out that the information asymmetry component plays a less role when news is 
completely conveyed to the markets.  
. 
 
 This multivariate analysis proved and confirms earnings announcements provide two 
directions of impact on stock liquidity. A part of stock liquidity will decrease immediately, 
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proved by positive sign of intercept dummy variables in the multivariate regression i.e. the 
regression is with stock illiquidity (natural logarithm of bid ask spread) as dependent 
variable, leading to a positive sign of the intercept dummy which means there’s an increase in 
stock illiquidity or a decrease in stock illiquidity due to the event, and this result from the 
increase in information asymmetry during the announcement period. The other part of stock 
liquidity will improve as the trading volume increases after earnings announcement. This is 
shown in the negative slope of the dummy coefficient of the interaction term between dummy 
variable and trading volume i.e. The regression is with stock illiquidity (natural logarithm of 
bid ask spread) as dependent variable, hence the negative sign of slop coefficient of interact 
term means that there is a negative relationship in the function of stock illiquidity or a 
positive relationship in the function of stock liquidity. This conclusion is proven in most of 
the indices, except for a few cases in the effective spread models where the sign of coefficient 
is insignificant. 
  
From what we observed, in the long term there are two side impacts of earnings 
announcement on stock liquidity /bid ask spread. Earnings announcements increase bid ask 
spread (decrease stock liquidity) as we observed from significant positive intercept dummy 
variable coefficient 𝛽1. Meanwhile at the same time, trading volume increases due to 
earnings announcement leading to the decrease in the bid ask spread (or improvement in 
stock liquidity) as we observed from the significant negative β3. The overall effect will be the 
total of both the above effects. This finding holds true in the multivariate analysis, and this 
also explains the results   from information cost liquidity hypothesis application. In the short 
term, stock liquidity decreases (bid ask increases) due to immediate impacts of earnings 
announcement. Due to the increase in trading volume after earnings announcement, stock 
liquidity gradually increases (bid ask spread decreases) over time. This helps to explain both 
the situations that in common law system as the US and the SA, where the information 
asymmetry cost component dominates bid ask spread, and in the code law system as France, 
where the cost of trading (inventory holding and order processing cost components) 
dominates bid ask spread. 
  
Finally, Chapter Four explores the role of information asymmetry cost component in the 
causes of price drift. It used the regression based on Huang and Stoll (1997) effective spread 
decomposition model. Huang and Stoll (1997) model directly infer information asymmetry 
cost component (and cost of trading component) in effective spread, which decreased in 
percentage by time in the JSE Top 40 and JSE Mid Cap and more or less remained at the 
same percentage level for other indices. In an attempt to establish a relationship between 
information asymmetry component and market response, the final regression is a panel fixed 
effect regression, this regression allows information component to vary over time. This 
regression examines whether the information component in liquidity plays a role in 
explaining the PEAD. The results from this regression revealed that information asymmetry 
cost component in the bid ask spread partially account for post earnings announcement drift 
in all four indices in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and for the CAC40 in France. 
However, there is very little statistical evidence that information asymmetry cost component 
has a relationship with post earnings announcement drift in the US market. This problem 
might be due to the earnings surprise measurement of the event as already stated in the 
previous pages, that there are a number of firms announcing earnings results at the beginning 
of the market open, and the rest release earnings information after market has closed. The 
reaction occurs at the time of the event therefore is difficult to calculate correctly.  
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In the end, I conclude from this thesis that, there is very strong evidence to show the 
association between earnings announcement and stock liquidity. The PEAD phenomenon 
therefore can be explained by the change in stock liquidity, the Johannesburg stock Exchange 
and French equity markets prove that the information component in stock liquidity can 
account for the change in post earnings announcement drift. The evidence from US market 
does not prove that conclusively but this may be due to the problem of measurement of 
earnings surprise.  
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